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NATIONAL MARITIME POLICY OF RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL ROUTES

This research is devoted to a topical subject – implementation of the national maritime policy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regional areas. The current political process in Southeast Asia strongly dictates Russia that it shall pursue an effective maritime policy in this region, ensuring its significant role and place in the new realities of the geopolitical space. Rapid changes in the post-Westphalian world order have significantly changed the balance of power in the world. This circumstance places increased demands on the effectiveness of Russia's not only political but also economic component. The Russian Federation, as a great maritime power whose maritime potential ensures implementation and protection of its national interests in any area of the world's oceans, serves as an important factor of international stability and strategic deterrence. This fact makes it possible to conduct an independent national maritime policy as an equal participant in the international maritime activities. In this regard, the tasks set in the presidential Decree № 327 "On Approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period until 2030," dated 25 July 2017 require their practical implementation. The effectiveness of Russia's defense of its political and economic interests depends on the fulfillment of these tasks. Formation of the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) opens up new opportunities for Russia in the implementation of its national maritime policy in this maritime zone. The article discusses in detail the combat composition of the fleet, the construction of new types of ships and their capabilities. The analysis of this problem allows us to outline the main ways of its resolution.

Key words: *Russian national Maritime policy, Kalibr cruise missile carriers, non-nuclear weapons, PLAR, Aug, stealth technology, Indo-Pacific region, far sea zone, NATO.*

In order to protect its interests and ensure its influence on the world military and political situation, the Russian Federation exercises the indisputable right to a naval presence in the strategically important areas of the world's oceans and display of its flag and military force. At the same time, Russia is strictly guided by the principles and norms of international law. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 327 of July 20, 2017 "On Approval of the Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period until 2030" of July 25, 2017 defines that in the field of naval activities, the state policy is a set of measures united by a common plan aimed at ensuring and implementing Russia's national interests in the world ocean [3].

In our opinion, one of the key directions for Russia in implementing its maritime policy in South-East Asia is the **Pacific and Indo-Pacific regional directions** formulated in the Russian Maritime Doctrine. There is no doubt that this region has a powerful economic and military-political potential, affects all modern international political processes, and Russia's place here should ensure the implementation of the tasks set by the President of the Russian Federation in Decree No. 327 of July 20, 2017 in the field of Maritime activities [3]. At the same time, it is important to take into account the fact that many countries of the Asia – Pacific region are interested in forming a new geopolitical region on the map – the **Indo-Pacific region** (**IPR**) [5]. But what is the role and place of Russia in the formation and development of the Indo-Pacific region? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the problem in two aspects: political-economic and military

Political-economic aspect. Despite the fact that the term "Indo-Pacific region" is accepted by the expert community and the political establishment in the West in Russia issues related to it are not discussed in expert or political circles. Obviously, there is a serious explanation for this. We can assume that the birth of a new geopolitical region in some sense goes against the global integration project "Greater Eurasia – a partnership for all," a project that should be open to all countries of the Eurasian space, including European countries. When announcing this project at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016, Vladimir Putin said: «We and our partners believe that the Eurasian economic Union can become one of the centers for forming a broader integration circuit" [4]. In addition, there is another aspect of this issue – active political and economic support for China as a strategic partner, which does not allow us to actively support the development of the Indian-Pacific region.

This is the contradiction of Russia's foreign policy. Considering the concepts of foreign policy and economic development of the states of the region, we can assume that inclusion of these countries in the "Greater Eurasia" project would have a favorable impact on the overall development of the project, as well as on the economy of Russia as a whole. If the territories of the countries are combined, various transport routes will be available: land and sea, including the waters along the Asian coasts of "Greater Eurasia." In this case, the Russian Far East, which occupies the most favorable geopolitical position, will be located at the junction of these territories in case of unification, giving Russia significant benefits as an economic cluster.

This is another step for Russia to regain its historical role as the center of Eurasia (Heartland).

In these circumstances, Russia's participation in the formation and development of the Indo-Pacific region becomes a necessity. Moreover, Russia should become a key player here, creating its own economic development strategy that would maximally express its geopolitical interests in this region. By combining the concepts of the "Northern sea route" and "Greater Eurasia," combining the efforts of the key players such as China and India, with which Russia has long-term favorable relations, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, and all the economic and political resources of Southeast Asian countries, it would be possible to achieve high economic results. But Russia's participation in the formation and development of the Indo-Pacific region is impossible without the maritime component, as an effective tool for influencing the state's foreign policy activities.

Military-political aspect. At the same time, the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly becoming a zone of military rivalry between the countries of the region. This is an additional factor that complicates the progressive development of trade, economic and political ties among the IPR member countries. What role has history prepared for Russia in these conditions? Naturally, there is no need to talk about any role without a naval component that provides a foreign policy aspect. This is well understood by both political and expert circles in Russia and abroad. Naturally, it is necessary to look for fundamentally new approaches to an effective resolution of the problems of ensuring the political and maritime activities of the state in the far sea zones, such as the Indian-Pacific region in the near, medium and long-term perspectives.

Presidential Decree No. 327 of July 20, 2017 sets out the task of "maintaining strategic stability and international law and order in the world's oceans, including through the effective use of the Navy as one of the main instruments of the Russian Federation's foreign policy" [1]. The doctrine emphasizes that an important component of national maritime policy in the Pacific and Indo-Pacific regional areas is strengthening of positive interaction with the countries of the region turning it into a zone of peace, stability and good-neighborliness, ensuring the naval presence of the Russian Federation in these distant sea zones on a periodic basis or as necessary [1]. It is almost impossible to perform these tasks with the existing combat forces and means either in the short or medium term perspectives.

During the meeting on the development of the armed forces and defense industry in Sochi on December 2, 2019, Vladimir Putin stressed that the Navy will receive two dozen surface, underwater and auxiliary ships and more than four hundred units of missile and torpedo weapons. The Russian President mentioned that these will be 23 carriers of Kalibr cruise missiles, hypersonic Zircons, new-generation submarines such as Borey-A and Yasen-M, as well as surface ships of the far sea zone. Their coming will ensure our permanent presence in the far sea zones, including the Pacific and Indian Ocean regional destinations.

Recent trips of heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great" to the shores of Cuba and Venezuela or visit of our rocket carrier "Moscow" to the Republic of South Africa do not mean the constant presence of our fleet in the distant maritime zones, as the zone of its responsibility are the Barents, Baltic, Japanese and Black seas and only partially the Mediterranean sea. The tasks that the detachments of warships of the Pacific and Black sea fleets solved in the distant ocean zone in the framework of combat training and naval presence in the operationally important areas and of ensuring the safety of civilian navigation in the Horn of Africa and near the Somalia coast about 10 years ago are not an indicator of a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean region. Although some combat experience was accumulated and it was useful in 2014-2018 in campaigns near the shores of Syria.

The main reason for this is the systemic crisis that Russia experienced in the 1990s. Changes began in 2015, when the small missile ships (MRCs) of the Caspian flotilla project 21631 Buyan-M and 11661K Gepard struck with Kalibrs at terrorist targets in Syria, located at a distance of 1.5 thousand km. It was a spectacular and demonstrative blow for the United States and its allies. A total of 26 missiles were fired at 11 targets. It was a turning point in the modern history of Russian Navy. For the first time ships have struck coastal targets. Moreover, these were the Caspian flotilla ships, which military theorists in the United States and NATO did not take into account because of their location outside of distant sea zones.

This fact has shown that Russia possesses long-range non-nuclear weapons and is ready to hit any target, not only in distant sea zones, but also in any land areas. Moreover, this can be done massively, which plays a crucial role in a combat situation. At the moment, the project 21631 Buyan-M and 11661K Gepard ships, as well as the new project 22800 Karakurt-type MRCs, make up the main strike force of the Caspian flotilla, the Baltic and Black sea fleets. They can potentially hit targets in Asia – from Syria to India – and across Europe.

During a meeting on the development of the armed forces and defense industry in Sochi (December 2, 2020), the President of Russia announced that the number of Kalibr carriers will double by 2023. This will not only be small rocket ships, frigates of the far sea zone 20380 and 11356R/M, diesel-electric submarines of the Varshavyanka type project 636 and multi-purpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (PLARK) of the Yasen project 885 (08850), but also support vessels, such as patrol icebreakers built according to the new «open» stern concept for the Navy (new types of nuclear icebreakers are planned to be delivered to the Navy after 2020: project 10570 – for the year 2022 and project 10510 – for the year 2024).

Will all the planned activities and the arrival of cruise missile carriers ensure the priority of the presence of the Russian fleet in the far sea zones? Of course, not. Therefore, at the meeting in Sochi, Vladimir Putin focused on the need for advanced development of the fleet. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 327 of July 20, 2017 requires that we become the second power among the world navies. The available forces and resources are not enough to fulfill this task, we need ships of the far sea zone – aircraft carriers, frigates, support and supply ships.

Due to the low autonomy of navigation – 15 days, small missile boats of the project 22800 of Karakurt-type in the strategic plan will not be able to solve the problem of permanent presence in distant sea zones. Experts agree that they were built as an alternative during the delay in the construction of frigates of project 11356, for which it is necessary to replace Ukrainian gas turbine installations with domestic analogues. Previously, it was supposed to build aircraft carriers, but they are facing problems that cannot be solved in the near future.

The leading Institute in the field of ship design, the Krylovsky state scientific center, and the main designer of the so-called "big platforms," the Nevsky PKB, have at least several projects: light, medium and heavy, which can be armed with both conventional and nuclear power plants. But for operations in the far sea zone, it is preferable to have a heavy nuclear ship. At the Krylovsky center, this is an aircraft carrier of project 23650 Storm and at the Nevsky PKB – project 11430 Lamantin with a displacement of 70 to 90 thousand tons and a length of more than 300 meters. They can be used for up to 60 to 90 aircrafts, including unmanned ones. The cost of developing and building just one aircraft carrier is estimated by experts at 300-400 billion rubles. The amount is currently very large and if we take into account the fact that the Navy needs not one, but at least 3 to 4 such ships, not only in the medium, but also in the long term, Russia will not receive them.

The problem is compounded by the fact that aircraft carriers need a support group, i.e., in tactical and operational terms, it should be an aircraft carrier strike group (AUG). A heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser of project 1144 Orlan-type "Peter the Great" (in combat formation) was designed for "Admiral Kuznetsov." In the recent past, the Navy had four such ships, and currently there are only two left. The only cruiser "Admiral Lazarev" (former nuclear-powered cruiser "Frunze") is withdrawn from combat service in the Pacific fleet. In the Northern fleet, "Admiral Nakhimov" is in Severodvinsk awaiting modernization. But the carriers of the project Storm and Lamantin need support and cover ships.

Such ships exist, but are still only in development. This is a nuclear-powered destroyer of project 23560 Leader. But it, like promising aircraft carriers, exists only in the layout. The design of the ship is interesting because it is a plan aimed at the future. It is designed using stealth technology: all weapons are removed inside, the contours and superstructures of the ship are made accordingly. Moreover, the ship is planned to house an arsenal of promising weapons: hypersonic missiles «Zircon», anti-aircraft missile system S-500 «Prometheus», the latest artillery and torpedo weapons. At the same time, the autonomy of navigation of the Leader destroyers will be limited only by the physical capabilities of the crew. What is important: the power of the ship's nuclear power plant will be comparable to that installed on the most modern American destroyer Zumwalt. This will allow in the future installing on the ship weapons based on new physical principles: laser or electromagnetic guns.

These promising ships exist only in the project. Therefore, the tasks of the fleet's presence as an effective tool for Russia's influence in the far-off sea zones are difficult to implement. The objective reasons for that are: the lack of sufficient forces and resources, including naval bases in remote areas of the world's oceans, as well as restrictions on the autonomy of the ships. The existing ship composition of the three fleets and the Caspian flotilla of Russia do not allow us to assert the opposite.

However, the tasks set out in Presidential Decree No. 327 on the effective use of the fleet as one of the main tools of Russia's foreign policy are urgent and require practical implementation. Moreover, it is required by the historical existence of the Russian state, the effectiveness of defending its political and economic interests. According to Vladimir Putin, the share of modern weapons in the Navy is 68% [2]. Therefore, the progressive development of the fleet and its technological re-equipment forces NATO countries to reckon with it. This is evidenced by the exits of Russian ships to the far sea zone. They distract the forces and resources of the probable enemy. As a rule, the output of ships as a strike force is carried out as part of a group of escort ships and submarines. In addition, even small missile boats of the project 22800 of Karakurt type can affect the geopolitical situation in the world.

The effective use of the fleet as one of the main tools of Russia's foreign policy is possible through the restoration of naval bases in remote sea zones. These are the bases (points of logistics) that the Soviet Union used to have in Camran (Vietnam), Cuba, Socotra island (the Arabian sea), Berbera (Somalia), the Dahlak Archipelago (o. Nokra), etc., as well as the organization of operational squadrons of permanent presence in Maritime zones, such as the former 5th operational squadron of ships (5th operational flotilla), based in the Mediterranean sea. Today, we do not have as many naval bases as the United States. The Tartus naval base in Syria allows us to control the Mediterranean theater of operations, but in the Indo-Pacific region, including off the coast of America, the Russian fleet can only be present sporadically. It is possible to restore bases in Vietnam and Cuba. There is a concept of the necessity to restore them. At least, this task is feasible, but it rests on political problems of a geopolitical nature. All the problems covered in this article are relevant and need to be solved. Therefore, the issues that were raised during the meeting on the development of the armed forces and defense industry in Sochi on December 2, 2019, are a priority for the development of the fleet.

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DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL POSITIONS ABOUT THE PERSPECTIVE STATE POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON ANTI-IMMIGRATION EXTREMISM

The article is devoted to the elimination of "white spots" in theoretical ideas about extremism caused by population migration, which in recent years has been increasingly manifested in migration relations, as well as "white spots" in theoretical ideas about state policy to counteract this socially dangerous phenomenon. It substantiates the need to introduce the concept of "migration extremism" and a number of closely related concepts into the political lexicon, which are defined by the author. The authors' methodological approach to the formation of a long-term policy of the Russian Federation to counteract migration extremism is described.

Key words: *extremism, radicalism, migration process, migration extremism, extremist activity, national security of the Russian Federation, threats to national security.*

Currently, the problem of extremism is covered in numerous scientific works of both domestic [8; 4] and foreign [14; 5; 7; 1; 2; 11; 9; 13] scientists. However, the problems raised in them almost do not affect the phenomenon of "migration extremism," which is closely related to the migration processes and, in the conditions of their activation, increasingly manifests its destructive consequences: the growth of crime among migrants; mass riots based on the radicalization of migration relations; violent actions of the local population against migrants and migrants against the local population, and others.

Given the socially dangerous nature of migration extremism, it is quite obvious that there is a need to develop a science-based state policy to counter this phenomenon. Such policy should be based on theoretical provisions regarding migration extremism. We believe that in the context of increasing migration processes in the Russian Federation and the world, this need is becoming more and more urgent and requires a theoretical solution.

The specificity of migration of extremism is that it is directly connected with the subjects of the migration process (migrants, indigenous peoples, NGOs, relevant to migrants, etc.), it occurs only after aggravation of contradictions between them, bears the imprint of the severity of migration relations, depends on the peculiarities of the territories where migrants move and depends on the migration policy of the states and international organizations. Its manifestations, as a rule, cause a wide public response. This phenomenon does not appear outside of migration flows and migration relations.

It should be noted that migration extremism is characterized by a wide variety of its manifestations: in the political, violent, domestic, industrial and religious (confessional) spheres [10. P. 1262-1265; 8], it often occurs on the national and nationalistic grounds, penetrates into the spheres of economy and culture, sometimes the phenomenon manifests itself in the form of information and propaganda, organizational and other activities.

The root cause of hotbeds of migration extremism is acute contradictions that arise on the basis of "friend and foe" between migrants and the local population, migrants of different ethnic or religious affiliations, migrants and civil society structures, as well as other subjects of the migration process. Often, the indigenous population perceives migrants as "newcomers and strangers," and migrants, in turn, often consider the indigenous population and migrants of other ethnic or religious backgrounds as "strangers." This circumstance often becomes a reason for the emergence of hotbeds of radicalization of migration relations and the activation of extremist activities of subjects of the migration process.

Understanding the specifics of migration extremism allows us to conclude that this phenomenon can manifest itself in two substances, namely, in the radicalization of migration relations and extremist activities of the subjects of the migration process. According to the authors, these two integral parts of the manifestations of migration extremism, which characterize its specificity (isolation from extremism in general), should form the basis for the formulation of a logical definition of migration extremism. The authors offer the following definition of this phenomenon: *migration extremism is a socio-political phenomenon that occurs in migration processes, manifests itself in the radicalization of migration relations and extremist activities of the subjects of migration processes, posing a threat to the security of individuals, society, and the state.*

This definition uses terms that have not yet developed a clear scientific understanding. The first of them is "radicalization of migration relations." This type of relations occurs in the depths of the migration process, when connections and dependencies are created between its subjects. Mutual perceptions of the migration process subjects are formed on the basis of the existing relations and dependencies. The range of perceptions is quite wide: friendly, neighborly, indifferent (neutral), dislike, hatred and hostility. According to the authors, the last three perceptions should be considered as a manifestation of radicalism in migration relations. Radicalism is not a permanent substance; as contradictions escalate, it moves from one state to another, more acute, and can be described as the radicalization of migration relations. The process of radicalization is manifested in the form of aggravation of relations between the subjects of the migration process, bringing them to the level of dislike, hatred and hostility.

