

RESEARCH NOTE

# Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan in the First Year after Deportation in 1937<sup>1</sup>

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Keywords: USSR, history, deportation, Koreans, Uzbekistan.

Koreans had lived on the southern territory of the modern Russian Far East before the arrival of Russian pathfinders in these lands. Therefore, they are an indigenous population of the modern Primorye region in the Russia, although, in the nineteenth century the number of Koreans was relatively small in the south of the Russian Far East. Russian Koreans supported the October Revolution and the fight of the Red Army against the old regime for several reasons. Bolsheviks put forward two principles of the new government—land for peasants and equality of peoples. These principles found a response in the broad mass of the Korean and Chinese populations in the Far East. After their victory, the Bolsheviks kept their promises. An area for ethnic Koreans, called Posiet, in the territory of the Primorye region was created, and Koreans resided in 28 districts in three areas of the modern Primorye region.<sup>3</sup> A Korean Education College was created in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk-city (modern Ussuriysk-city), as well as Korean language schools, a

national theater, Korean-Chinese printers and so on.<sup>4</sup> Korean families usually have many children, so the Korean population in Russia grew at a fast pace. This Korean population fell victim to the policies of deportation, which were applied to many of the non-Russian peoples of the Far East under Stalin. For many decades such deportations were denied, and then when admitted, the documentary materials surrounding them were unavailable. However, in the 1980s with the development of greater accessibility to archives held by the Russian Federation, the stories of such difficult historical moments are once again visible and reachable. This Research Note, in particular, explores the archival material that exists in the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, Государственный архив Российской Федерации, State Archive of the Russian Federation) relating to the deportation of Koreans of Primorye to Uzbekistan.

Clearly, mass ethnic deportations took place in the Soviet Union not only in the 1930s, but in the 1940s as well. In the 1930s, along with the Koreans, the Chinese population of Primorye was deported to Xinjiang and Central Asia.<sup>5</sup> The Polish and German populations of the western fringe of Russia and also the Volga Germans were deported or moved in the 1940s.<sup>6</sup> The Kalmyks, once a branch of the Oliat Mongols, were deported from the northern edge of the Caucasus to Siberia in 1943. There were also many other Caucasian ethnic groups such as the Crimean Tartars (deported to Uzbekistan in 1944), the Balkars (deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944), and the Chechens and Ingushetians (also deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944), all transferred against their will. These deportations sit inside a distinct category of state practices in the Soviet Union of the time, but they also sit within a wider category of deportation and population transfers in the first half of the twentieth century, such as the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, the population exchanges between Turkey and Greece in 1923, and between Romania and Bulgaria in 1940. Moments of ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–2001, between Croat, Bosnian, Albanian, and Serb populations and their militaries and paramilitaries continue the relevance of studying this form of state strategy and practice from a historical perspective.

In the timeframe of this research note, the authorities of the Soviet Union had thoroughly prepared for these deportations of ethnic groups in the Russian Far East. Firstly, eminent people of the NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennyh Del/ Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), who were highly experienced and capable of tough action, were sent from Moscow to the Far East in order to direct the bureaucracy involved and manage the process. For example, Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov,<sup>7</sup> the confidant of the People's Commissar of NKVD Yezhov, took an active part in a number of

high-profile cases of deportation and was transferred to the Far East to carry out large-scale repression, including that against Koreans. Before the deportation began, a list of Koreans, who lived in the southern part of the Far East, was confirmed. On 21 August 1937, Stalin and Molotov signed the first order regarding the deportation of the Korean population. According to this document, the eviction of Koreans was to be undertaken in three stages. The first stage was the deportation of Koreans from the border areas, and the second and the third stages were deportations from the hinterland of the region, depending on their location in relation to the border. The deportation of the Korean population from the Far East to Central Asia was planned to be finished by 1 January 1938.<sup>8</sup>