Radicalization can develop not only vertically, as noted above, but also horizontally – moving to other subjects of migration relations. With this in mind, it is possible to formulate the following authors' definition. Radicalization of migration relations is the process of aggravating contradictions between the subjects of the migration process, bringing them to the extreme perceptions: dislike, hatred and hostility with the possible violent actions based on ethnic, religious and other intolerance, as well as the spread of radical sentiments to other subjects of the migration process.

Another component of migration extremism is the extremist activity of the subjects of the migration process. Let's give it the following definition: *it is proposed to understand the extremist activity of migration process subjects as practical steps taken by individuals, groups and organizations to illegitimately use violence, aimed at inciting dislike, hostility and hatred between the subjects of the migration relations based on ethnic, religious and other intolerance, creating an environment of fear and high risks of disrupting stability in society.* Given the high level of public danger from migration extremism, it seems appropriate to form a special direction of state policy-a policy to counter this phenomenon. However, the scientific community has not yet developed stable ideas about this policy, and a theoretical methodological approach to its formation has not been developed. This type of policy is not reflected in the encyclopedic literature, and it is not found in the political or legal acts: concepts, strategies, doctrines, or in the laws of the Russian Federation.

To reveal the concept of "state policy to counteract migration extremism," we take the well-known concept of "politics," formulated by V. I. Zhukov and B. I. Krasnov, which is proposed to understand as "activities of state bodies, political parties, social movements, organizations and their leaders in the sphere of relations between large social groups, nations and states, aimed at mobilizing their efforts to win political power or strengthen it by specific methods" [6. P. 64].

It seems that the basic political elements outlined in the definition should also be reflected in the definition of the state policy *on countering migration extremism, which, according to the authors, consists in the activities of authorized state bodies aimed at reducing the risks of radicalization of migration relations and countering the extremist activities of subjects of the migration process (radical* *individuals, groups and organizations), as well as minimizing (eliminating) the consequences of extremist activities.* We believe that this definition will help to form a primary understanding of this type of policy, which may be refined in the course of further research.

The objects of this type of policy are foreign States and international organizations, migrants, local populations, local governments, civil society structures, and employers who use migrant labor. Subjects are state bodies at the federal and regional levels with the authority to form and implement such policies both within the country and abroad.

The main goal of the state policy on countering migration extremism is to ensure the security of the individual, society and the state from the threats emanating from this phenomenon. Understanding the possible ways to achieve this goal allows us to identify three priority policy areas: 1) countering the radicalization of migration relations; 2) countering the extremist activities of individuals, groups and organizations that are subjects of the migration process; 3) eliminating (minimizing) the consequences of manifestations of migration extremism.

Countering the radicalization of migration relations is currently not a theoretically developed topic. In our opinion, effective counteraction can be implemented in two main organizational forms: 1) maintaining the radicalization of migration relations at an acceptable low level (friendly, neighborly, neutral (indifferent) relations); 2) deradicalization of migration relations.

The need to maintain the radicalization of migration relations at an acceptable low level is caused by the need to restrain the process of radicalization for a long time in a state of neutral, good-neighborly and even friendly relations, to prevent radicalization from reaching the level of hostility, hatred and hostility. Based on this, it is proposed that the process of maintaining the radicalization of migration relations at an acceptable low level *should be understood as a purposeful management activity of the state and other subjects of the migration process to maintain an acceptable low level of radicalization of migration relations in a state of friendly, good-neighborly, neutral (indifferent) relations, preventing radicalization to the level of dislike, hatred and hostility.*

Measures to maintain the radicalization of migration relations at an acceptable low level include: constant monitoring and assessment of the degree of radicalization of migration relations; familiarization of migrants with the migration legislation of the receiving country; warning of the subjects of the migration process about the inadmissibility of extremist activities, and many other measures.

Consolidation of the activities of all subjects of the support process (authorized state bodies at the Federal and regional levels, local governments, public organizations working with migrants, etc.) on the use of the measures listed above, constitute the organizational content of this form.

The need for *deradicalization of migration processes* due to high risk of exit of the process of radicalization within the acceptable low level and need management structures to repay the hotbeds of radicalization, lead migration relations in the centers in the state of neutral, good-neighborly and even friendly, it does not prevent the spread of radicalization process on other subjects of migration relations. Currently, science and practice do not designate the term "deradicalization of migration relations," which reflects a specific management process, so it is proposed to introduce this term into scientific use and formulate the concept.

We suggest that *deradicalization of migration relations should be understood as purposeful management activities of the state and other subjects of the migration process aimed at reducing the level of aggravation of migration relations, bringing them to a safe state: neutral, good-neighborly and even friendly (the process of reverse radicalization of migration relations*).

The goal of deradicalization: through consolidated actions of the subjects of the management process, to launch process opposite of radicalization − the transfer of radical migration relations to a state of neutral (indifferent) relations. In our opinion, the de-radicalization of migration relations can be carried out through political, economic, social, cultural, legal special and other measures.

Thus, political measures should include: the development of state acts in the field of de-radicalization of migration relations; organizational activities of the state to consolidate the efforts of Federal and regional state bodies, local governments, non-profit organizations, civil society structures, including the church, to reduce the level of radicalization of migration relations, etc.

Economic measures include: allocation of material and financial resources to resolve conflicts that have caused radicalization, identification and closure of channels through which illegal activities of individuals, groups and organizations aimed at inciting contradictions in migration relations are financed, and other economic measures.

It is proposed to include the following social measures: improving the quality of adaptation and integration of migrants and their socialization; destruction of enclave stay, residence of migrants; development and implementation of social programs that contribute to the deradicalization of migration relations and other social measures.

It seems appropriate to refer to cultural measures: increasing the promotion of tolerance among participants in migration relations, as well as the moral principles of behavior of both migrants and the local population, provided they live in the neighborhood; creation of discussion platforms to discuss the problems that caused the radicalization of migration relations and ways to deradicalize them, as well as other cultural measures.

Legal measures, in our opinion, should include the development of normative and legal acts that give the subjects of migration relations legal functions and powers aimed at their deradicalization activities.

Special measures may include: increasing monitoring and assessment of the level of radicalization of migration relations in places where migrants settle; establishing the causes of radicalization and identifying its instigators, as well as their isolation; applying mechanisms for criminal prosecution and forced removal, and other special measures.

We believe that in the future, the de-radicalization of migration relations can become one of the important directions of the state's policy in countering the radicalization of migration relations.

The next important area of countering migration extremism is related to *countering extremist activities in the migration sphere*. Work in this direction is regulated by Russian normative legal acts [3; 12] and implies the solution of three subgroups of tasks.

The first subgroup of tasks is to prevent extremist activity in migration processes, including the identification and subsequent elimination of the causes and conditions of extremist activity.

The second subgroup of tasks is focused on detecting, preventing and suppressing extremist activities in the context of increased migration processes. Federal law No. 114-FZ of 25.07.2002 "On countering extremist activity" specifies measures to address the first and second groups of tasks [3].

The third direction of countering migration extremism provides for *minimizing (eliminating) the consequences of extremist actions*: restoring order and law in migration relations; punishing the perpetrators of mass riots that arose on the basis of migration extremism, and criminals-extremists; eliminating the causes of extremism in migration processes, and other tasks.

Thus, the theoretical positions formed in the article about migration extremism and its components eliminate the "white spots" in the theoretical understanding of these phenomena. Based on these concepts, it is possible to develop a methodological approach to the formation of a state policy to counteract migration extremism, including three priority areas of state policy: 1) counteraction to radicalization of migration relations; 2) counteraction to extremist activities of subjects of the migration process; 3) elimination of consequences of manifestations of migration extremism. Implementation of the first direction is advisable in two organizational forms: maintaining the radicalization of migration relations at an acceptable low level and deradicalization of migration relations in cases of the emergence of foci of radicalization. It is advisable to implement the second priority direction in the following areas: detection, prevention and suppression of extremist activities.

We believe that the provisions formulated in this article can become a theoretical and methodological resource for the formation of a long-term policy of the Russian Federation to counteract migration extremism.

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ON SOME POLITICAL SCIENCE ASPECTS OF THE 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Prior to the 2020 reform, the Constitution, with certain flaws in its content and adoption procedure, was perceived by many as the basis for consensus and further development. The constitutional reform changed the text of the Constitution by a third, and its spirit and public perception almost completely. It is necessary to analyze the status and prospects of reformatting relations between the state and society, as well as the correspondence of the undertaken swing to the growing challenges and clearly increasing public demand for the socio-political development of Russia as a renewed advanced nation. With the adoption of the new version of the Constitution, it is unlikely that the reasons for the objective aggravation of contradictions, acute political differentiation in society and subjective difficulties in managing the process of increasing division will disappear. The potential of a mid-decade consensus is coming to an end. We need deep incentives for a new and long-term consolidation of the society and the state.

Key words: *civil society, constitutional system, constitutional reform, amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, unified system of state and public power, political institutional engineering, Constitutional Commission.*

Prior to the 2020 reform, the Constitution, with certain flaws in its content and adoption procedure, was perceived by many as the basis for consensus and further development. The constitutional reform changed the text of the Constitution by a third, and its spirit and public perception almost completely.

The present situation requires analysis of the status and prospects of reformatting relations between the state and society, as well as the correspondence of the undertaken swing to the growing challenges and clearly increasing public demand for the socio-political development of Russia as a renewed advanced nation.

It is no less difficult than the chosen way to save the corporate system, which had developed in the concrete historical conditions of the end of 1993 as a temporary one. It is quite possible that the bet is made on the powerful self-growing authoritarian potential of the inner core of the Constitution laid down by Yeltsin's team in order to strengthen specific Russian constitutionalism and overcome the crisis.

The Constitution has become a means of solving an operational problem, demonstrating in whose hands the initiative is and will remain. For the main law tug of war between the "*attractiveness of the initiative and the constitutional amendments themselves*" does not look fundamental enough, and tactical benefits are obtained with the strategically unpleasant addition of a deepening split in the society, also on the constitutional issue.

The amendments – after all the stages of a fleeting campaign – tried to provide an answer to the urgent needs of the constitutional system. At the same time, the long-needed turn to democracy, the return to society of the right to vote and a variety of forms of public participation, popular and constitutionally regulated parliamentary control over the actions of public authorities, the development of political institutions, including guarantees of free elections and the reform of the party-political system, were avoided in eloquent silence.

It is the institutions and organizations of the civil society that are accumulators, representatives and participants in the processes of reconciliation of diverse interests, self-regulation of public relations, initiation, discussion and participation in monitoring the implementation of adopted legal acts at various levels.

We need a holistic eco-environment and architecture of diverse, integrated decision-making non-profit organizations that represent the interests of the regions and territorial communities, producers and consumers, entrepreneurs and employees, experts and practitioners, the entire political spectrum capable of replacing millions of officials and civil servants.

In principle, the 2020 constitutional amendments have two groups of positive innovations that move us in the right direction. In terms of changes in the organization and functioning of the power mechanism, a step forward has been made; however, the analysis of the changes in the form of government is the subject for a separate article.

By the time of the second reading, the Administration of the President added the first portion of amendments with extensive normative material dedicated to supporting various aspects of life and civil society institutions. There are important and mostly necessary norms about the conditions of economic growth, labor, social partnership, culture, upbringing of youth and children, family, children, marriage, education, language, etc.

It seems that after 28 years, its contents were partially rehabilitated. In this part, I do not share the "taste" criticism of the accepted norms from a number of my colleagues. Many of the amendments are substantially in line with the proposals we published earlier, which means that the work of the Constitutional Commission and, later, of independent constitutionalists was partly not in vain. Unfortunately, there was not enough spirit to support the civil society structurally – in the form of an independent landmark Chapter 2 (4) "Civil society," as we proposed to do in 1990-1993 (4) and in 2013 (1) [2. P. 108-134; 3. P. 10-22; 4. P. 244-251].

Curtsies towards the society, however, pale against the background of maintaining the same system itself, which requires not just tuning, but system changes. There is a fatal subordination of the superstructure to the basis, as predetermined by the classics of historical materialism.

In modern Russia, economic and political monopolism, not controlled by the society, definitely rules; the egoism of the ruling narrow class firmly determines the superstructure, including its legal patterns. It requires strict pragmatic actions in the interests of the actual beneficiaries of the existing system of production relations, appropriation and distribution, rather than observation of the principles of the constitutional system.

The basis determines the preservation of the authoritarian decision-making mechanism, the indispensable cult of power, the absence of institutional mechanisms for identifying, representing and coordinating group and class, and now also caste (we should ever live to see!) interests.

Political and economic dimension of the constitutional process is reflected in the "power" part of the amendments made through the prism of main political and economic objectives: to avoid any risks in the consolidation of the results of privatization and subsequent redistribution of property, to ensure inheritance of the acquired statuses and fortunes.

It is clear that the key trend of the 2020 amendments was further concentration of the supreme power. For the constitutional principle of horizontal separation of powers and vertical separation of authority the forecast may be negative. Within the framework of the "unified system of state and public power" being built, the power vertical created in recent years is supplemented by a single power horizontal.

The updated system of supreme monocracy looks almost like a system of autocracy. The presidential power has been extended to all state bodies, and the power of the head of state has actually been extended at the expense of the powers of other branches of government, which are coming under a single beginning as if getting in line. The space for competitive joint dialogue, mutual search and implementation of the balance of branches of power is being reduced.

In my opinion, the main future contradictions in the relations between the society and the state, as well as the prospects for the development of the constitutional system itself, will be connected with the acceptance or rejection of this amendment.

The conflict of the supreme power with a significant part of the educated class is growing. As a result of a hasty and rather one sided campaign it became obvious that the number of skeptics and pessimists among the educated class has increased several times.

A very likely consequence of the current campaign may be the devaluation of the Constitution and the deepening crisis of public confidence in the state power.

First of all, the Constitution is threatened with a kind of desacralization in the eyes of those who do not agree to perceive it as a means to achieve applied goals of political expediency, other than the high task of building a truly constitutional system.

As it was in the 1980s, a significant part of the educated society (and not at all the marginalized part of it) is moving into the latent sphere, forming a “second” society parallel to the official world. This phenomenon once served as the basis and driving force, the social base of the perestroika in the USSR and a series of power transformations in the countries of state socialism in the late 1980s. [5; 6. P. 6-31].

To the correlation between the notions of “society and “people.” The Constitution gives preference to the concept of “people,” which opens the Preamble and occurs in various meanings 11 times (of which 6 times in the sense of the people of all Russia and 5 times in the sense of peoples living on the territory of the state). The people as a historical and cultural community of people with a single language, history, territory and ideally as a political nation is enshrined in the Constitution as the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of state power (Part 1. Art. 3).

But from the practice of constitutional, social, political and socio-economic processes of the long period from 1994 to 2020, it turned out that nothing depends on such a lofty and abstract understanding of the people. After the removal of the Chapter “Civil society” from the draft Constitution, which does not seem accidental today, the concept of “society” was affected most of all (it is not used in the Constitution at all, although 8 times there are combinations with the word “public” : “public associations” – 5 times, “public security” and “public order”– 3 times). Our concept of the Constitution, meanwhile, has always been based on an understanding of the society’s contract with the state as an official representative of the society (2).

It is society that is the social collective actor. As a social community and a set of institutions and organized interests, social relations, it should be considered as a starting platform, a key support and the main addressee of the constitutional system. It is society that is called upon to play the leading role of an equal partner, and if necessary, an opponent of the state (in the case of the latter’s usurpation of power). The state is accountable to the society and must, in turn, protect the democratic constitutional order, law and order, provide the necessary social, economic and political conditions and mechanisms for the normal reproduction and further self-development of institutions, members of society and the people as a whole.

A kind of political indicator of the effects of the 2020 reforms can be a narrowing and even exclusion of diversity, competition from a number of spheres of public life via some new “ideological” amendments to the Constitution (about the belief in God, prohibition on diminution of the value of the feat of the people in the defense of the Fatherland, etc.). Political plurality does not expand either because of the eloquent silence about the urgent and demanded constitutional guarantees of political self-organization of the society in the legal constitutional formats.

In the opinion of my colleague in the Constitutional Commission T. G. Morshakova, certain amendments with uncertainties contained in them, if they are subsequently reflected in the norms of the Criminal code and the Administrative code of the Russian Federation, may result in further restrictions on freedom of speech, literary, artistic, and scientific creativity that are undesirable for the educated class.

Is the educated class a priority recipient of the messages of the supreme power in the new Russian conditions? Apparently, and this is confirmed by independent sociologists, during the 2020 campaign, the task of the Presidential Administration was not to convince people in the reasonableness of the amendments, but to suppress the apathy and distrust of the already loyal and conformist part of the population.

As if on purpose, some elements of constitutional reform are built on an almost Orwellian Newspeak, where words lose their original meaning and mean the opposite. Some actions differ significantly from the stated positions (3). There are symptoms of a growing gap in public consciousness between the law and truth, and the discrepancy between the actions of state authorities and the socio-cultural norms and public understanding of due process.

Finally, another serious problem of the weak legitimacy of the 1993 Constitution (5) could have been solved in the course of the Constitution updating, as the author of these lines has repeatedly suggested. But, no. The vote suggested in the Presidential Decree looks like a replica of the mechanism used by Boris Yeltsin to "force consent" in a virtual state of emergency during the adoption of the Constitution, which left a mark of dubious legitimacy on the Constitution. It can now go deeper despite the 14.8 billion rubles allocated for the preparation and conduct of the vote (according to E. A. Pamfilova, "legitimacy is expensive" (5)).

The level of political support for the supreme power is declining. In the run-up to the election season of various levels, up to the highest, there is no prospect of "political swings" (not to be confused with "carousels"), the critical threshold of discontent with restrictions on the rights and freedoms, deterioration of the conditions for self-development of society and growth of welfare may be exceeded.

When the recession of the overheated world economy, taking place now with the voluntary or involuntary assistance of the COVID-19 pandemic, comes to an end, there will be a new need for growth, creativity, creation and development on the basis of the new relations between the society and the state.

The political institutional engineering and PR of the "new decision-making system" involved in the reform reflect the desire to hedge the risks associated with the change of the supreme power, to preserve influence after the "big transfer" (to hedge against an "internal opponent") and to close off from an "external opponent" (conditional nationalization of the elite, restriction of foreign influence, attempts to rally people around the personified state sovereignty).

With the adoption of the new version of the Constitution, the reasons for the objective aggravation of contradictions, acute political differentiation in the society, and subjective difficulties in managing the process of increasing division are unlikely to disappear by themselves. The potential of a justified mid-decade consensus, in my view, is coming to an end. We need deep incentives for a new and long-term consolidation of the society and the state.

NOTES:

(1) Proposals of the Constitutional Club and the FCR (2013) Initiative drafts of new chapters of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Chapter 2. Civil society; Chapter 2. Referendum and free elections. The electoral system; Chapter 5. Parliamentary control see: *Rumyantsev O. G*. 20th anniversary of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: lessons of history, prospects for development // Modern constitutionalism: challenges and prospects: materials of the international scientific and practical conference dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Saint Petersburg, November 14-15 2013). M.: Norma; 2014. P. 108-134; as well as: Journal of constitutional justice. No. 2 (38). P. 10-22; Constitutional bulletin. No. 5 (23), April 2020. P. 244-251.

(2) Here is a fragment from the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation (as of February 21, 1991):

«Article 113.

The state is the official representative of society and expresses its will within the framework of the Constitution. The state, its organs and officials serve the entire society, not any part of it. The state, its organs, institutions and officials are responsible to society and the citizen.

Article 114.

The state must:

1) protect and guarantee human and civil rights;

2) protect the democratic constitutional system, law and order;

3) protect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;

4) Develop and implement policies aimed at the free development of economic initiative and effective social protection." See: Rumyantsev O. G. Constitution of the 1993. History of the phenomenon. Documentary poem in seven parts from the Executive Secretary of the Constitutional Commission of 1990-1993. 3rd edition, amended and supplemented. M.: RG Publishing House; 2018.

(3) – The constitutional reform came against the background of repeated assurances from previous years that the Constitution is unchangeable;

– The 2020 amendment bill includes dozens of unrelated proposals and changes after expanding the subject of amendments, which hardly makes it possible to consider them as one "amendment," as described in the title of the adopted "Law on Amendments to the Constitution," contrary to the requirements of the relevant Federal Law;

– The Preamble agreed by the Constitutional Commission and accepted with minor changes by the Constitutional Conference in 1993, according to the RG management, "can be changed according to the procedures that are provided for chapters 3 to 8," the benefit of this was eventually abandoned after hearing criticism; but the appearance of a number of norms in Article 67 does not seem very appropriate;

– Against the background of the stated objectives of the reform: renewability and changeability of power, the key amendment and the crown of the reform becomes the personified amendment providing opportunity for the incumbent head of state to run for a third consecutive time, totally for the fifth and sixth presidential terms;

– The very method of approving changes to the Constitution by the all-Russian vote, which is not a referendum, but another, not the highest form of direct democracy in the course of which the supreme basic law is being changed.

(4) Since September 1990, our project originally had an important Chapter "Civil society," immediately following Chapter 2 "Human and civil rights and freedoms." At first, for being too bourgeois, it was attacked by the Communist faction in the Supreme Soviet of Russia during the article-by-article review of the draft Constitution at the spring (1992) session; and in the fall of the same year, the Mayor of St. Petersburg A. A. Sobchak, promoting the so-called "RDDR draft," stressed the excessive verbosity of the draft and the non-legal nature of the norms on civil society. In 1993, the Chapter again found its place in the draft Constitution, but did not pass through the narrowed crucible of the Yeltsin Administration Constitutional Conference.

(5) RT. 2020. 4 March.

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ON THE QUESTION OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The article attempts to identify and analyze the main factors and milestones in the formation and evolution of the Concept of national security of the Russian Federation. It is shown that while in the USSR this sphere was primarily, if not exclusively, about the security of the state, guarantees of its physical existence, its viability, institutions and interests, in the Russian Federation its purpose, system and structural components, goals and objectives have undergone a qualitative transformation. The main focus is on substantiating the thesis that the national security system has been brought into line with the Constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation, while its main purpose is to ensure the security of an equally multi-ethnic Russian people, state, society and individual.

Key words: *the Russian Federation, Constitution, Concept, strategy, state, policy, state security, national security, people, society.*

Along with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the fundamental document defining the purpose, system and structural components, main parameters, priorities, and directions of national security is the Concept, and since 2009 it is the National Security Strategy, which is an officially adopted system of views and provisions aimed to protect the vital interests of the individual, society, and the state from external and internal threats. It is designed to determine the place, status and role of the state in the world community, its goals, national interests, resources and means to ensure the identification, suppression, neutralization and destruction of all real and possible external and internal threats.

As is well known, until 1988, there was almost no open domestic literature on state security issues in the USSR. Official documents used the concept of "state security," which covered primarily, if not exclusively, the protection of the state. Scientific development of its support was carried out in closed research institutions under the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and other "power" departments. Security issues were considered primarily in relation to the protection of the state system, institutions and interests of the state, for which the concept of "state security" was used until 1982. In the same year, the concept of “public safety” was introduced to expand the scope of security. Thus, a step was taken towards ensuring the security of the public life of citizens by the state.

This trend was further developed with the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, when the concept of *new political thinking* attempted to expand the scope of security for citizens, including universal values such as individual rights and freedoms.

As for the Russian Federation, a qualitatively new step was taken in this direction in 1996, when the concept of “national security” was introduced [8. P. 260]. The need for this step was determined by the requirements of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993, in which one of the Central places is occupied by the section on the guarantee of human rights and freedoms. As a result, there is no need to define the security of the state and society separately. The formation of a systematic understanding of the ideological and political foundations of the national security of the Russian Federation has begun. This notion was deciphered in the document no. 1300 of December 17, 1997 entitled “Concept of national security of the Russian Federation.” The document contains the first normative definition of national security: “The national security of the Russian Federation is understood as the security of its multinational people as the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power in the Russian Federation” [4]. Here special attention should be paid to the provision on the security of the multinational people as the bearer of sovereignty. Its significance becomes obvious if we realize that the Concept was adopted at a time when Russia was going through the most difficult period in its modern history, when the infamous phenomenon of the “parade of sovereignty” was still not completely overcome, and many people still had concerns about the prospects for the unity of the Russian Federation.

As the vertical power was restored and Russia returned to the geopolitical arena as a great military and political power capable of defending its national interests on a par with other major players in the world politics, the first definition was supplemented and brought into line with the changing geopolitical realities. Thus, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, signed by the President of the Russian Federation on May 12, 2009, declares that national security means “protection of the individual, society and the state from domestic and foreign threats, which in turn ensures constitutional rights and freedoms, an appropriate quality of life for citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity and stable development of the Russian federation, the defense and security of the state” [9]. A more detailed and refined definition is given in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation No. 683 of December 31, 2015. Paragraph 1 of that document emphasizes that “The current Strategy is the basic strategic planning document defining the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities, objectives, tasks, and measures in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy aimed at strengthening the Russian Federation’s national security and ensuring the country's sustainable development in the long term." It includes the country's defense and all types of security envisioned by the Russian Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation – primarily state, public, informational, environmental, economic, transportation, and energy security and individual security; the Russian Federation's national interests are objectively significant requirements of the individual, society, and the state with regard to ensuring their protection and sustainable development" [10].

It is obvious that this definition corresponds to paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, according to which "In the Russian Federation recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and according to the present Constitution" [5].

Despite all the editorial differences, the common definition for all of these definitions is the recognition of national security as a state of protection of territorial unity, inviolability of state borders, and unconditional preservation of national-state sovereignty. As many researchers correctly point out, there can be no independent state without sovereignty [6. P. 187]. Indeed, as the world experience shows, any national state can be considered independent, able to ensure its physical existence, territorial integrity, non-interference of external forces in internal affairs, etc., only if it has an undisputed sovereignty over the entire territory under its jurisdiction. In an independent, viable state capable of defending its national interests, there can be no other authority than that of the state itself, which is exercised throughout the territory under its jurisdiction. In this territory, any parties, unions, organizations, associations, associations that claim to participate in political activities, or claim seats in the power system, can be considered legitimate only if they recognize the supremacy of state sovereignty. The problem of sovereignty affects not only the nature and purpose of power at the level of a single state, but also at the level of its relations with the outside world, among other subjects of international relations. The condition for the legitimacy of its sovereignty on its own territory is the recognition of the same rights for other States on their territories. Therefore, as K. S. Hajiyev notes, "the formation of modern national states has become part of the process of mutual recognition of equal rights and equal sovereignty for each individual state. Accordingly, each state has the right to prevent interference in its internal affairs and to ensure its territorial integrity" [1. P. 278]. In this sphere, it is of key importance that the world community is a system of sovereign states, each of which, in accordance with its national interests, national historical, socio-cultural, political-cultural and other characteristics, independently determines its own form of government, its own national security priorities, ways and means of protecting national interests.

Any self-respecting independent sovereign state does not recognize any other authority that seeks to impose its will on it. In other words, the state has no right to allow any external forces to interfere in its internal affairs. Most importantly, it resolutely defends the territorial unity of the country and the inviolability of internationally recognized state borders. In other words, in the system of international relations, the state acts as an equal subject with other sovereign states. If a given state is not able to enforce these principles, it does not have full sovereignty over the territory officially under its jurisdiction, as well as its own citizens. In this context, one of the key purposes and goals of the national security system is to protect national sovereignty. It is designed to ensure physical survival, vitality, free, and stable functioning and further development of the state and society, protection of the constitutional order, political, economic, defense, scientific-technological, informational and intellectual potential, historical and cultural heritage of the country. One of the main goals of the national security system is to protect and promote national interests, which determine the meaning, goals and motivations of the very existence of the state. They are formed in accordance with the real weight, place, status and role of the state in the international community and the prevailing world order, its resource capabilities, level of economic development, national and historical traditions, etc. When determining and implementing its national interests, the state takes into account the real and potential sources and nature of threats to the security of the state, objective economic, political, geopolitical and other factors, the interests of other members of the world community, etc.

There are certain indicators and thresholds, the violation of which gives grounds to say that the state is not able to defend its sovereignty and national interests. From this point of view, it is important to realize that there is a difference between vital, long-term, permanent national interests and secondary, variable, and contextual interests. Naturally, for the existence of the state and the preservation of its sovereignty, vital interests are of crucial importance, representing a set of needs, goals, and attitudes, the satisfaction of which reliably ensures the existence, viability, and effective functioning of society, the political system, and the state itself. Secondary interests are derived from vital interests.

It is the clash of vital national interests that generates all sorts of contradictions, conflicts and wars in the international arena. From this point of view, it is necessary to take into account that national interests are not a constant, once and for all, given quantity. Their priorities, time and spatial parameters are subject to more or less significant changes depending on changes in the real situation in the world in each specific historical period.

Taking into account all the above, it can be argued that the system of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation should be understood as a set of General goals to ensure the national interests of Russia. The concept of "national security", combining all known types of security, is multidimensional and covers the most important spheres of public life, such as economic, social, military, information, technological, etc. Along with the traditional ones, new factors of national security have become important, such as the level of development of the national economy, its competitiveness in world markets, the level of development of science and technology, the quality of the education and health system, terrorism, inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, various diseases, drug trafficking, etc.

Therefore, a successful solution to the problem of ensuring security requires a comprehensive approach to solving such global problems as resolving and managing international conflicts and building confidence, taking and implementing measures to ensure the inviolability of borders, preventing international terrorism, international cooperation in the field of human rights, the peaceful use of outer space, etc. This notion is correlated with the notions of "protection of the individual, property, society and the state;" "personal security of citizens," "public security," "economic security," etc. Accordingly, we are talking about national security, based on the organic unity of interests of all three of its basic objects – an individual, society and the state from external and internal threats.

Therefore, national security is ensured by the joint efforts of all authorities at all levels. For this purpose, the state has the right to use all available economic, human, political, military, ideological and other resources.

In the context of the serious aggravation of international tension on the world stage in recent years, the question of the physical self-preservation of the state is seriously raised. It is around this goal that other fundamental characteristics of the state are developed and protected, such as national-state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, etc. We are talking about the fact that in the current geopolitical conditions, due to a complex of known factors, the West, led by the United States, which has concentrated in its hands an unprecedented economic, technological, military and political power, and not least, economic and technological superiority, and global financial power, is almost an existential threat to Russia. In this context, the arguments of some Western and domestic analysts and politicians who talk about Russia's weakness and its inability to resist the powerful United States and the West as a whole are also dangerous. As noted, for example, by the French analyst J.-S. Mongrenier, "Russia is perceived as a small troublemaker, which should not distract the US from the big violator, that is, the PRC" [7].

In relations between the states, especially the great nuclear powers, it is crucial to have a very clear and precise understanding of and identification of such "red lines" that cannot be crossed without far-reaching negative consequences.

Weakness is a deadly sin of any state, first of all, of any great power. Therefore, under no circumstances should Russia be allowed to reduce its status as a nuclear superpower, capable of containing the hegemonic claims of any modern nuclear power, no matter how powerful it may be. It is in this sense that we should evaluate Sergey Lavrov's statement that Russia did not succumb to the trick of the Obama Administration, which proposed the idea of renouncing nuclear weapons by all states, reducing their number to an absolute minimum, respectively, in the Russian Federation and the United States. Given the clear advantage of the United States, especially NATO, in conventional weapons, such a reduction would pose an existential threat to Russia's national security. As German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel stated in an interview with *Spiegel* magazine, "in a world where predators live, it is difficult to be a herbivore" [12]. Therefore, it is natural that, as Lavrov stressed, Russia will not sign the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, adopted in July 2017 at the UN Headquarters in New York [2].

It is obvious that for Russia, in this context, there is no alternative to nuclear weapons as a means of deterring aggression from a possible enemy in the twenty-first century. Therefore, it is completely justified that in its military doctrine, Russia did not confirm the previously declared commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such an obligation would, in fact, contradict the basic premise that these weapons are not regarded as a means of warfare, but as a means of deterring a possible aggressor. Therefore, if the 1997 version of the National Security Concept provided for the use of nuclear weapons only if "there is a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state," then the 2000 version of the Concept considers its use legitimate and necessary in response not only to its use by the aggressor, but also "to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in critical situations for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies" [3]. This provision is also enshrined in the current Military Doctrine. Its Article 27 reads: "The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy" [11].

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SOME PRIORITIES OF THE MODERN STATE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The article considers the priorities of the state national policy at the present stage and the problems emerging in the course of their implementation. Proposals are formulated to improve the state national policy.

Key words: *national policy, interethnic relations, Russian nation, civil identity, ethno-cultural development.*

In modern conditions, the most acute problem among the many pressing problems facing Russia is the implementation of national policy.

Not only the development of the Russian state itself, but also the strengthening of its national security will depend on how balanced it will be, and how comprehensively and effectively its priorities will be implemented.

The development and strengthening of interethnic relations in modern conditions is a major task, the solution of which will become one of the guarantees of maintaining stability in society. Since 2012, the state authorities are addressing this priority task by adopting a number of documents and creating certain state structures, among them are: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On ensuring interethnic consent" [14], Council under the RF President on interethnic relations [15] and Council for interethnic relations and cooperation with religious associations under the Chairman of the Federation Council [8]. The Government approved the program "On the strengthening of the unity of the Russian nation and the ethnic and cultural development of the peoples of Russia (2014-2020)" [6], created a "system for monitoring and prevention of conflicts" allowing to assess and predict possible conflicts on ethnic grounds, approved the Federal Target Program "Russian language" for 2016-2020 [3], created the Federal Agency for ethnic affairs. In addition, in 2018, the President of the Russian Federation by his decree approved a new version of the "Strategy of state national policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025" [16]. The Strategy is based on Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized norms and principles of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and such Federal laws as "On security," "Strategic planning in the Russian Federation," as well as other normative legal acts regulating activities in the field of state national policy of the Russian Federation.

Strengthening the civic consciousness and spiritual community of the Russian Federation (the Russian nation) is one of the main goals of the State National Policy Strategy. Considering this approach to nation-building, it is worth noting that it does not pose a threat of disappearance of ethnic groups in a single culture, called the Russian nation. This definition is considered from the point of view of cohabitation of citizens or a kind of supra-ethnic identity of the population of the country, whose cultural and historical heritage forms the Russian people, multinational and united.

In the minds of Russian citizens today, there is no clear understanding of what constitutes a general civil identity. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that there are different opinions on this issue: some equate themselves with citizens living in the country and believe that this is their identity, others associate this concept with a civil nation and national brotherhood, others find in Russian culture the national cooperation of peoples, and others associate their beliefs with a common civil and political life. From a scientific point of view, this notion is interpreted as a "loyalty to the state, government, and elites" [10], according to sociologists, the general civil identity is "... solidarity with the people and loyalty to the state power" [12] and "...it also contains an activity component of responsibility for the country affairs" [2].