In September 1937, NKVD troops began the process of the eviction of the Korean population from the southern part of the Far East. According to general estimates, from the Far Eastern Region 171,781 people were transported (according to other sources, approximately 175,000 Koreans were transported to Central Asia),<sup>9</sup> who were in 36,442 families. Yet this did not mean that all Koreans were deported from the Far East. A few Koreans were not repressed for a number of reasons. The deportation itself was poorly organized in practical terms and led to numerous victims already on the way. Thus, as a Zinaida Yuirova Anakhovich (maiden name Khagai) recalled:

Me and my family were on the way from the Far East for three months, we arrived at the Golodnaya Steppe railway station in Uzbekistan. We were actually dropped off in an absolute bare steppe. My family—parents and four kids—was evicted from Primorye Region, Zarech'ye village in Mikhailovskij district, a district on the border area ... We arrived—four children and parents. We were the only family, in this echelon, to stay fully preserved, who handled the trip. Parents told us that all families lost their children, or even two or three. We, Koreans, all had families with many children back then ... There was a diversion on the way, a crash—we, Koreans, were being destroyed in the best way. On purpose.<sup>10</sup> At every stop someone was buried—parents, kids, the elderly. People were dying. This story is rough, dark and very sad (sighs). We were taken to a steppe and, in fact, abandoned. I was born in May, I was three to five months old, when we were taken on a train in September, and dropped off in December. The oldest child was seven years old.<sup>11</sup>

Another victim of the deportation, A.I. Pak, recalled, that “we were deported in November or December. Mom thought it was a mistake, and we were temporarily taken away. Parents were uneducated.”<sup>12</sup> At the beginning of the winter in 1937–1938, groups arrived in Central Asia. The Koreans had to live in hastily built dugouts, which did not serve most well—a third of all nursing infants did not survive that winter. Many elderly people also died.<sup>13</sup> The same Z.Y. Anakhovich recalled, how in winter,

we lived in a dugout and then moved to a barnyard ... We were eating herbs. We ate quinoa, dandelions, chives. Parents were walking far—50 km and further, looking for herbs. The state gave us flour as supplies—we were baking flat cakes ... Without herbs we would not survive. From the beginning of the New Year we began to organize a collective farm. After all, Koreans have always been engaged in agriculture ... In that year, winter was short, spring was early, and thus we were looking for dandelions and spinach in the snow ... It was forbidden for us to leave the settlement further than 35 km away. Thus, adults went looking for herbs outside this zone at night, so no one could see them—it was very scary.<sup>14</sup>

As related by A.I. Kim.

our family was sent to a settlement by Surum station on the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan [now known as Kyzylarykskij rural district]. It is a hilly terrain with stony soil, swampy and overgrown lowlands. Uzbeks looked at those who arrived with surprise. Receipts for livestock and harvest abandonment in Primorye had to be thrown away. Aleksandr and his younger brother got measles.

A.I. Kim also remembers that “his sister Kim In-Su, aged 19, went missing in the steppes of Uzbekistan.”<sup>15</sup>

As we can see, the reception of immigrants was not organized. Koreans were dumped on any territory possible. The local population was also not ready for the reception of immigrants. Hence, rumors spread about the Koreans being “cannibals.” This situation occurred not only in Kazakhstan but also in Uzbekistan.<sup>16</sup>

During resettlement, a part of the Korean population was placed in areas where it was impossible to farm, worse than if the land had been difficult to farm. The same thing happened to Koreans who were fishermen by trade.<sup>17</sup> Only after a lot of human suffering and many victims did the Soviet leadership decide to move the deported population to places where farming was possible.<sup>18</sup> During the resettlement, a number of Korean families ended up in the Astrakhan and Rostov regions, where they could fish. In 1941–1942, due to attacks by the armies of Hitler’s Third Reich on the south of the Soviet Union, Koreans were used in the construction of defensive fortifications and later were also moved to Central Asia.

The exact number of deaths of Koreans during and after the deportation from the Far East is unknown as no one kept a full track of such losses. Hypothetically, we can assume, if every family lost on average one person during the deportation, then only the transportation from one place to another on its own took no less than 30,000 human lives, mainly children and elderly people, since there were 36,442 families. In addition to these numbers there are a few thousand Koreans who died in the dungeons of the NKVD and in camps. The first winter

in Central Asia also cost the lives of many young and elderly people. Thereby, we can conclude that the losses from the Korean population were not less than 40,000 people—about every fourth Korean who was forcibly deported. Thus, in percentage terms, Soviet Koreans were one of the nations who suffered the most during Stalin's repressions. However, they were not declared "enemies of the people" by the Soviet government.