In modern conditions, it is important to form an understanding of the general civil identity. This concept is based on the clear understanding by each person of himself as a citizen of the country, with a clear idea of the homeland and readiness to act in its interests regardless of any circumstances. Let's question whether the society is ready for this. Let's turn to the data of the all-Russian VTSIOM survey, according to which "... 59% of respondents share the idea of "we are citizens of Russia," a third of respondents to the question "who am I?" replied "just a human," 15% named their nationality, 14% called themselves Soviet people, and 6% – a citizen of the world" [9].

But according to the Institute of sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences "... up to 90% of people identify themselves as Russian citizens" [5]. Based on the analysis of this research, we can conclude that when defining themselves on the nationality principle, people identify themselves by culture and language, and in terms of civil identity, the main criterion is the state. It is important for everyone to understand their belonging to the general civil (Russian) nation. While we agree with the existence of other nations formed as a result of a fusion of different peoples, we are wary of speaking about the Russian, historically established nation.

It should be emphasized that this is not a violation of the rights of ethnic groups to self-determination, given that the country consists of numerous national-cultural autonomies and national-cultural associations of citizens who are active participants in the implementation of the state national policy. It is clear that the creation of the Russian nation does not assume a homogeneous composition of the cultural nation, there is no need to change anything in this direction. There is only a necessity to make an effort to conserve the historical, spiritual and cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation.

So, let's define the main factors of common civil community: first, the common historical past of the peoples, confirmed by facts; second, the experience of living together as the foundation of a common culture; third, the Russian language, which is a means of interethnic communication.

The factors that we are talking about bring people closer together and focus on the search for a new national idea, which the head of state spoke about back in 2016 when holding a meeting with entrepreneurs: "we have no other unifying idea other than patriotism and cannot have any" [7].

"According to a survey conducted by the all-Russian center for public opinion research, 92% of Russians consider themselves patriots. Thus, the level of patriotism reached its highest level in 18 years, increasing from 80% in 2016. 59% of respondents said that patriotism is manifested in love for their country. More than a third of Russians, 39%, consider it patriotism to strive to change the state of affairs in the country. For many, the main manifestation of patriotism is working for the good of the country (38%). 19% of the survey participants believe that a true patriot should say the truth about his country, whatever it may be. 12% of respondents believe that a patriot is supposed to believe that his country is better than other countries" [17]. The level of public confidence in the existing government, the state's activities in the foreign policy arena, including in the fight against international terrorism and the implementation by the state authorities of national projects aimed at strengthening the national unity of the country have a positive impact on the growth of patriotism today.

Recently, the idea of adopting a law on the Russian nation has been discussed in society and received considerable resonance. It is the question of strengthening the all-Russian civil consciousness based on the common traditions and values that form the basis of our history, unity and integrity of the multi-ethnic people, which is nothing more than the main direction of state development and national security. Today, the definition of a nation has found its place in the Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation. It is very important that the consciousness we are talking about is formed not by representatives of the power bloc, various elites, but by the people who have reached certain heights in science and art, who have knowledge and experience in the field of international communication. Undoubtedly, we need qualified specialists and standards for their training.

The national language is the language of interethnic communication and it plays a huge role in strengthening our multi-ethnic society. It is the core that forms the civil, cultural and educational space. The Russian language is the tool that reveals the meaning of the words homeland, Fatherland, power, and identity, which allow us to form the concept of "we". It is no accident that the task of strengthening the Russian language is identified as a priority in the Strategy of State National Policy. At the same time, we should not forget about the support and development of national languages, since today 89 national languages are taught in educational institutions of the country. At the same time, there is a problem of relocation of Russian-speaking citizens from national republics, which contributes to the reduction of Russian specialists in the administrative apparatus and negatively affects inter-ethnic trust.

In the modern conditions of a developing society, our country is faced with another problem – the clogging of the Russian language with foreign words. The speech of citizens, especially young people, is full of foreign borrowings that make confusion in the language, parasitize in it and impoverish the vocabulary. It is necessary to fight against this, to protect our language, to monitor the purity of speech. Today, the Russian language is littered with American phrases that blur the basis of our language, lead to changes in value orientations and restrict our thinking. J. Locke said: "... he who uses words without a clear and unchangeable meaning misleads himself and others. And he who does this intentionally is an enemy of truth and knowledge" [1]. It is obvious that the preservation, development and protection of the Russian language is one of the priority tasks both within the state and outside its borders and requires the implementation of measures aimed at achieving these goals.

An important factor of civic identity today is all-Russian values, as well as trust in the government. As for values, in addition to those guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, other values that are characteristic of a developing country with its multi-ethnic people should be offered. Regarding trust in the government, it is worth paying attention to the fact that identification with the state cannot be carried out without trust, and it may negatively affect the general civil identification. The level of trust in the government today is quite high, "according to the latest data from the Levada Center, it is 84%" [4], unfortunately, trust in relation to some regional authorities have modest numbers.

The formation of a unified cultural and historical space at the level of the Federation and regions is the basis of a common civil identity, which allows us to unite and unite the nation through communication. At the same time, such a space should not carry changes that contribute to isolation. "We know what this means for the Russian state" [11].

The mass media also have a significant influence on the formation of a general civil identity in modern society. After analyzing the content of the programs of the main federal TV channels, we can conclude that television programs carry very little information about the peoples of the Russian Federation, their culture and identity, which in turn negatively affects the education of young people and does not instill in them respect for the traditions of the peoples of Russia. Despite the positive dynamics in the development of national attitudes, there is still an open question about the existence of national stereotypes, which cannot be eliminated all at once. Experts in this field believe that anti-Semitism, xenophobia and Caucasian phobia are more pronounced in large localities. National and religious extremism is still a serious problem. Today, all sources of information, the Internet, social networks and certain literature, abundantly present at book markets, carry intolerance in favor of interethnic strife, preventing the strengthening of the all-Russian identity.

The development of information technologies in the country and in the world is moving forward with leaps and bounds, developing information and technological progress on the one hand and having a negative impact in some areas on the other hand. In particular, the development of interethnic relations is negatively affected by the information war. Success in addressing the challenges of countering extremism largely depends on the fruitful work of media managers and Russian Internet providers throughout the country. Special efforts should be directed to this type of work with young people, since they are more vulnerable in this sphere.

Over the past decades, our country has changed markedly. Leading a confident internal and external activity, it evokes a sense of patriotism in the majority of Russians, which obviously contributes to the consolidation of the society. It is also important that Russia is pursuing a confident policy on the international arena, taking part in the resolution of the global security problems, taking a leading position in the fight against international terrorism with an intention to demonstrate to the world the famous values of Russian culture, language, science and education. The positive dynamics of foreign policy development and the high rating of the head of state in the country and in the world are the grounds contributing to the strengthening of the civil unity.

The main role in the formation of a civil nation today belongs to the Federal Agency for ethnic Affairs, which builds a system for managing national processes. However, it is worth paying attention to the fact that in the presence of a body that regulates national processes, there is a number of state structures still involved in the tasks that fall in the area of the Agency's operation, resulting in the lack of necessary coordination and interdepartmental responsibility.

Thus, the process of forming an all-Russian nation is not easy by its nature, it is definitely a long process requiring constant attention and significant efforts from the state authorities.

Our strength, as well as the strength of our ancestors, lies in unity, only thanks to which we will be able to preserve our cultural values, the identity of the peoples, their traditions and the Fatherland as a whole.

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INFLUENCE OF CONFUCIANISM ON THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ELITE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIETY[1]

The article is devoted to the study of the influence of Confucianism in Russia. The author pays special attention to the influence of Confucianism on the political and cultural elite of the Russian society.

Key words: *Russia, China, Confucius, Confucianism, history, modernity, influence, political and cultural elite.*

Confucianism (the teachings of Confucius) is an important part of the world's cultural heritage. This is an ethical and philosophical doctrine created by Confucius (553-480 BC). For a long time, Confucianism was identified exclusively with China. Currently, it is widely represented all over the world.

Many works are devoted to the study of the spiritual origins of Confucianism, its history, elements, components and orientation. There are no comprehensive studies on the history of Confucianism in Russia.

The nature of Confucianism's presence, the extent of its prevalence, and the context of its public perception differ significantly from one era to another. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to study the influence of Confucianism on the political and cultural elite of the Russian society.

From the methodological point of view, we note that in this work we consider Metropolitan and regional ruling groups, whose representatives perform the function of governance, as the "political elite" of Russia.

Representatives of the Russian intelligentsia (creative and scientific) are studied as the "cultural elite".

It is important to note that it is necessary to distinguish between Confucianism as a teaching that is followed and a teaching that is studied.

At present, it is impossible to date with certainty the time when Russians got "acquainted" with the teachings of Confucius. There are no comprehensive, generalizing scientific studies on this problem. A generally accepted point of view is the hypothetical assumption that this event should be dated to the Middle Ages.

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It is possible that the fragmentary penetration of certain elements of Confucianism, for example, in the form of individual (phenomenal) contacts, mainly books and actual borrowings, could have occurred in the XIII century during the Mongol conquest of the Russian principalities. This assumption is hypothetical.

It is based mainly on the fact that the Mongol army had some Chinese natives (mainly specialists in the field of artillery and clerks) who, theoretically, could be both supporters of Confucius' teaching and simply bearers of knowledge about it.

If this kind of phenomenological contact took place, then the number of its participants on the part of Ancient Russia was negligible, and the result is clearly not significant, since there are no references to either Confucianism or Confucius in written sources of this era (Chronicles, hagiographic literature, other genre works, etc.).

The image of China in Russian literature is clearly identified from the XV century, but it is related exclusively to the trade issues. In 1472, Tver merchant Afanasy Nikitin mentioned China in the context of the production of high-quality and inexpensive porcelain products.

Active incorporation of Chinese themes into the everyday life of Russia began only in the XVII century. There are quite pragmatic explanations for this process.

After the end of the Time of Troubles in Russia, an interest in the correct organization of the state administration grew sharply. People were interested in the rights and duties of individual estates, and the relationship between the tsarist government and the people, i.e., the problems that Confucius was actively engaged in. Therefore, a number of his selected statements (anonymous and often with distortions of the author's text) on this issue were included in the domestic collections of statements of ancient and modern sages. The name of Confucius was not mentioned and the author was presented in a "neutral" form, like, for example, "a certain wise man; a wise old man from the Kingdom of Cathay," etc.

It is believed that the first direct (identification) contacts between representatives of the two countries were established in the early XVII century, when the first Russian mission led by I. F. Petlin (1618) was accepted in the "middle Kingdom" at the court of Emperor Shen-Tsong (1573-1620). By this time, Western Europe was already acquainted with the creative heritage of Confucius, whose works became known thanks to the Jesuit monk Matteo Ricci (1552-1610).

In 1656, China was visited by the mission headed by F. I. Baykov, in 1660 – by the Embassy headed by I. Perfiliev, etc. However, in the XVII century, relations between Russia and China can be described more as pragmatic "trade" relations.

Therefore, speaking of the XVII century, it can be stated that the Russians, who are connected by their activities with China, were not actually carriers of Chinese Confucian traditions. In many ways, this was determined by:

1) considerable influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in terms of religious identification and existence of an appropriate legal framework;

2) the rarity and irregularity of direct contacts, due to a variety of reasons (territorial conflicts, military attacks on merchant caravans, etc.). In addition, a significant part of the trade contacts were carried out through "third hands," so the areas of direct communication were local and limited.

The situation begins to change in the XVIII century. Paradoxically, an interest in China came to Russia not from the East (Russia has a long border with China), but from the West within the framework of the culture of the European enlightenment.

At the first stage, to a large extent, this interest was based on "cultural fashion" and consisted, most often, in external borrowing of everything fashionable, i.e. Chinese without trying to research or study it.

In the capital and provinces, it was decided to incorporate Chinese parks in manor houses, caves, pagodas, bridges, palaces etc. Elements of Chinese decor and costume, sculpture, works of art, paintings, porcelain, carpets, silk, etc. became widely popular. G. R. Derzhavin characterized that time, saying: "it was a Theater here and swing there, then an Asian house of bliss...," when telling about the opening of the Chinese Opera (Theatre) in 1778 in Tsarskoye Selo [4. P. 96-97].

At the second stage in the 70-80 years of the XVIII century, some representatives of the national Enlightenment in their internal spiritual development were sincerely interested in the spiritual teachings and practices of China.

Confucianism has taken a very special place in the study of Chinese culture. Among the creative intelligentsia, who were in search of spiritual components of the true understanding of the meaning of life and interested in other models and practices of life, it is no exaggeration to say that there was a special interest in Confucius and Confucianism.

Representatives of the Russian cultural class were literally "mesmerized" by the paradoxically modern and surprisingly wise attitude to life. Domestic thinkers studied Confucianism intuitively, often in isolation from the history and culture of China, but fully aware of the fact of "communion" with the treasury of unique human wisdom.

It was at this time that we can state the beginning of the real influence of Confucianism on the "thinking" class of the Russian society. By this time, probably, appeared the first publications in Russian of entitled (attributed) sources about Confucius. However, rather approximate translations and the arbitrary nature of completing such collections did not actually contribute to the popularization of Confucianism, on the contrary, awareness of it turned into an attribute of belonging to the ruling class.

Therefore, in the XVIII century, the influence of Confucianism was mainly limited to:

1) nobility. Metropolitan (to a greater extent) and provincial (to a lesser extent). In part, those representatives of nobility who identified themselves as representatives of the European, enlightened culture;

2) top intelligentsia. More precisely, those representatives of the "thinking class" who were either directly connected with the managerial elites or studied China in terms of its history, culture, philosophy, literature, etc. Consequently, Confucianism of the middle and second half of the XVIII century affected only a part of the "political" and "thinking" class of the educated minority of the Russian society.

It should be recognized that influence of Confucianism in Russia was especially strong during the reign of the Empress Catherine the Great (1762-1796).

Actually, the Empress became a "popularizer" of the ideas of the European Enlightenment in Russia. Modern researchers identify direct semantic context close or identical to the works of Confucius in the work by Empress Catherine II "Grandmother's Alphabet," as well as in "Historical Song" by A. N. Radishchev, in the "Letter about the use of glass" by M. V. Lomonosov, in the poem "About true bliss" by A. D. Cantemir and in the "Letter of a Chinese to the Tatar Murza" by M. V. Sushkova [3].

Thus, in particular, A. N. Radishchev called Confucius a "wonderful" (amazing) teacher of humanity. Addressing the genius of Confucius, he wrote: "Your word is radiant/In the midst of a terrible storm, battle,/on the ruins of the Motherland/It is always shining in splendor/And through the whole centuries/In soaring high/Ascend and fly" [9. P. 76-77].

In this paradigm, the following issues have proved to be fundamental and in demand:

1) the role of an enlightened ruler.

"The teacher said: What is called a human duty? The father must prove parental feelings, and the son – piety; elder brother kindness, and younger – friendliness, the husband – justice, and the wife – obedience, the older – mercy, and the younger one – obedience, the sovereign – humanity, and citizens – loyalty. These ten qualities are called human duty" [6. P. 105];

2) relations between the ruler and his subjects.

"The teacher said: When you rule a land that can supply a thousand war wagons, you must be careful in your business, truthful, love the people, save money, and encourage the people to work in accordance with the changing seasons" [7. P. 400-401];

3) relations between the younger and older people.

"The teacher said: At home, the younger ones are respectful to their parents, and on the side to the older ones, careful and truthful" [7. P. 22];

Thus, the spiritual teaching of Confucius turned out to be relevant and fundamentally modern for the Russian political problems of the Enlightenment. Questions and problems that were considered and acutely debated in the Russian society actually received clear, concrete and time-verified answers through the statements from Confucius.

Of course, sometimes other people covered their own thoughts and ideas by the name and authority of Confucius, often attributing to him their own thoughts and ideas.

In the conditions of an absolute "enlightened" monarchy disguise allowed public figures to preserve their freedom and sometimes their lives. Thus, China, the doctrine of Confucius and Chinese wisdom, became an independent concept of Russian culture, politics and literature, and Confucius himself became an authoritative author, a supporter of the restriction of serfdom in Russia.

The concept of "Chinese mind" (Chinese wisdom) was formed and widely used in Russian public thought under the direct influence of his writings [3].

To this same thematic period should be attributed the research of the authors who "discovered" the real works of Confucius for the Russian reader. Translations by A. L. Leontiev (1716-1786) and Fr. Iakinf (N. Ya. Bichurin) (1777-1853) introduced the domestic reader to the text of the classical Canon "Si Shu," the true history and culture of centuries-old China [5. P. 68-69].

From 1828 to 1851, N. Ya. Bichurin alone published more than 100 works, including many valuable translations.

In 1780, the first book of the Quatrains, da Xue, was published in Russia, and "Jung Yoon" was published in 1784.

A partial return to the old ideals took place during the reign of Emperor Alexander I (1801-1825), but during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I (1825-1855) the influence of Confucianism on the political and cultural life of Russia was constantly decreasing.

Russian researchers note the fragmentary influence of Chinese heritage and Confucius, in particular, on the authors of the Nicholas I Russia, such as Alexander Pushkin ("Ruslan and Lyudmila"), however, this is an exception rather than the rule [1].

A certain surge of interest of the "thinking class" in the teachings of Confucius was observed during the reign of Emperor Alexander II (1855-1881). This is again explained by the modernity and relevance of Confucius' work and its perception in the "Russian era of change". However, the vector of event interpretations, even taking into account the traditional Russian conservatism, did not contribute to the expansion of Confucianism's influence in Russia.

Thus, in the middle of the XIX century, the spread of Confucianism in Russia was localized. The "political layer" of the society, which was extremely interested in Confucius' ideas in "Catherine's" Russia, almost completely distanced itself from them in the mid-90s of the XVIII century.

However, interest in the heritage of Confucius, in general, has always been characteristic of the "cultural layer" of Russian society. Thus, during the reigns of the Emperors Alexander III (1881-1894) and Nicholas II (1894-1917), sources record a new stage of growth in the popularity of Confucianism in Russia.

1. An interest in Confucianism from the scientific community (cultural layer) is represented by the brilliant works of P. E. Skachkov (1892-1964); P. S. Popov (1848-1913), V. P. Vasiliev (1818-1900), and others. It is P. S. Popov who has the merit of publishing the classic treatise "Meng-Tzu" in 1904. At the same

time, the national school of "Chinese studies" was actively developing, and the tradition of studying various aspects of the history and culture of China and Confucianism in particular was being formed.

2. The Russian intelligentsia was literally "fascinated" by the works of Leo Tolstoy, who actively used Chinese cultural heritage in his works. Confucius became a necessary daily "companion" of the great Russian writer. In 1905, a rare and little-known work by L. N. Tolstoy was published, the history of which was described in the publisher's preface. "During the serious illness of Leo Tolstoy in January 1903, when his life was hanging by a thread, ... he still found the strength to read the gospel and, out of habit, daily ... the calendar, read the sayings of various great people collected there" [8. P. 1]. The sayings of Confucius turned for Leo Tolstoy into a spiritual medicine: "when a wise man adheres to the law of virtue, he hides it from the eyes of people and does not regret that it is not known to everyone. ... Although people do not know what good is, they have it in themselves. ... Everything has its beginning and its end. So is the business of man: there is not a single business that does not have its beginning and its end. He who truly understands where the beginning and the end are, is close to the truth.

To attain knowledge, one must examine the essence of things… To be highly moral means to be a free soul" [8. P. 21-176].

The legacy of Confucius is more or less present in the works of a number of Russian poets and writers of the late XIX – early XX centuries.

The growth of interest in Chinese culture and Confucianism in particular in the early twentieth century was probably caused by the following circumstances:

1) the Russian – Japanese War of 1904-1905, as a result, a part of the Russian society personally visited China and could get acquainted (to varying degrees) with the culture of the Chinese people;

2) the defeat in the war, the internal ideological crisis, which stimulated the spiritual search for directions of development among the Russian intelligentsia (cultural class). As a result, a significant part of the society turned to the heritage of Confucius, to the study of scientific literature, the development of Chinese spiritual practices, etc.;

3) the search for the "Eastern" wisdom, sacred knowledge, attempts to see the meaning and direction of the world's development, characteristic of a significant portion of the Russian cultural layer of that era;

4) the presence of a significant Chinese Diaspora in Russia, which was widely represented in almost all regions of Russia [2. P. 132-134].

S. M. Georgievsky (1851-1893) and I. Ya. Korostovets (1862-1933) made a great contribution to the study of Confucianism. Anna Stolpovskaya called Confucius a great "reformer of morals."

In the Soviet period of history, the attitude to Confucianism should be recognized as rather negative. Since Confucius was considered part of the feudal elite that exploited the working population of China. At the same time, this did not mean that representatives of the scientific community were forbidden to study his work. V. M. Alekseev (1881-1951) and V. A. Rubin (1923-1981) made a huge contribution to the study of the problem.

During the periods of complications in relations between the USSR and China, the situation deteriorated significantly. A kind of "liberalization" occurred during the period of "perestroika." However, it was not due to a growing interest in Confucianism on the part of the political layer of the USSR, but rather to the actual inability to control the society. Attempts by the representatives of science to pay attention to the Chinese studies (historical, political, economic and cultural) were not widely supported in the society. At the same time, M. L. Titarenko noted that Confucianism has always been a regulator of life relations in China [10]. The works by L. S. Perelomov, V. V. Malyavin and L. S. Vasiliev were devoted to the study of Confucius ' personality and legacy.

After the collapse of the USSR (1991) and the first disappointments in the Russia's new capitalist course, there was again an increase in the interest in China in general and Confucianism in particular. This process was primarily due to the serious economic success of the PRC, which combined elements of capitalism and planned economy with modern development which contrasted the negative results of the "process of initial capital accumulation" in the Russian Federation. Some representatives of the cultural layer of the Russian society tried to explain the Chinese specifics be many factors, including the traditions of Confucianism, which promoted the study of such traditions in the Russian Federation. However, without the support of the PRC, this process was rather slow. The situation started to change from the beginning of the XXI century.

In 2001, the "Treaty of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation" between the Russian Federation and China was signed. Within the framework of this agreement, it was supposed to intensify mutual activities in the field of science, culture and inter-civilizational contacts.

In 2002, a decision was made to provide large-scale support from the PRC to the public Russian Confucius Foundation. The Foundation fully supports publications in the Russian Federation of classical works ("Da Xue," "Zhong Yun," "Lun Yu"), etc.

Currently (2019), scientific research and conferences are being held in the Russian Federation, the exchange of students and teachers has intensified, and Confucius Institutes have been opened and are working fruitfully.

With regard to the degree of influence of Confucianism on the modern political class, it should be noted that such research has not been conducted in Russia. Therefore, we can only hypothetically assert that such influence may well exist in certain regions of the Russian Federation. This assumption is caused by the presence of personal interests.

Certain elements of Confucianism can be spread much more widely in the Russian Federation. However, this is only an assumption. For example, the personal image of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu contain elements that, with a certain degree of caution, can be attributed to the tradition of Confucianism. However, their points of view on this matter are not known. There is no doubt about another circumstance. The global and universal significance of Confucius's legacy is undeniable.

In modern Russia, there is a steady trend to research and study Chinese politics, economics, history, culture, and spiritual practices. In this regard the number of Russians who sincerely want to join the culture of the Chinese people will only increase.

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HOW TO DISCLOSE RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY POTENTIAL?

Foreign policy potential can be understood as the ability and readiness of a country to use reserve opportunities and open up new opportunities available in the world for the implementation of its national interests. The concept of economic potential is developed in the most detail in science. There are also labor, export, defense, personnel, institutional and other types of potential. The implementation of foreign policy potential concerns both the use of known reserves, but not previously used for various reasons, and the disclosure of new opportunities arising from domestic and foreign policy changes. The countries of the world are actively implementing their foreign policy potential, finding new meanings in world politics, introducing new institutional forms of international interaction, and making greater use of forecasting and other modern methods. Russia should strive for a leadership position in the implementation of its foreign policy potential.

Key words: *breakthrough, potential, economic potential, export potential, integration potential, opportunity, ability, readiness, initiative.*

Today, the goal is to achieve a breakthrough in the development of Russia. President Vladimir Putin, addressing the Federal Assembly on January 15, 2020, stated that “Russia faces breakthrough historical tasks, and everyone's contribution to their solution is significant” [32]. Breakthroughs, including in foreign policy, are the subject of study in various countries. Researchers note that the Camp David agreements, the unification of East and West Germany in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and some other events were breakthroughs in world politics, they have significantly changed the world situation [15]. Where do such breakthroughs in foreign policy come from? What can they give our country? You need to look for meaningful answers to these questions.

According to our hypothesis, one of the sources of a breakthrough in the development of our country may be the realization of its foreign policy potential. This means opening up new and using previously unused opportunities in Russia's relations with foreign countries. To prove this hypothesis, we need to study the concept of potential, its classification, ways of use and disclosure. Foreign experience in working with foreign policy potential may be of interest. On this basis, we can offer some recommendations on how to use Russia's foreign policy potential to realize its national interests. These questions are the subject of research in this article. It can be considered as a continuation of the author's previous articles on the concept of potential [24. P. 17-30; 23. P. 74-87].

The notion of potential. In scientific articles and monographs, the concept of potential is used quite widely, but its essence and content are rarely considered. Meanwhile, a lot depends on the accuracy of its understanding in its separation from the notions of strength and power that are close in meaning. Etymologically, they are very close indeed. The word "potential" is derived from the Latin *potentialis* which means "powerful," from *potentia* "strength, power," from *potēns* "able," part. praes. act. from *posse* "capable, able," from the adjective *potis* "powerful, able" [33]. But this proximity of meanings should encourage further research. Aristotle distinguished between "act" and "potency," between reality and possibility. The difference between them contains the space of development. Potency is the ability of a thing to be tomorrow somewhat different from what it is today [35. P. 17].

The essence of potential is seen in the foreign policy changes. Any major change can be imagined as the result of realization of some potential. This is why scientists are studying the potential for major international changes [30. P. 232-238]. Professor Ch. Hermann of the Ohio State University identifies the following reasons for changes in the international policy: shifts in the position of the head of state, transformations in the position of the state bureaucracy, restructuring within the country and, finally, foreign policy shocks [6. P. 3-21]. As an example of the first reason, the author cites the decision of Egyptian President A. Sadat to seek a peaceful settlement with Israel after the 1973 war. This is not the only example of the influence the leader of the country has on its foreign policy. Here is a notable example of Botswana: the new President of the country, as noted by V. Sibilev, in fact, opened the country to the world [37. P. 28-33]. This change may be of interest to Moscow: the share of Russia and Botswana in the production of rough diamonds is more than 50% of world production. There are other opportunities for developing relations between the two countries.

As the second reason, Ch. Hermann presents the resistance of the capital's bureaucracy to the possible changes. D. Trump foresaw such resistance and promised in his election campaign to "drain the Washington swamp." The author of this article has already written about the so-called "deep state" in one of his recent works [25]. The third reason Ch. Hermann illustrated by the Vietnam syndrome, the Watergate scandal, and other major changes in the American domestic policy. Finally, as an illustration of the fourth reason, we can cite the sharp twists and turns in the US – India – Pakistan relations in recent years. Ch. Hermann classified changes by their depth into four types: adjustments; changes in the program; changes in the problem/goal and, finally, changes in the international orientation.

The analysis of the fourth cause of changes in the world is of particular importance for foreign policy. Changes can affect the local, regional, or global space. An example of a megatrend concerning global space is the digitalization of international relations. This process affects all countries, and those countries that are the first to reveal their newly emerging potential are more successful in addressing their national interests. An illustration of this is the activity of the US Embassy in Brazil at the beginning of the last decade [31]. B. Scott, American Ambassador to Brazil, on arriving there in 2012, asked to identify the main bloggers in twelve major Brazilian cities. He established a direct contact with them, passed them the necessary information, opened their potential and, thus, dramatically increased the influence of the United States in Brazil. Russia, which is ranked fourth in the global digital diplomacy ranking, has all the opportunities for such achievements. In the regional context, the emergence of a new state may be such a sharp change. One of the Russian foreign policy documents in connection with the visit to Moscow of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of South Sudan A. D. Achuil states that “there is potential for expanding trade and economic cooperation, including in such areas as energy, construction, development of automobile, railway and pipeline infrastructure, and agriculture” [4]. This potential opened up when South Sudan became a sovereign state in 2011 and started to gradually form its system of foreign economic relations.

The analysis of the literature shows that potential is often associated with the concepts of opportunity, ability and readiness for change. According to the Philosophical Dictionary, “... a possibility becomes a reality when a complete set of conditions for the existence of a certain phenomenon arises spontaneously or is consciously prepared” [34. P. 75]. For example, Russia’s leadership in the world energy sector is conditioned by the huge reserves of oil, gas, and coal on the territory of Russia, the highly competitive position of the state atomic energy Corporation “Rosatom” on the world stage, and other objectively existing circumstances, the effective use of which creates prerequisites for occupying one of the world leading positions.

In other words, the possibility expresses an objective development trend inherent in existing phenomena, the presence of the conditions for the appearance of an object (thing or phenomenon), or at least the absence of such circumstances that would exclude its occurrence [34. P. 74]. Therefore, the task of the subject of foreign policy is to be able to determine what is necessary and what is not possible for the realization of the opportunity. In this sense, the group of authors says that “a rational way for assessing military potential is to develop a value judgment about the country’s ability to achieve the main goals of its military policy, such as, for example, strategic nuclear deterrence” [13. P. 53-68].

However, the ability alone is not enough to realize the potential, this also requires the readiness of the subject of foreign policy. The main source of development in the world today is often considered not a physical resource, but a human resource potential [10. P. 68-74]. These problems are considered in the research of proactive behavior by M. Crant [7 P. 435-462], in the concept of personal initiative by M. Frese and D. Fay [11. P. 133-187] and other theoretical approaches. According to Frese, proactivity is manifested in a number of employee qualities, in particular, in the long-term and perspective vision of development processes, in the ability to anticipate future problems and ways to resolve them, to offer alternative ways to achieve goals, and the willingness to highlight potential problems and promising opportunities. All these qualities can be included in the list of competencies necessary for Russian diplomats.

A. N. Berezhnoy suggests that the economic potential is understood as the ability of the system to effectively use basic and functional internal resources, and to implement its capabilities in external conditions. In his opinion, the content characteristics of the economic potential are the resources available in the region, opportunities and readiness for socio-economic transformations [3. P. 7-14]. As we can see, this approach also includes the above-mentioned link "opportunity-ability-readiness." Each country has a huge number of opportunities to conduct its foreign policy and implement changes necessary for the realization of its national interests.

However, as A. Sushentsov writes, potentials are not always converted into significant foreign policy achievements [39]. The existing opportunities should be realized, and this requires the ability and, further, the readiness of the diplomat to find these innovative elements with the help of the above-mentioned competencies.

Readiness is understood as a conscious attitude to the upcoming activity, due to the high level of development of motivational, cognitive, emotional and volitional processes of the individual or team, which ensures the success of the upcoming activity [19]. According to another definition, readiness is an active and effective state of the individual, an attitude to a certain behavior, the mobilization of forces to perform a task, which includes knowledge, skills, attitudes and determination to perform these actions [9]. Finally, according to another definition, readiness consists in countering obstacles that arise in the course of performing an action [20]. All these features should be reflected in the daily activities of a diplomat.

What does the "opportunity – ability – readiness" triad mean in foreign policy practice? The answer to this question can be found in the thoughts of the Chairman of the Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council F. Lukyanov. He states that in recent years, Russia has achieved notable success on the world stage. Explaining the reasons for these foreign policy achievements, he notes " ... the ability to react quickly to the changes and a sense of opportunity. It also includes the ability to see the mistakes of others and use them" [22]. As we can see, this author also establishes a connection between the possibilities and the ability to implement them. In terms of this article, we are talking about the effective use of the existing foreign policy potential of Russia in specific conditions.

Thus, the foreign policy potential can be understood as the ability and readiness of a country to use reserve opportunities and open new opportunities available in the world for the implementation of its national interests.

Classification of potential. Researchers suggest different classifications of potential. The concept of economic potential is most fully developed in the literature. Obviously, this is because the economic potential is calculable. In addition, it is easier to determine the share of reserve capacity of a particular production that is not currently used in the economy. Thus, D. V. Troshin mentions labor, export, defense, and personnel potential as components of economic potential [42. P. 50].

The integration potential deserves special mention. According to A. A. Nikulina, the integration potential is expressed "... in additional economic benefits and advantages for integrating countries, which cannot be achieved (or can be achieved less effectively) without the integration interaction" [27]. A. V. Khramova connects the potential with integration activities within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union, in particular, with the potential of unification and the opportunities of the Eurasian Economic Integration [18. P. 193-199]. She mentions such types of integration potential as geographical, resource, transit, military, and intellectual.

An interesting idea is expressed by A. S. Vladytskiy, according to him "the existing integration potential of our country, in case of its effective use and further development, will contribute to the development and implementation of integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space" [4. P. 12]. In other words, the potential itself is not realized, but an initiative is needed to realize it. The initiative is a form of manifestation of the readiness of the subject of foreign policy to realize its potential. Putting forward an initiative implies understanding of the existence of foreign policy potential and ways of its implementation. It can be seen as a manifestation of the diplomat's readiness to implement Russia's foreign policy potential.

If there is an integration potential, then there must be a disintegration potential [8. P. 209-225]. What can it consist of in the sphere of international relations? *Brexit* provides a clear example of modern politics in this regard. It is possible to carefully disintegrate the non-working forms of the UK's ties with the European Union, leaving and even strengthening the promising ones. And it is possible to completely destroy the established relations, but this would not be a disintegration, but a destruction. The first way looks much more favorable from the point of view of potential realization than the second. It is unclear what path British and European politicians will take.

Quite often, the concept of export potential is given in the classification of potential [38. P. 3-22]. V. V. Kotilko and V. S. Vishnyakova define "export potential as the ability of a country's economy, individual industries or enterprises to produce the necessary amount of competitive products for export" [21. P. 42]. According to these authors, export potential includes financial, production, marketing potential and competitiveness. The concept of the necessary quantity of production (and in foreign policy, this is a necessary action) requires further discussion. Who and how determines this necessity? Behind the surface of this question is a much deeper relationship between freedom and necessity.

If there is an export potential, then there is also its opposite – import potential. A study of the literature has shown that this type of potential is poorly understood. Meanwhile, attention is drawn to the ambiguity of the concept of potential. In physics, there are concepts of positive and negative electric field potentials. The existence of integration and disintegration potentials has already been noted above. I. Tarasova writes that there is a creative and destructive potential for using network resources in the Eurasian space and around the world [41. P. 152-159]. The study of the duality of foreign policy potential, including the import potential of foreign economic relations, can lead to the identification of more general patterns related to this concept.