The difficulty of the situation was that the deported population was turned out in an unfamiliar region that was unprepared to support communities in making a living. That is why the Korean population was not ready to adapt to the new conditions straight away, the deported had no information at all on their new home areas. Moreover, the main element of the Korean deportees was included in collective farms, where work was planned across large areas, although, in the Far East, Korean peasants had worked in Chinese-Korean garden beds, which specialized in harvesting several multiple crops in a relatively small cropping area.<sup>19</sup> In Central Asia, the Koreans were settled on various collective farms, which conducted a completely different type of farming. Therefore, forced immigrants faced difficult conditions of transition into another farm system. They did not even have time to adapt in a new region.

Korean families that travelled from the Far East to Central Asia were in poor economic condition. They had owned a number of domestic goods and property prior to deportation, however, the situation changed after forced resettlement. The Soviet state allocated a large number of building materials for the resettlement of immigrants in Central Asia. In addition, on average 1,600 rubles were allocated for each family. Therefore, according to general plans, good conditions (land, cattle, building materials, financial support) were provided for those deported. However, in reality, the supply of Korean collective farms proved to be clearly insufficient. This was true when it came to the quality of land they were offered—they were only getting 0.5 to 1 hectare of irrigated land.

The process of further transportation of Korean families later continued, which caused additional confusion. The A.I. Kim mentioned previously remembers: "in 1939 the family was sent to Nizhnechirchikskij district, and later to a collective farm called after Dimitrov in Soldatskij (Golovinskij) district." In some cases, Korean collective farms were loaned property to support the deported populations in amounts that exceeded the credit-worthiness of the collective farms,<sup>20</sup> and this drove them into debt.

A similarly difficult situation regarding immigrants who remained in the Uzbek SSR. Initially, the plan involved 4,685 semi-detached houses for Korean collective farm workers. However, by 20 September there were only 348 houses that were 25 to 50% completed. House construction plans for Korean workers and

employees were affected just as much. The plan was to build 350 houses, but the construction was finished with only 61 houses.<sup>21</sup> The houses for immigrants were mostly unfinished, without floors, ceilings and interior work, and the costs of their construction was significantly high.<sup>22</sup> In autumn 1938, Sovnarkom<sup>23</sup> of Uzbek SSR reported to Moscow that 34,872,200 rubles had been spent on the resettlement of Koreans, which was equal to 85% of all the years of allocation, although, in reality, the construction plan was completed with less than 10% done.<sup>24</sup>

The irrigation construction plan for Korean collective farms was also not completed. The problem was not only delay in the hydrological infrastructure. There was also a lack of building materials, which local leaders simply forgot to deliver to the places of work on the farms.<sup>25</sup> This had a negative effect on the crop production and output of Korean collective farms. Another serious impact for them was the activity of the motor technical stations. They finished soil and crop processing on the fields of immigrants after a significant delay, and the autumn ploughing was generally thwarted.<sup>26</sup>

Calculations with migrants for their property left behind in the Far East (including movable and immovable property, growing crops, fresh produce, livestock) amounted to 9,416,500 rubles which was not been fully distributed.<sup>27</sup> In total, 41,035,000 rubles were allocated for the arrangement of migrants. By 20 September 1938, 34,872,200 rubles had been spent by the local authorities, but there was no report for a significant part of this amount,<sup>28</sup> and thereby part of this money had been misused.

Schools for Koreans were unfinished. Thirty-one schools for Koreans had been planned for construction in Uzbekistan. Although, by 10 September 1938, the average readiness of these schools was only 29.7%.<sup>29</sup> A.I. Kim also has memories about school in that period of time: “there were no school supplies, only a pencil, notes, and an eraser.”<sup>30</sup> He found that his studies could not go on because “I was constantly hungry.”