For a long time, science has focused on resource potential, such as mineral resources or land resources, and to a lesser extent on non-material types of potential, such as institutional, human, or innovative. This classification is interesting because the use of potential mainly concerns its resource part, and the disclosure of potential – the intangible, primarily human and innovative potential. In this regard, it is interesting to consider these two components of potential – the use of existing reserves and the disclosure of new aspects of possible cooperation between countries of the world.

Use and disclosure of the potential. The use of potential is discussed rather often. This is quite understandable, because the use of potential is the use of well-known reserves that have not been previously put into business circulation for various reasons. An example in this case is the Ukrainian gas transportation system. According to its technical capabilities, it can deliver about 180 billion m^3 of gas per year from Russia to European countries. However, these capabilities are not fully used. Gas pumping reached its maximum in 2008, amounting to almost 120 billion m3 of Russian gas. In the proposed meaning, the GTS potential as the difference between possibility and reality amounted to 60 billion m3. In 2018, less than 87 billion m3 was pumped through the GTS, and its potential increased to 93 billion cubic meters [12]. There is a serious political struggle going on between Russia, the United States and other countries over this potential in the form of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

When using the potential, we are usually talking about extensive development. In the above-mentioned case, we are talking about expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. Such an extension can be quite large-scale and significant. Yet the use of potential rarely leads to a qualitative leap in relations between countries, reaching a really new level, which is characterized as a breakthrough. To do this, it is necessary to discover a new potential, rather than use the already known one. Therefore, in this article, we will mainly focus on ways to unlock the new foreign policy potential.

Unlocking your potential means creating something new that didn't exist before. Let's take institutional capacity as an illustration. On October 23-24, 2019, Sochi hosted the first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum. This event can be called a new stage in the development of relations between Moscow and the countries of the African continent. Without an organizational framework, this relationship is unlikely to continue to progress successfully. In addition to the continental Forum, Russia needs to look for other institutional forms of interaction with African countries, both at the sub-regional and two-or three-way levels, i.e., to develop its institutional potential. The need for it is high, because the African countries are very different, and most likely it will not be possible to cut all under the same comb.

The development of institutional foreign policy potential can take various forms. In the 70s of the last century, the US State Department established the so-called Dissent Channel, through which a diplomat or group of diplomats could report their disagreement with the officially conducted state policy. This Channel was repeatedly used by American diplomats to convey their views to the leadership of the State Department [16. P. 36-40]. The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States has a similar practice of so called "red groups" that study the shortcomings in the CIA's activities from the inside and offer recommendations for their elimination [28]. In our opinion, such close attention to a non-standard position is justified, since it allows people to identify existing foreign policy contradictions and the opportunities arising from them at the early stages of their occurrence.

One of the ways to unlock the potential is to clarify the content of existing concepts in the world politics and create new ones. An obvious example in this sense is the history of the emergence and development of the BRIC Union. The idea of combining this group of countries was suggested in 2001 by an analyst from "Goldman Sachs," who in the course of research identified similar trends in the development of Brazil, Russia, India and China. The similarity of the development trends suggests similarity of national interests. Only after this analytical work did politicians of these countries undertake organizational efforts, which culminated in the creation of BRIC in 2006. Later, the South African Republic joined the Union, and it took its current form. However, its potential has not been used for almost five years.

Clarification of the existing concepts and creation of new ones mean creation of new meanings. Such theoretical development, whether it is a step or a leap, in practice leads to a new goal setting. An example in this regard is Russia's policy towards Africa. Director of the Institute for African Studies, corresponding member of RAS, member of the RAS Presidium I. O. Abramova noted that ten years ago Russia wanted to become a part of Europe and considered Africa as a byproduct of its foreign policy and economy [1]. Nobody had the slightest wish to look for the potential for developing Russian-African relations. Today, in the context of the announced "turn to the East," it is clear that other strategic directions – South and North – should not be neglected. And when this becomes obvious, new goals are set for the development of these areas.

New meanings do not occur in a vacuum, one of the sources of their emergence is the study of the past mistakes. P. P. Yakovlev said that "the history of Latin America comes to new terms, the region has accumulated the significant potential for a change created by the intellectual environment in order to make correct conclusions from the past mistakes. The third decade of the XXI century should be a turning point in its socio-economic development" [45. P. 101]. Indeed, the study of your own and others' mistakes can be a source of significant achievements. We also note the connection in this author's thought between the potential and a change in development. A fracture can be seen as a synonym for a breakthrough, a leap in development. However, a break is a sharp turn, a change in the direction of development. Justification for such sharp turns requires finding the hidden potential and ways to reveal it.

The past makes it possible to evaluate certain foreign policy actions as a mistake. As for the present, most often the search for potential is associated with the need to resolve the accumulated problems. The lack of resolution means that the old approaches are no longer effective enough, and new ones are needed. As an illustration let us draw attention to the serious problems that exist today in the development of the Union state of Russia and Belarus. In this regard, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said at a meeting with his Belarusian counterpart Sergei Rumas at the end of January 2020 that "we need to fully unlock the potential of the Treaty and ensure maximum harmonization of national legislation" [26]. We can deduce the following pattern from this example: the more acute the foreign policy problem is the greater is the need to disclose the potential available in its zone.

When solving foreign policy problems, the set of tools and methods used in this process is of the utmost importance. Without neglecting traditional tools and methods, we note the increasing importance of the new knowledge management systems, data management and artificial intelligence. It is impossible to make a single step in diplomacy today without modern information technologies, as is evidenced by the best EU practices [5; 44]. Therefore, Russia needs to pay attention to the further development of digital diplomacy, which is both a powerful innovative channel for interaction with a wide foreign audience and a source of diverse information. At the same time, evaluating the effectiveness of digital diplomacy should include not only the presence of the Foreign Ministry and Russian embassies in foreign social networks, but also their influence in them.

Another important aspect in the disclosure of foreign policy potential is addressed by V. Heifets and L. Hadorich. Upon analyzing the state of the Latin American integration association UNASUR, they noted that “the integration Association under consideration, at least for the time being, has a certain potential” [14. P. 91]. What needs to be done to unlock and realize this potential? These authors write about the “leadership vacuum” in UNASUR, about the “erosion of regional leadership” [14. P. 89, 90]. We fully agree that unlocking and realizing potential is a leadership function. One of the most important qualities of a leader is to see the prospective a little further than others see it. Thus, the development of potential is directly related to the development of leadership skills of politicians and diplomats, and for this, among other things, it is advisable to study the theory of leadership.

Foreign practice of using and disclosing foreign policy potential. There are quite a few examples of successful implementation by foreign countries of their existing foreign policy potential. Modern Mongol-Japanese relations can serve as one of them [2. P. 267-271]. Japan is the main international donor to Mongolia, accounting for about a third of the aid provided to this country by donor countries. And this is no accident, the line is carried out by Japanese strategists. Tokyo has identified the competitive advantages of the Mongolian economy, in particular, the agricultural sector. For Japan, Mongolia is also becoming a mediator in the North Korean issue and a necessary partner in ensuring security in the region. In turn, Mongolia is also interested in developing priority relations with Japan. Along with the influx of Japanese investment and modern technologies, Japan’s role in Mongolia’s foreign policy as the main “third neighbor” is being strengthened.

China is constantly searching for foreign policy potential. A manifestation of this promising activity is the promotion of a number of major, most often foreign economic, initiatives. From Beijing’s point of view, Southeast Asia has the potential to ensure its national security and economic growth. Southeast Asia is rich in natural resources, including energy resources. The region has a large market for Chinese exports. Southeast Asia, especially its less developed countries, is very profitable for Chinese capital investments. Finally, a number of Southeast Asian countries are geographically, economically and politically integrated into the Chinese belt and road Initiative. The goal of this Initiative, going beyond its purely infrastructural significance, is to strengthen China’s influence in world politics [36. P. 40-49].

Breakthroughs in foreign policy and potential disclosure are closely related to forecasting activities. Forecasts can be considered as part of capacity-building activities. Foreign authors draw attention to the fact that more and more international and non-governmental organizations, including commercial companies, are turning to forecasting. In particular, international organizations such as UNESCO, UNIDO, OECD and WEF have set up structural units or projects aimed at forecasting. The RAND Corporation created the Mediterranean Foresight Forum, and the well-known American analytical structure the Atlantic Council – the Foresight, Strategy and Risk Initiative [17]. To unlock Russia's foreign policy potential, it is necessary to make more active use of the results of predictive activities of public and private structures.

The main role in unlocking potential is played by the human being, so in foreign countries great attention is paid to the human potential, in particular, the potential of a diplomat. A number of countries introduced in the staff of their embassies the position of "attaché for innovations". The UK has sent almost 100 such attaches to more than 30 countries around the world [17]. Their main task is to promote British competitiveness, mainly in the economic sphere. But the innovative diplomat can be viewed more broadly. To provide innovative cooperation means to find new areas of cooperation that correspond to the prospects of modern world development. With such an approach, all Russian diplomats must be innovative to ensure a breakthrough in the country's development.

Recommendations are being developed abroad on how to find and implement these innovations in international relations. So, British experts recommend moving along this path in four directions: a) learning and informing; b) influencing and promoting; c) nurturing and establishing contacts; d) activating and scaling [29]. Each of the recommended directions is detailed. For example, the content of the latter is the joint development or identification of external resources for the development of new areas of cooperation. These recommendations could be used in the activities of Russian official and public diplomats.

As a follow-up to this trend, some countries are setting up innovative offices. Since the early 2000s, Switzerland, for example, has established a network of Swissnex innovation hubs in San Francisco, Boston, Shanghai, Bangalore, Rio de Janeiro and other cities. The hubs are managed by the State Secretariat for education, research and innovation, with the assistance of the Swiss Foreign Ministry. The hub activities are coordinated with approximately 20 science and technology offices attached to Swiss diplomatic missions [40. P. 148]. In Russia, such functions could be taken by the Ministry of science and higher education, the Ministry of digital development, communications and mass communications, and the Russian export center.

Conclusions. To sum up, the foreign policy potential can be understood as the ability and readiness of a country to use reserve opportunities and open up new opportunities available in the world for the implementation of its national interests. The concept of economic potential is the most developed in science. There are also labor, export, defense, personnel, institutional and other types of potential. Attention is drawn to the diversity of potential: integration and disintegration, export and import, constructive and destructive, and others. The implementation of foreign policy potential concerns both the use of known reserves, but not previously used for various reasons, and the disclosure of new opportunities arising from domestic and foreign policy changes. Breakthrough solutions in the country's development are more related to the discovery of new potential than to the use of reserves. In this regard, the most important is the innovative and human potential. The countries of the world are actively using their foreign policy potential, finding new meanings in world politics, introducing new institutional forms of international interaction, and making greater use of forecasting and other modern methods. Russia should strive for a leadership position in the implementation of its foreign policy potential.

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FEATURES OF MODERN TERRORISM

The article is devoted to analysis of specifics of modern terrorism. The article reveals the main features of terrorism of the XXI century: religious and extremist orientation, transnational character, network structure of terrorist organizations, a wide arsenal of terrorist means, high intensity, growth of the political potential of terrorism. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the role of modern information technologies in the activities of terrorists.

Key words: *terrorism, the nature of modern terrorism, the terrorist activities of Islamic extremists, terrorism information, organizational basis of terrorism.*

There are different points of view on the specifics of the current phase of terrorism in the teriological literature. Some authors write about the global nature of terrorist actions, the increasing level of their scale and organization. Others point to the strengthening of the position of Islamism among the currents of international terrorism. Many note that terrorists have started using new approaches and technologies.

Based on the analysis of terrorist activities and taking into account existing approaches, we can give the following characteristics of the current stage of terrorism. Its specific features, in our opinion, are:

1. Religious and extremist orientation. In modern conditions, as in the last century, there is a variety of forms of terrorism. However, most often terrorist acts occur on a religious basis, both in pure form (terrorism of religious extremists) and in combination with other types (for example, ethno-religious terrorism, which is widespread, in particular, in the Russian North Caucasus).

At the same time, at present, political activity of religious extremists is characteristic, first of all, for Islamic confessions [10]. This is largely due to the traditionally high degree of politicization of Islam. Muslims have always closely linked political and religious power. For Islam, there has never been a difference between the Muslim community and the state, religion and law, secular and spiritual authority. Islam as a religion originally contained a political component.

Political Islam now goes beyond the area of traditional settlement of Muslim peoples. In particular, its influence is increasingly spreading to Western countries, where the number of Muslim populations is growing. Many people note that the conflict of values between them and the indigenous peoples of Western Europe and North America has worsened.

Political Islam – Islamism-has a certain degree of radicality. Its supporters analyze political phenomena through the prism of Islamic values and seek to use religious norms and principles in political activities. At present, it is the most widespread form of radical Islamism. It advocates radical, systemic changes and proclaims creation of a theocratic state based on Sharia law as its ultimate goal. It acts as the antithesis of Western democracy and presupposes autocratic means and methods of managing society.

Radical Islamism has become the ideological basis for the terrorism of Islamic religious fanatics. They are ready to make any sacrifice including self-destruction for the sake of higher values. This is evidenced by the increase in the number of suicide bombers in the twenty-first century. Readiness for self-sacrifice increases the effectiveness of religious extremism and makes it difficult to fight it. Suicide bombers are difficult to stop, even with the most extreme measures. J. Baudrillard rightly notes that "the radical difference of the new terrorism is as follows: having all the weapons developed by this system, the terrorists have one more type – their own death, and this becomes fatal" [1].

While noting the growth of Islamist political extremism, we should not equate terrorism with Islam. Experience has shown that Muslims themselves are the main victims of terrorist acts committed by religious fanatics [2].

2. Transnational character. The peculiarity of modern terrorism is its planetary scale. First, the internationalization of terrorism is growing, and it is international terrorist attacks that are responsible for the greatest number of victims and destruction. Secondly, terrorism is increasingly directed against the world system as a whole.

For the first time, the ideas of global reconstruction of the world were developed in the program of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda. In particular, it contains the idea of "the universality of Islam," which consists in the need to achieve the establishment of Islam throughout the world through Jihad.

The Islamic state (IS) also seeks to establish a Great Islamic Caliphate. At the same time, some of the terrorist leaders are in favor of including not only Muslim, but also non-Muslim countries in its composition. This is a kind of an alternative project of a new world order based on Islamic norms and values. However, it should be recognized that not all terrorist organizations pursue global goals. Some of them even refuse to join the global Jihad.

3. Network structure of terrorist organizations. It involves constant interaction between network nodes, rapid transfer of information across all its links, joint accumulation and distribution of financial, logistical, military and other resources and flows.

This form of organization of armed struggle did not arise in the twenty-first century, but now terrorist organizations are increasingly moving to the network principle of activity. Elements of a terrorist network are mobile, flexible, and resilient. They are completely autonomous. A group may include several links (political, financial, etc.), which makes it independent of external factors.

The number of people in a cell is usually from three to five persons. The network provides a high degree of anonymity, since each member of the cell is familiar only with their immediate supervisor.

Groups, cells-honeycomb or individual members coordinate their work based on a common ideology and goal; national, religious or other self-identification; responsibility for the success of a common cause; coordination of activities through sites registered in the third countries, etc.

Moreover, a study of the situation with the terrorist underground in Western Europe shows that often terrorist attacks are committed by ordinary people acting independently of Islamist organizations and indoctrinated by jihadist propaganda via the Internet [8].

The network structure of terrorism seriously complicates the fight against it and gives it great advantages in confronting a stronger opponent in the form of state structures. The absence of a rigid hierarchy and command system makes it difficult to defeat networks whose main unifying principle is a common ideology. In it, the main ideological and political guidelines are formulated in such a way that they are a direct guide to action for all elements of the network, and contain strategic and tactical recommendations for their implementation. Another advantage of the network is a higher degree of intra-group solidarity due to the fact that it consists of like-minded people who are fanatically committed to the common cause.

However, it would be wrong to absolutize the network nature of the organizational structure of modern terrorism. Terrorism has not become fully networked; it has a hybrid structure (a combination of hierarchical and networked organizational principles).

4. Wide arsenal of terrorist tools. Among them, information technologies that allow terrorists to conduct “cyber Jihad” should be noted first of all. Terrorists have always paid great attention to information, because they are interested in causing maximum resonance in society by their actions. Therefore, they try to get into the headlines in any way, like to give interviews, etc. [6].

What is the role of modern information technology (MIT) in the terrorist activities? First, extremists use the latest achievements of science and technology in the field of computer and information technologies when committing terrorist acts.

Secondly, the media component of modern terrorism has acquired a fundamentally new meaning as a result of the use of MIT. They allow terrorists to communicate with the entire world. We can blame Internet for turning terrorism into a transnational phenomenon. Now, it can affect not only thousands of users of information networks, but also entire states, quickly transmit information (including in real time), gain informational independence and form a collective identity.

With the help of MIT, terrorists are able to disable (carry out cyber attacks) the control systems of nuclear reactors, air and rail transport, storages of strategic raw materials, distribution of electricity and water, chemical and biological laboratories, etc. Such attacks are not only instrumental, but also in many ways morally and psychologically important, because they are aimed, among other things, at intimidating and demoralizing society and the political elite by threatening to disable the most important life-support systems and socially dangerous objects ("cyberterrorism").