The food supply of Koreans was also unsatisfactory. In particular, a regular supply of baked bread was not provided; there was a lack of fat, fish, and vegetables. There was a special need for children’s clothing and footwear, and the retail network was also unfinished. Health centres, hospitals, and obstetric clinics were not finished on time either.<sup>31</sup> A number of places also lacked a supply of drinking water. According to A.I. Kim: “at the Surum station there was a big problem with drinking water. Water was delivered several kilometres away. It was carried on foot. It was of very bad quality.”<sup>32</sup>

Sovnarkom of Uzbek SSR released for other organisations over 200 wagons of wood, three wagons of nails, 56 tons of high-quality roofing iron, and so on. However, these materials had been intended for Koreans. In addition, a significant

amount of building materials were not moved from the railway stations. Out of 4,168 wagons of wood, only 1,981 were unloaded.

The situation also worsened when a part of the sawmill materials for RSFSR migrants was not delivered to the republics of Central Asia on time—6,239 wagons were brought instead of 9,652.<sup>33</sup> A substantial amount of the wood was rotten, affected by fungus; in some cases, the standards required were not met.<sup>34</sup> By 8 October 1938, around 500 wagons of wood, 120 tons of nails, 2,100 boxes of glass, 590 roofing rolls, 150 tons of linseed oil, 2.5 million bricks, 16 tons of wire, and other materials<sup>35</sup> still had not been moved from the base warehouses for Korean migrants. The monitoring of funds by collective farms was also not undertaken or managed. However, Korean collective farms managed to strengthen themselves economically in such distress.<sup>36</sup> Migrants managed to pull themselves together in these difficult conditions and start a fight for survival.

Some migrants looked for alternative ways to achieve the necessary construction. According to A.I. Kim:

The houses were being built. Old men advised chopping reeds and knitting mats for the roof and walls. The reeds were covered with clay, then this surface was burned. Reed stalks burned out and the clay became solid as a rock. That is how they got bricks.

It was very difficult to dig dugouts. There was no equipment. The walls in a dugout were laid with clay bricks, which were made of wheatgrass and clay. Beds were made of reeds. 15 to 20 cm of reeds were stacked, then pressed with wire or rope, and tied in an interval of 10 to 15 cm in the shape of a mat. The ends of the mat were precisely cut off. Such mats were suitable for the roof, bed bases, wall insulation, and much more. The walls of the houses were made of tightly bundled brushwood; the rooves was covered with rice straw.<sup>37</sup> Such houses naturally were fire hazards, however, they were cheap and easily built.

During the difficult times, on the collective farm, people were eating the bark of trees, kurmak grain (weed), rice hulls (rice husks), and quinoa. There was a difficult situation with clothes. People were wearing long shirts, that is, underwear and a shirt at the same time. The shirt was sewn at the bottom so it would not ride up from the wind. There was no footwear at all. For the winter, people made something like bast shoes<sup>38</sup> or clogs from straw. They lasted two to three days. Worn car tires that were issued for working days were highly valued. Shoes called “torigi”<sup>39</sup> were made of worn car tires.

In 1938 Koreans had sown 10,000 hectares, from which there were 4,220 hectares of rice, 158 hectares of cotton, and 5,632 hectares of grain and garden crops. From 1.5 to 2 hectares of sowing accounted for one collective farm and in



Figure 1 Torigi (this picture was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018).

districts with rain-fed farming, up to 4 hectares. Koreans harvested a bumper crop of rice (from 20 to 29 centners<sup>40</sup> from a hectare) in 1938. In many local collective farms, where in recent years the harvest did not exceed 8 to 10 centners from a hectare, Koreans were harvesting more than 20 centners. Uzbek collective farmers thought that the reason behind this is that Koreans cultivate and process rice very well.<sup>41</sup>