In addition, MIT are a means of creating an atmosphere of fear in society using information that exaggerates the power of terrorists, reports on the terrible consequences of terrorist acts, including videos of hostage executions, etc. ("information terrorism") [4. P. 164]. Accordingly, the main goals of information and psychological terrorism are:

1) disorganization of social and political life. Terrorists display films and videos on the Internet designed to show that they are invincible and completely control the situation in society;

2) discrediting political opponents, also by creating an "image of the enemy": the United States, Israel, their allies, and, ultimately, all the "crusaders." The "image of the enemy" is constructed using depersonalization, which greatly facilitates aggression, since the "enemy" turns from concrete to abstract: he may be American, European, etc.;

3) propaganda of radical Islamism, recruitment of supporters. Internet resources allow terrorists to propagate their ideas around the world, establish close relations between immigrants and extremist organizations in the Middle East, South Asia, and other parts of the world. Compared to previous years, the time it takes to recruit a terrorist is rapidly decreasing. Its main tool is communication in social networks. According to experts, it is the bright, regularly updated content that is a powerful factor in generating interest in it from radical Muslims. Special attention is paid to young people who dominate terrorist organizations. Therefore, starting from schools, counter-propaganda using the most modern methods is necessary [9];

4) ensuring communication between terrorist cells and coordination of their activities. It is known that many of the extremists who committed terrorist attacks in Europe were regular users of Islamist websites, where, among other things, you can get instructions, either explicitly or implicitly, on how to prepare and carry out terrorist attacks.

The objects of information terrorism are, first, members of terrorist organizations; second, sympathizers; and third, opponents (state authorities, law enforcement agencies, opposition leaders, etc.).

5. High intensity. Modern terrorism is characterized by a special cruelty and great destructive consequences. In the past, hundreds of people were victims of the bloodiest terrorist attacks, now they are numbered in thousands. In 2018, the damage caused by the actions of terrorists in the world amounted to almost US $33 billion [3].

6. Growth of the political potential of terrorism.

For a long time, it has been assumed that the political possibilities of terrorism are very limited, that it is used by those whose military potential is insufficient to defeat the enemy in an open clash.

However, despite the serious damage inflicted on al-Qaeda in recent years, the strategic importance of terrorism as a political tool has increased [7]. Due to a number of reasons, the scale of its political tasks has grown significantly in the twenty-first century (seizure and redistribution of power, influence on mass consciousness, etc.). But this topic deserves a separate analysis.

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ON THE PROSPECTS OF ISLAM AS A SYSTEM-FORMING FACTOR I N THE CAUCASUS

The article analyzes the place and role of Islam in the formation of national consciousness of the peoples of the Caucasus, who profess this religious system. Attention is focused on the justification of the thesis about the failure of the ideas of those analysts who are convinced that in the conditions of Caucasus Islam is almost a system-forming factor, determining the nature of political and economic modernization of the region, political behavior and choice of the peoples concerned of the forms of their political self-organization. In favor of this thesis, there is a strong evidence that the choice or rejection of political parties, the political course of the authorities, and the power system itself are determined not so much by religious beliefs, but by the socio-cultural, political-cultural, ethno-national and other factors characteristic of each nation.

Key words: *Russia, Caucasus, region, people, religion, faith, Islam, national consciousness, politics, values.*

The Caucasus is a specific region, populated by many peoples, sometimes making many claims to each other of an ethno-national, territorial or other nature. There are many difficult-to-resolve knots of contradictions and conflicts related to the issues of economic and political modernization, as well as systemic and structural components of the state structure. Among them, one of the key places is occupied by the very complex problems generated in the confessional sphere by the pluralism of various trends in Caucasian Islam. This issue becomes even more important because many analysts, publicists, political figures and even researchers consider Islam as one of the most important factors determining the forms of political self-organization of the respective peoples of the Caucasus that can even become the basis for their unification into a single political entity.

It should be emphasized that the works of Russian authors published in recent years cover a wide range of issues in this subject area [2; 3; 4; 7; 8. P. 100-108].

However, the problem is not completely resolved. Due to many objective circumstances the study of this topic continues to maintain a high level of relevance.

Naturally, this is a complex topic that requires a very careful assessment and is a subject of many works in the Russian political science. Therefore, the this article focuses on some aspects requiring, in the opinion of the author, certain adjustments.

As a rule, world religions, due to a complex of factors, proclaim their goal to neutralize or even erase ethnic, cultural, political and other differences between tribes, ethnos, peoples and nations. Just as Christianity proclaims that there is neither a Greek nor a Jew, but there are Christians, so is Islam makes no difference between an Arab, a Persian or a Turk, but considers them all Muslim believers, members of the United Ummah, regardless of any differences. However, as evidenced by the historical experience of mankind, religion plays an important role in the formation of national consciousness. Some authors even tend to talk about ethnic religion. In many Arab countries, Islam is strongly identified with nationalism. As K. S. Hajiyev rightly notes, "the perception of life's realities through the prism of religious beliefs has become part of the worldview of many Caucasian peoples, their culture, history, and lifestyle. It is often very difficult to draw a clear line between the religious and national aspects of their lives" [5. P. 283]. This is particularly evident in politicized Islamic fundamentalism.

In this context, it should be taken into account that Islam is not only a cultural, confessional, spiritual phenomenon aimed at preserving and further developing the religious and moral spheres of the society, but also an important component of the socio-cultural and political-cultural spheres, which has a more or less significant impact on the political consciousness and behavior of the people. The ego can be used to achieve specific political goals determined by the specific interests of the political struggle. In this sense, Islam acquires the characteristics of a kind of complex religious and political doctrinal system. As the leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran Ayatollah Khomeini argued, "Islam is a political and religious teaching in which politics complements worship, and worship complements politics." He justified this thesis with the idea that "there are more political prescriptions in Islam than religious ones" [6. P. 17]. In this context, it is interesting to note that although Azerbaijan is a secular state according to the Constitution, Islam occupies a prominent place in the life of this country. One of the symbols on the national flag of Azerbaijan is the green stripe. At the inauguration ceremony, President of the country swears on the Koran. The days of religious holidays of Muslims Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Adha are declared holidays.

A correct understanding of the place and role of Islam in the mentality and various spheres of public life implies overcoming the negative interpretations and assessments that have been received in certain circles of Russian society over the past few decades. There is often a tendency to identify Islam as a whole with one of the fundamentalist movements of radical Islamism represented by Salafism, which serves as the ideological basis for various manifestations of extremism and terrorism.

In fact, the danger is not rooted in Islam or the Koran, but in perverse interpretations of the topic or other radical movements that pursue their own specific interests. It is important to take into account that many ethnic, territorial and political contradictions, perturbations and conflicts that have shaken the socio-political life of the Caucasus-Middle East region over the past two or three decades are based not on certain religions, but, above all, on various factors of a socio-economic, political, spiritual, ideological and other nature.

Therefore, it can be argued that Islam cannot be considered as an exclusively negative factor in the life of the Caucasian peoples, allegedly contributing to the destabilization and stimulation of radical, separatist moods and movements in the region. The role of Islam, understood in the broadest sense of the word, in the entire Caucasus-Middle East region cannot be assessed only as negative or positive. Just as any religious system, it contains both principles in various combinations, and the promotion of one of them depends on the specific situation in each particular country. On the one hand, fundamentalist Islamism is actually used by radical and extremist groups to achieve specific material, financial, political and other self-serving goals. On the other hand, with appropriate use of the Islamic values, norms, and attitudes, they can make an important contribution to the improvement of the moral climate in the republics, preserving and strengthening social and political stability in the society. It can be argued that traditional Islam plays an important role in countering the spread of narrow nationalism, ethnism, and various forms of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, in some national republics of the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, ministers of traditional Islam more than once stopped the most hot heads at that line, crossing which would be fraught with unpredictable negative consequences for all the peoples of the region.

However, to disclose the topic stated in the title of the article, it is necessary to keep in mind the following circumstances. The process of spreading and accepting Islam by various peoples of the region took many centuries. If in a number of regions of the southern and north-eastern Caucasus it was adopted already in the VIII-IX centuries, some peoples of the North Caucasus finally adopted it only in the XVII-XVIII centuries. This process at all stages took place in constant contradictions and struggle with the local adats – the system of customary law of the highlanders, which regulates socio-economic, family, spiritual and moral relations. In this issue, we can agree with V. Akayev, according to whom "the establishment of Islam among the peoples of the North Caucasus occurred through clashes and struggle with the mountain adats – the system of customary law of the mountain people that regulates socio-economic, family, and spiritual and moral relations. The initial rejection of Islam by the Caucasian mountaineers is largely due to a significant discrepancy in the way of life, social structure, moral and ethical standards, their perception of the world from the forms of socio-cultural life, spiritual views of the Arab conquerors" [1]. The roots of traditional folk culture were so deep that Islam was forced to adapt to the social and spiritual life of the Caucasian peoples.

As the analysis of the content and features of Islam among the Caucasian peoples shows, while adapting to local conditions, it absorbed and assimilated many elements of traditional pre-Islamic beliefs, myths, and norms regulating the behavior of the peoples of the region. As a result, it became syncretic. As you know, some archaic features of the economic and social order, remnants of patriarchal-tribal relations, were preserved for a long time in a number of mountainous regions of the Caucasus. As noted by the famous Soviet religious scholar S. A. Tokarev, "although Christianity was spreading in the Caucasus since the IV-VI centuries... and Islam – from the VII-VIII centuries, under the outer cover of these official religions, many backward peoples of the mountain regions actually retained very strong remnants of older and original religious beliefs, some of them, of course, mixed with Christian or Muslim ideas" [10].

It can be argued that in the Caucasus, Islam is a fusion of General Muslim spiritual values with local pagan beliefs and cults. In this issue, we can agree with N. M. Yemelyanova, according to whom "pre-Islamic beliefs have had and continue to have a significant impact on the way of life of Kabardians, under their influence, Kabardian Islam took a peculiar form, different from that existing in other North Caucasus regions" [11. P. 5]. Thus, in the Republic of North Ossetia, Islam has become an integral part of a special syncretic combination of pre-monotheistic beliefs, Islam and Christianity. The syncretic character of Islam is more or less clearly shown in the memorial rite of Ossetian Muslims.

We can say with a considerable degree of confidence that in the Caucasus we often speak not only about the revival of Islamic religious values, norms, attitudes and principles, but also in combination with the norms and rules of life inherited from the historical traditions of the respective peoples.

Of particular importance, from this point of view, is the fact that almost all aspects of the life of the vast majority of the Caucasian peoples have now undergone social, economic, cultural and political modernization. They have mastered and integrated the most important aspects and attributes of the Russian lifestyle. In this context, the thesis about a certain archaization of the society, which allegedly revives the layers of consciousness, behavior, and political culture that were inherent in these peoples in the distant historical past, does not seem to correspond to the real state of things. The thesis about the supposed transition of a part of the population of the Caucasus from the zone of Russian cultural, linguistic, and political space to the zone of influence of Islam after many years of domination by Soviet ideology is also devoid of real grounds. According to M. Sivertsev, for example, strategic and geopolitical prospects in the Caucasus are beginning to be determined by a new cultural and religious orientation away from the "Imperial" center towards the religious centers of the Islamic world [9. P. 18].

Therefore, it is necessary to assess very carefully the degree of religious awakening of people, because often we are talking about religiosity in everyday terms, at the level of common sense, as is the case with most Orthodox people who call themselves Christians and often do not necessarily connect this with their political choice. This is particularly evident in politicized Islamic fundamentalism. Assessing the political likes and dislikes of the vast majority of the population of the national republics of the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, where there are enclaves with representatives of peoples who profess Islam, we cannot ignore this aspect of the religious sphere of the entire Caucasus region.

As you know, the Caucasus is characterized by an extreme diversity of peoples, which belong to almost all more or less large language families with their branches: Indo-European, Caucasian-Iberian or Japhetic, Turkic. The confessional map of the Caucasus is characterized by the same diversity. If the Armenian-Gregorian Church plays a decisive role in Armenia, then Georgians and Russians are mostly Orthodox. As for Islam, it has many faces and is represented by dozens of different schools and trends – from conservative (for example, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia) to modernist (Ismailis, led by the Aga Khan IV).

There are cases when representatives of the same people adhere to different beliefs. For example, the indigenous people Udis belong to the Lezgin cultural-linguistic group, belong to the Armenian Gregorian Christianity, a small part of the Lezgins (inhabitants of single, but large villages) are Shia, and the majority of them belong to the Sunni version of Islam. Adjarians are Muslims, while Georgians are Orthodox. There are adherents of both Christianity and Islam among the Ossetians. During the period from the end of the XV to the XIX centuries, when Abkhazia was under the rule of Turkey, part of the population was converted to Islam. However, at the end of the XIX century, many became Christians, etc. The vast majority of Azerbaijanis are Shiites by faith. At the same time, Shiism in the Republic of Azerbaijan differs from its counterpart in Iranian Azerbaijan.

In the Caucasus, Islam has many currents or maskhabs that often contradict each other, do not tolerate each other and conflict with each other. In some republics, there are two or three (or even more) muftiates, between which there are constant friction and contradictions, disputes and conflicts. Currently there are seven Muslim spiritual directorates in the North Caucasus: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol territory, as well as Adygea and Krasnodar territory.

Their contradictions and conflicts were particularly sharpened by the emergence and growing influence in the region of the diverse fundamentalist and Salafist movements of radical Islamism, primarily Wahhabism, which became the ideological basis of separatist extremism and terrorism. As you know, their representatives have launched a real war against not only the official authorities of the Federal center and the corresponding national republics of the Russian Federation, but also against traditional Islam.

There is no doubt that religion leaves its mark on people's attitude to the events that take place around them. However, it is a clear exaggeration to say that there is some "Islamic" way to solve certain vital problems in the region. It seems that conclusions about certain "Islamic parties," "Islamic electorate," "Islamic path," as if able to determine the forms and directions of social development, political and economic modernization of the region as a whole and the corresponding national republics of the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan, would be a clear exaggeration. The validity of this thesis is evidenced by the fact that all attempts to create any stable political parties based on Islamic values, norms and attitudes have failed almost in all national republics of the Russian Federation.

Ethno-national, territorial, tribal, clan, language, political, socio-economic interests, attitudes, attitudes, political likes and dislikes of the vast majority of the population prevail over religious values. For example, the contradictions between Lezgins and Azerbaijanis are rooted primarily in the fact that the Lezgian people are divided by the state borders between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan, and not in the fact that the former profess Sunnism and the latter Shiism. The rapprochement of Shiite-Islamic Iran with Gregorian Armenia in contrast to the alliance of Shiite Azerbaijan and Sunni Turkey (however, on an ethno-national basis) indicates a re-evaluation of the confessional factor in relations between countries.

In many cases, the commitment to Wahhabism and other forms of fundamentalism covers the desire of individuals of an adventurous nature to seek adventures, fields of application of their forces and sometimes the desire to earn money. The appeal of some opposition organizations and others to Islamic values is due, among other things, to the desire to attract the attention of the public, as well as financial funds of authorities, non-governmental organizations and structures of Muslim countries. The analysis of the real state of things shows that the revival and spread of religious beliefs among a certain part of the population are largely formal, attributive in nature. The euphoria about the return of this part of people to the mosques, observed at the first stages after the collapse of the USSR, is gradually changing to a sober assessment of the secular realities of the modern world. Given this state of affairs, it is hardly correct to say that in the Caucasus there is a general infatuation of the population of national republics with Islamic values and norms, which are considered as a guide not only in everyday life, but also in the choice of forms of political self-organization, state structure and political behavior in general.

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THE ROLE OF INFORMATION WARFARE ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE 2008 ARMED CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

The main goal of information warfare is to influence the socio-political structure of the society in order to exert pressure with the prospect of its further subordination. This can affect both the loss of the state's authority on the international arena, and its destruction from within, thereby causing irreparable damage to the country and its allies. Information wars can lead to political changes at the local, regional, and international levels. They contribute to the emergence of new strategic alliances, as well as to the change of political centers of attraction. The relevance of the article is due to the importance of information warfare as the main component of ethno-political conflicts in the modern world, as well as the most important tool of political coercion. Information wars are one of the most important aspects of modern society due to the development of information and communication technologies. The object of this research is information wars in ethno-political conflicts. The subject of the research is the information warfare in the Republic of South Ossetia. The article analyzes theoretical aspects of the phenomenon of "information war," which has great applied significance, since the study of this phenomenon contributes to the development of strategies in matters of national security, and also reduces the degree of information and psychological influence. The author reveals the degree of influence of the information component in the course of the information war in the formation of world public opinion. The study analyzes the significance of information warfare on the example of the Republic of South Ossetia. The phenomenon of "information war" has appeared relatively recently in scientific terminology. Therefore, this aspect is not sufficiently studied, which requires further in-depth comprehensive research.

Key words: *information war, armed conflict, international community, public opinion, Yugoslavia, Republic of South Ossetia.*

The foundations of modern information warfare were formulated in the late XX-early XXI century. To achieve the goals of information warfare, it is necessary to carry out a detailed study of the existing social groups and their relations in the society, as well as the channels, intensity and nature of their interaction with the political elite in order to purposefully influence the public opinion.

Information technologies, directly used in the information warfare, occupy a priority place if compared to other means of warfare because of the total impact on the psychological and moral status of the citizens of the opposing side.

The usage of such technologies in information warfare is somewhat dangerous because the national special services cannot fully ensure information security of their own country due to their inability to timely recognize such tool.

Propaganda is one of the technologies of information warfare. It disorients the population, leading to a decrease in the authority of the state power and its legitimacy, thereby provoking political instability and division in the society. Such processes can lead to civil strife and political conflicts [7].