Whereas, it must be noted, that before the deportation Koreans were not involved in rice growing in large amounts at all; moreover, the climatic and sowing conditions in Central Asia were completely unfamiliar to them. A.I. Kim recalls: “in spring 1938, we started to develop the land. We were sowing wheat and sugar beet. Rice checks were arranged. The weeds growing next to rice were being ripped out four times a season. Korean women were wearing tights and stockings to protect themselves from the insects living in the water.”<sup>42</sup> Moreover, this did not turn out to be the limit of rice production—A.I. Kim recalls that: “in 1938 the harvest was quite good. In 1939 the harvest was even larger ... Rice crop turned out to be good: in our collective farm the land was productive and 40–41 degree temperatures also contributed to this. There was no fertilizer, so the fields had to be changed.”<sup>43</sup>

Aside from the harvest, Koreans were always looking for options to earn extra money. From his memories A.I. Kim recalled:

I remember, dad used to work a lot, he was making hats from reeds; in hot weather hats were in great demand, Uzbeks bought them with pleasure. My dad made 30 hats, and the day before the accident (his own death) he was making a lot of jokes: ‘when I sell all the hats, I will feed you properly and I will die in peace.’ And that is exactly what happened. The day was successful, me and



my dad went to the market; it was a 3 km walk. We had sold all the hats and bought a lot of rice candies.

Under the pressure of circumstances, the economic and cultural life of Koreans had begun to change. They began to adopt many customs from the local population or partially change their traditions under local influences. For example, they lost the culture of cultivating garden beds and all the traditions and skills associated with them. Instead, the cultivation of bakhcha<sup>44</sup> took on a primary cultural role. This situation also affected Korean cuisine—some dishes disappeared due to the lack of components and ingredients (for example, spicy red caviar, small shrimp in fried pig blood) or changed under the influence of local traditions (this way, instead of *kaduri*, local *kozinaki* appeared.)<sup>45</sup> Dishes from local cuisines, such as *plov*, also appeared in the Korean diet.

After all these changes, some customs and rules remained the same among the Koreans. For example, according to A.I. Kim a custom of the ““red passport” remained, noting the name and surname of the deceased: “There were seven words written for men and eight words written for women. If there is no passport, then the soul of the person could not be accepted in the other world.” The same went for keeping holidays such as *asyandi* (асянди, the first birthday of a child), Eastern New Year, and many other customs and traditions. As we can see, despite the adversity, remnants of religious cultural components still remained.

Koreans were able to instil in the local population some of their ways of doing business. A.I. Kim recalled:

Uzbeks were engaged in pastoral activities back then. They knew very little.<sup>46</sup> And when Koreans were fishing in water reservoirs, Uzbeks were surprised: what is it and what is its purpose? They did not know themselves, that fish can be eaten. Koreans appeared weird to them due to different culture and customs (Koreans were eating fish, garlic, and pork).<sup>47</sup>

However, afterwards, the local Uzbeks adopted the consumption of garlic and fish from Koreans.

The central authorities in (Moscow) drew attention to the arbitrariness of the SSR administrations’ approach to Korean immigrants only in 1938–1939. During the organization of settlements with Koreans in Central Asia even the administrative structures of Primorye region and Khabarovsk region also got involved. As a result, all migrants who had exchange receipts for horses were given the animals.<sup>48</sup> Before that, they were not given horses at all, although the final settlement of such receipts was not fully carried out.

Whereas the leadership of both Central Asian republics requested a second budget from the RSFSR for the resettlement of Koreans in 1939 in their regions,

it is not exactly known why that was done, perhaps for the elimination of the negative results of their own actions or attempts to continue corrupt activities. Whatever the reasons for the request, the republics were ultimately refused by Moscow so far as this request was concerned. However, Moscow still allocated 1,835,0000 rubles by 1939 for migrants to reside in the Kazakh and Uzbek SSRs (including deported Koreans), in addition to the amount previously used for the deportation and the deportees' needs, although, the state monitored spending of this further amount. In addition, building materials were allocated for 1939,<sup>49</sup> in particular, more than 90,000 cubic meters of lumber.

It is necessary to note the huge number of arbitrary acts and lawlessness of the Uzbek SSR authorities towards the migrants. While the local population of both republics tried to somehow help Koreans in many cases,<sup>50</sup> officials robbed them. Numerous instances of materials issued to external organizations demonstrate that there had been a high level of corruption. The seizure of houses, the use of collective farm transport at will, unauthorized salary cuts for Korean collective farmers, the theft of money from the budget all show the level of lawlessness of local authorities.

For a long time in the CIS countries (including Russia) the losses of the Korean population during the deportation were considered to be the results of policies imposed by the central authorities of the USSR.<sup>51</sup> Undoubtedly, the death of most people during the forced move from the Far East to Central Asia lies on the consciences of the Moscow organizers of the first ethnic mass deportations. Nevertheless, as we can see, the majority of deaths among Koreans in the first year of deportation had other reasons, particularly the actions and inactions of the authorities of the republics in Central Asia regarding the migrants. However, despite numerous instances of arbitrariness undertaken by the administrations of Uzbekistan and the heavy loss of life and property, Koreans were able to survive and even thrive there. They were able to rebuild quite quickly and adapt to the new living conditions, although, it was at a great cost.

The evaluation of the archival material in this Research Note shows that, in its essence, the Korean deportation had mixed outcomes. In previously published works it was asserted that this process also had economic goals.<sup>52</sup> But in terms of results, this deportation mostly brought financial losses to the state. The economic benefits from the relocation of Koreans in the Far Eastern region (the confiscation of property and livestock and the transport of active peasants to Central Asia) could not cover the huge financial costs for settlers in Uzbekistan. The reasons for these losses rest in the actions of authorities in Central Asia (corruption, arbitrariness, requests for allocation of new financial investments in 1939 to compensate their actions, and other frauds) as well as in the unaccounted additional expenses

(i.e., buying a fishing fleet for the settlers, additional transportation of population, and other costs) involved in the deportation and relocation of Koreans in these new territories.

## Notes

1. This publication was supported by the 2020 Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2020-R06).
2. Dr. Alexander Kim, Associate Professor, Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service, Institute of Law, Department of International Relations and Law (Russian Federation); Dr. Mariia Surzhik, Leading Engineer, Federal Scientific Center of the East Asia Terrestrial Biodiversity (Institute of Biology and Soil Science), Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok; Dr. Aleksei Mamychev, Professor, Laboratory of Political and Legal Research, Moscow State University (Russian Federation).
3. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow), Fond 1235. Opis`130. 1935. delo. 3, Lists 20–21.
4. S. G Nam. *Koreiskii natsional'nyi raion: Put' poiska* (Moscow: Nauka, Glavnaiia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1991); Kim Iosif, *Sovetskii koreiskii teatr* (Alma-Ata: Oner, 1992).
5. Vladimir Baturov. “Repressii protiv Kitaitsev v stalinskom Sovetskom Soiuzhe.” *Velikaia epokha*, 27 April 2010: 1–2.
6. P Polian. *Ne po svoei vole ... Istoria i geografia prinuditel'nykh migracij v SSSR* (Moscow: Memorial, 2001).
7. In future Lyushkov defected to the Japanese and actively collaborated with Japanese Secret Services in work against his homeland. He organized two Stalin assassination attempts. In 1945 he was killed in Dairen by Japanese officers as Japan was defeated by the allies, and he had knew too much about Japanese Special Services, it was dangerous to keep him alive. Since he refused to commit suicide, he was killed by the Japanese themselves in an escape attempt.
8. Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow). Fond 3. Opis` 58. delo 139. Lists 1–2. Protocol № 52.
9. N.F. Bugai. “Vyselenie sovetskikh koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka,” *Voprosy istorii* 5 (1994): 141–148.
10. We assume that eyewitness meant a train wreck with Korean deported population on board. One train, heading to Central Asia with Korean migrants, on the 12th of September 1937 derailed on the stretch between the stations Dormidontovka—Khaka, as a result, more than 20 forced migrants died, around 50 were injured (Zemskov V.N. *Spetspere-selentsy v SSSR: 1930–1960* (Moscow, Nauka. 2005), pp. 164–166). Later it turned out, that this accident was likely a misadventure. It was quite possible for another reason—due to wear and tear of railway tracks at that time (Gnatovskaya, Elena and Kim, Alexander. “K voprosu ob otnoshenijah mezhdū dal'nevostochnymi zheleznodorozhnikami i Sovetskim rukovodstvom s nachala 1930-h gg. do 1945.” (On the question of the relationships between far eastern railway workers and the Soviet leadership from the beginning of the 1930s to 1945) *Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*, 42.3 (2015).
11. Sergei Mukhanov. Deportatsiia koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka. “Ia vyzhila tol'ko blagodaria liubvi i zabote roditel'ei.” *Smolenskaia gazeta*, 1 February 2011.
12. Conversation with A.I. Park was in October 2019.
13. Andrei Lan'kov. Koreitsy SNG: stranitsy istorii. *Seul'skii vestnik*, 13 February 2002.
14. Sergei Mukhanov. Deportatsiia koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka.
15. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.

16. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
17. GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis` 29, delo 49, Lists 29–30.
18. GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis` 29, delo 49, List 35.
19. More thoroughly, we are viewing this subject in the article “Chinese-Korean garden bed—specification of use in the Far East of Russia”.
20. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. Lists 48–49.
21. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 73.
22. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 72.
23. Sovnarkom- Совет народных комиссаров/Council of People’s Commissars. In was a Government of Soviet Republics.
24. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 54.
25. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 65–68.
26. Autumn ploughing—digging the ground in autumn—is considered an important preparatory stage before the planting in spring.
27. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 71.
28. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 70.
29. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 73.
30. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
31. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 39.
32. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
33. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 34.
34. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 16.
35. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 55.
36. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 31.
37. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
38. Braided bark shoes covering only the foot.
39. See Appendix 1.
40. A centner is a measure of weight, known in India as the Quintal, and in English as the Hundredweight. Historically a Hundredweight was equivalent to 100 Lb, but in the Soviet Union, a centner was measured as a 100 metric kilograms, so therefore one centner= 100 kg. In this case a hectare could produce between 2000 and 2900 kg of rice.
41. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 23.
42. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
43. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
44. Bakhcha—a large field, generally covered by watermelons, melons and pumpkins. Usually located far from settlements. It is usually common in Central Asia, although, after the 1950s Soviet Koreans has brought this system to the Far East. As a result, bakhcha also was also covered by cucumbers and other crops.
45. Alexander Kim. “Wõndonnamtchoke issnũn rõsia koryõinũi ũmsike taehan ũmune huanghae,” in: *Chõnt’ongmunhwaũi kyesũnggwa pojõn: hyõnsidae chosõn(han)minjok sae walmunhwa yõn’gu* (Yanji: Yanbian University Press, 2016).
46. We assume that this was not related to all Uzbeks, but only to a group that lived in that area.
47. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
48. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 16. List 85.
49. GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 1.
50. In particular, it was confirmed by Lyubov Khwan, who turned up in Kazakhstan after the deportation. The same thing is described by Tsoi Alexei Danilovich, in particular, he wrote that “the local population was convinced that the settlers were certainly not “cannibals”, normal in communication, peaceful, and then began to settle Korean families in their places—some provided a separate room in a house, others provided space in their good solid sheds, helped them to install a stove they could cook on and that would keep the place

warm. In such critical conditions such real qualities of ordinary people as kindness and generosity appear.” (Tsoi Alexei Danilovich. *Dvizhenie k tseli: zhizn` obychnogo sovetetskogo korejtsa* (Moscow: Maks Press, 2016), p. 9).

51. German Kim. *Istoriia immigratsii koreitsev, tom 1: Vtoraia polovina xix v.-1945g* (Almaty: Daik-press, 1999); Nicolai Fedorovich Bugai. “Vyselenie sovetsskikh koreitsev s Dal’nego Vostoka.”
52. Alexander Kim. “The Repression of Soviet Koreans during the 1930s.” *The Historian*. 74.2 (2012): 267–285.

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### *Materials from Russian archives*

Main materials from it was received from Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow) Fond P-5446 contains records about deported people in Middle Asia, almost all documents from this fondy from relate to Koreans, however, among these materials we can see information about other nations.

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