The authors studying the phenomenon of information warfare can be divided into three main groups.

Supporters of the first group believe that the above phenomenon takes place during the period of peace. Such approach is aimed at solving political problems not by force, as well as applying preventive measures to potential conflicts [4. P. 68-70].

Supporters of the second group believe that the information war is a new type of fighting, where protection of one's own information space becomes no less important than resistance and use of various information technologies in information warfare. Protecting your own information field is important, because the information war continues in the time of peace and it is undeclared and unpredictable [8. P. 44-47].

Supporters of the third group, representatives of the military science, believe that information wars are not conducted in the time of peace, but are an accompanying element in the period of open military confrontation to demoralize the opposite side. In this regard it is necessary to achieve and maintain information superiority over the opponent [3. P. 73].

As early as the beginning of the XX century, with the advent and spread of mass media, the power of mass media as a tool for influencing public consciousness and shaping public opinion became clear. Already in the XXI century, at the age of information technology, the importance of winning in the information field has come to the forefront. In some cases, a victory on the information front makes it possible to win over the enemy before the start of the hostilities [6].

The phenomenon of information wars has been studied by many scientists and experts. G. Murklinskaya in her research indicated that in the early 90s of the XX century, after the military operation in Iraq, the Americans created the concept of "revolution in military affairs," which focused on the conduct of "more humane" combat operations using "non-lethal" and new information technologies, which made it easier to control, manage local population and was also used for intelligence purposes.

One of the founders of the concept of information wars, M. Libiki, noted that information war is a type of conflict, the main task of which is to protect ones' information systems, distort and manipulate the information of the opponent and prevent the enemy from accessing and processing information. According to Libicki, the main objective of information war is not victory over the enemy in direct confrontation, and establishing and maintaining control over all [1].

In the opinion of I. Vasilenko, "information war" is "systematic information impact on the entire info-communication system of the enemy and neutralization of the state in order to create a favorable, global information environment for any political and geopolitical operations that provide maximum control over space" [10].

On the other hand, G. Viren believes that "information war is a set of measures to influence mass consciousness in order to change people's behavior and impose goals that are not among their interests, as well as protection from such influences" [12. P. 48].

The methodological basis of the research is the system, structural and functional methods, methods of comparative analysis and synthesis, analogy and induction.

In the modern world, the threat of information technologies influencing public consciousness in order to change the status quo in their favor is increasing. Information warfare includes various tools for the information suppression of the opponent. Today, the world community is faced with the problem of controlling the impact of information technologies in the information war, which provides a basis for protecting information resources and developing its own information security technologies.

Various approaches to the concept of "information war" have been studied, which is of great practical significance. A comparative analysis of the use of information technologies in the information war in the Republic of South Ossetia is carried out. As a result of the analysis, common features were identified in the technologies used in the information war in South Ossetia, on the basis of which it can be concluded that the Anglo-Saxon model of psychological conflict management was applied [9].

There are several main approaches to the peaceful resolution of international conflicts in the classification of models of psychological management. We are talking about the Romano-German, Middle Eastern, Anglo-Saxon and East Asian approaches. These models are based on cultural and civilizational differences, but they are complementary. According to A. V. Manoilo, the information war accompanying the August 2008 fighting in the Republic of South Ossetia "clearly corresponded to the schemes and templates of the Anglo-Saxon model of psychological conflict management" [11].

The main characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon model of psychological conflict management are:

First. Armed conflicts are initiated in places where there are already either latent conflicts or low-intensity conflicts. However, the conflict itself is not the goal. The goal is to produce PR news that focuses attention on certain points, thereby drawing certain states into this conflict.

Second. The main goal is the major participant of international relations that has a national interest in the region. Any action of the above-mentioned actor, whether active or passive in relation to the conflict, becomes a target for informational and psychological attacks.

The third. The result of information and psychological attacks during the conflict is the creation of political myths and stereotypes, substitution and manipulation of factual material, which affects the formation of world public opinion, to which, as a rule, the aggressor and the victim change places.

Fourth. Competent throw-ins in the media, and their certain frequency keep viewers in suspense and do not give them time for critical analysis and their own understanding of what is happening. The idea of a threat to the life of the entire world community is being imposed. The population ceases to assess the essence of what is happening sensibly, resulting in fear in society. The result of using this technology is to unite against an artificially created threat and legitimize actions aimed at interfering in the internal Affairs of the parties to the conflict.

The fifth and final stage is direct intervention in the internal affairs of a state under the guise of a peacekeeping operation in order to strengthen its own military presence in the region.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Georgia, nationalist leaders led by Z. Gamsakhurdia came to power. The policy pursued by that regime, including gross violations of the main rights and freedoms of national minorities living in the GSSR, caused the national liberation struggle of these peoples and led to the formation of new states – the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia. The first attempt to restore territorial integrity in the early 90s ended with the defeat of Georgia in both republics. In August 2008, Georgia made another attempt to annex the territory of the newly formed states [13].

The Russian operation aimed at "Forcing Georgia to peace" did not allow Georgia to implement the operation "Clear field," which meant destruction and expulsion of ethnic Ossetians from their historical homeland. In South Ossetia, the fighting was accompanied by an information war, which was waged in varying degrees by both sides with the support of the allied countries, primarily Russia and the United States.

The Georgian-Ossetian war of 2008 was accompanied by a tough information confrontation in the international arena, including manipulation mechanisms and elements of information warfare. According to most scientists and experts, Russia, which enjoyed full support of the population inside the country, won a convincing victory on the battlefield, but lost the information war to Georgia.

It should be noted that in the information war in August 2008, Georgia and a coalition of Western countries worked both in the internal and external information space. While South Ossetia worked only in the internal information space, and the Russian Federation exclusively in the external information field.

The information war between Georgia and the Western coalition against South Ossetia and the Russian Federation, its geopolitical ally and main strategic partner, began long before the military invasion of the Republic of Georgia into the Republic of South Ossetia. The illegal arrival of Mikhail Saakashvili to power as a result of the "rose revolution" in Georgia in November 2003 can be considered the initial stage of the information war that led to the 2008 war [11]. Information about the allegedly downed Russian drone, interception of Russian missiles, arrests of peacekeepers with allegedly prohibited weapons, etc. periodically appeared in the information field, thereby creating the hostile image of the Russian Federation preparing to invade the territory of Georgia in the international information field. These actions were aimed at replacing the image of Russia as a peacemaker and guarantor of stability in the region with the image of an aggressor. In parallel with spreading disinformation about Russia, Georgia presented the image of the legitimate leadership of South Ossetia as a criminal regime that kept the entire population of South Ossetia, allegedly dreaming of returning to the jurisdiction of Georgia, in fear. Georgian media published photos and personal data of public and political figures of South Ossetia, declaring them criminals, opening criminal cases against them on far-fetched charges, thereby trying to demoralize the Republic's leadership by analogy with the techniques used in Yugoslavia. By 2008, having formed the public opinion of the population of Western countries in a way that was beneficial to Georgia and its allies, Georgia prepared ground for a military invasion of the territory of South Ossetia. That situation was similar to the situation created by the United States and NATO in respect of Iraq and Yugoslavia [5].

Since the beginning of hostilities in 2008, the Internet and all Russian TV channels were blocked in Georgia. The population had access only to local and Western sources of information, which showed a one-sided picture and distorted existing realities. The destruction and numerous victims as a result of the massive bombing of South Ossetia by Georgia, recorded in photo and video materials, were distributed in the world media as the results of Russia's invasion of Georgia. Unlike Georgia and its allies, South Ossetia and Russia were not ready for an information war. Having won the real war, Russia lost the information war.

From the above, it should be noted that:

– the information war of Georgia and the Western coalition against South Ossetia and Russia was successful;

– the world public opinion was prepared for Georgia's invasion of South Ossetia;

– in the information war around South Ossetia, the media in the hands of Western political strategists often turned from sources of information into a source of disinformation, thus forming world public opinion in the direction favorable for them;

– South Ossetia, under constant pressure, limited opportunities and lack of access to international political and information platforms, was unable to put up a decent resistance to Georgia and Western countries in the information field, thus losing the information war on the international arena. But nevertheless the information war inside South Ossetia was won;

– despite losing the information war, Russia and South Ossetia won the real war, which resulted in the recognition of South Ossetia as an independent and sovereign state by the Russian Federation on August 26, 2008. Russia thus initiated the process of international legitimation of the Republic of South Ossetia.

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GEOPOLITICAL PICTURE OF THE WORLD ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: LESSONS OF VICTORY FOR THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE XXI CENTURY

The article deals with the geopolitical situation and the world balance of power in the run-up to the Second World War and the essence of the world processes in the interwar period. Events preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Cause of war. The participation of the USSR in the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. Lessons and geopolitical outcomes of the victory.

Key words: *Great Patriotic War, the Second World War, Victory of the Soviet people, defeat of German fascism, Soviet armed forces, Red Army, lend-lease, Resistance movement, internationalism, patriotism, geopolitics, international relations.*

«…I believe that all who profit from the war and who contribute to it should be shot on the first day of hostilities by trusted representatives of honest citizens of their country, whom they send to fight.”

Ernest Hemingway,
from the preface to the book “Goodbye, weapons!”

History, as we know, raises more questions than it gives clear answers. Any attempt to evaluate a historical event from just one point of view is bound to fail. In the pursuit of truth, the historians are in great danger. Even to the events of yesterday, many of us have an ambiguous attitude. To an even greater extent this applies to the events of the past.

Now history is a real battleground where both geopolitical interests and the interests of individual national elites collide. Before our eyes, modern politicians are turning historical science into a battlefield. It, like any other science, is formed by specific people with their worldview and interests. Even a simple enumeration of well-known historical facts is always personal. Any interpretation of a simple chronology already has a point of view that differs from other points of view on the same chronology.

Soon we will celebrate 75 years since the end of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. By historical standards – this is a moment, but it is a long time by human standards. Therefore, interest in the events of those times does not weaken. There are many reasons for this.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people redrawn the map of the world and defined a new world order not only in the XX, but also in the XXI century. The horrors of war make you wonder: who is to blame and what should I do so that it doesn't happen again. The war was an unprecedented test of all the material and spiritual forces of the Soviet Union and became the most severe test of the fighting qualities of the Red Army.

In our time, we unavoidably have to evaluate the results of this "examination" in terms of the effectiveness of social systems and guidelines of various states, and use the results of this assessment both for the "internal consumption" and for propaganda purposes.

As L. Ivashov aptly put it, in the pre-war period, "a new global entity was actively entering the world stage , it was the "world backstage" (financial and industrial capital in alliance with the political and military elites of the West), whose goal was the global power of financial capital" [6. P. 4-13].

The USSR, as the geopolitical center of the Eurasian continent, remained, as Russia was before, the main object of aspirations of the contenders for global dominance.

Practically nothing has changed since the time when Prime Minister of Great Britain L. George declared that "the traditions and vital interests of England required the destruction of the Russian Empire in order to secure English rule in India and realize English interests in Transcaucasia and Minor Asia" [6. P. 8].

Preparations for the Second World War began when the First Worls War was not yet over. The financial capital was again its initiator. The state was merely a tool. Preparations for the war continued and were not, and could not be, unexpected for any politician or military. The only question was who would start it first and when. That was decided by the leading financial group that claimed to be the world's leader. The internal contradictions of the world financial system that had not yet been fully developed were resolved through a war.

As A. Ralph Epperson writes in his book "the Invisible Hand: Initiation into the Secret Version of History," multi-millionaire banker Meyer Rothschild said: "Give me control over the nation's money and I don't care who is making its laws" [2. P. 455].

On November 25, 1936, Germany and Japan signed an agreement in Berlin on joint activities in the fight against the Communist International (Comintern) in order to prevent the spread of Communist ideology in the world. Italy joined the Pact in November 1937, Hungary and Manchukuo (a state formed by Japan on the occupied territory of Manchuria) – in February 1939, francoist Spain – in March 1939. In November 1941, the Pact was extended for 5 years, at the same time it was joined by Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, as well as the puppet governments of Croatia, Denmark, Slovakia, and the government of Wang Jingwei formed by the Japanese in the occupied part of China [18].

Historians note that the war in Spain served for the future Hitler coalition as an example of how far Western countries can go to ensure security in Europe.

A participant in those events, George Orwell (Eric Arthur Blair) in his essay "Remembering the war in Spain," published in London in 1943, wrote: "the outcome of the war in Spain was decided in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin – anywhere but not in Spain. After the summer of 1937, everyone who could see ahead realized that the Republic could not win unless there were profound changes in the international balance of power" [13].

But the further back those days go, the more acute is the struggle for truth, the more sophisticated are falsifications of the history of those years and the past events. More and more often, we witness a tendentious desire of certain opportunistic and biased not only historians and publicists, but also political figures to distort the truth about the prehistory of the World War II and about the components of the Victory. Attempts are made to de-heroize it, to whitewash some participants, and sometimes real traitors.

On the eve of the 75th anniversary of the Victory, various Russophobic organizations became active, trying to put Hitler and Stalin on the scales of responsibility for the outbreak of World War II.

So, in September 2019, on the eve of the opening of the exhibition "75 years of liberation of Eastern Europe from Nazism," the Bulgarian political elite provoked a scandal over the historical memory of the World War II, accusing Russia of "half a century of repressions." In the Czech Republic, the authorities are trying to remove the monument to Marshal Ivan Konev from Prague. And today, there are many similar acts in Europe saved from Nazism.

On 19 September 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution "On the Importance of the European Memory for the Future of Europe" by 535 votes in favour, 66 against and 52 abstentions. The document was initiated by Polish MEPs on behalf of the European conservatives and reformists faction, which includes the ruling Law and Justice Party of Poland. The text of the resolution emphasizes that: "the World War II, the most destructive in the history of Europe, was a direct consequence of the infamous Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and its secret protocols, according to which two totalitarian regimes, set out to conquer the world, divided Europe into two zones of influence." At the same time, the resolution does not contain a word about the policy of appeasement of the aggressor by Western countries in order to reorient Hitler's aggressive plans from the West to the East, and about the culmination of this line – the Munich Agreement of 1938. Its participants gave the sovereign state of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and later Poland and Hungary joined the division. While the USSR was the only power that in the pre-war years resisted the Nazi military threat.

A similar attempt to rewrite history is being made by the so-called Institute of National Memory of Poland. The poles are trying to shift their responsibility for the beginning of World War II in Europe to the government of the USSR, but here it is important not to rant, but historical facts: Poland's allies Great Britain and France did not want to come to its aid in September 1939. Why? Moreover, in contrast to their political position towards Germany, to which they then formally declared war, they did not declare war on the Soviet Union. Thus, for themselves and their descendants, they forever divided the actions of the USSR and the Third Reich both in relation to Poland, and in principle in the context of the beginning of the Second World War in Europe.

We know the words of Winston Churchill, who said on October 1, 1939, that the Soviet troops should have stood on the lines that they then reached. He even called their presence there a "second front" against Hitler.

But Poland was among the countries that flirted with Hitler for anti-Soviet purposes in the 1930s. Moreover, unlike Great Britain or France, Poland expected to become a direct ally of the Third Reich in its aggression against the USSR, and in 1938 almost took part in the partition of Czechoslovakia, breaking off the Teszyn Region from it.

It was the Polish Ambassador Jozef Lipsky, who in 1938 supported Hitler in solving the "Jewish question" by expelling Jews from Europe to Africa. "If he does it," the Ambassador said in his report,"we will put up a magnificent monument to him in Warsaw."

After reading the report of the Polish Ambassador to Germany Yu. Lipsky to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu. Bek, even today's politically colorblind people who trying to falsify history, I think, should see the light.

Let's consider the following: "..the Chancellor (Hitler) received me today in Obersalzberg in the presence of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 4 PM. The conversation lasted more than two hours. Before that, the Chancellor received the Prime Minister of Hungary and the chief of the Hungarian General Staff. ... (Hitler) pointed out that he had told Chamberlain that the Sudeten question should be resolved peacefully or by war in such a way that the Sudetenland would be returned to Germany.

Chamberlain returned to London, convinced as a result of this conversation of the necessity of rejecting the Sudetenland. The occupation of the Sudetenland by force would, according to the Chancellor, be a more complete and definite solution. Nevertheless, the Chancellor claims that if his conditions are accepted, he will not be able to refuse to accept them in front of the public of his country, even if part of the Czechoslovak problem would remain unsettled. Therefore, the Chancellor is considering how to solve the remaining part of the problem concerning Hungary and Poland. In this regard, he invited the Prime Minister of Hungary and me for talks.

With regard to the Hungarian demands, I specifically highlighted the question of Transcarpathian Rus, emphasizing the strategic moment in relation to Russia, the Communist propaganda carried out on this territory, and so on. I got the impression that the Chancellor was very interested in this problem, especially when I told him that the length of the Polish-Romanian border is relatively small and that by means of a common Polish-Hungarian border across Transcarpathian Russia we would create a stronger barrier against Russia. In addition, I pointed out about Transcarpathian Russia that this territory, which Slovakia does not claim, was given to Czechoslovakia only as a mandate, that its population is very low and strongly mixed, and that Hungary has the greatest interest in it.

Clarifying our point of view regarding the immediate area that Poland is interested in (Teszyn), I noted: ...at this point, we would not have retreated before the use of force if our interests were not taken into account.

In further analysis of the tactics that should be used to solve the entire Czechoslovak question, the Chancellor said:

1. if his proposals are not accepted by Chamberlain, the situation will become clear, and, according to his warning, he is ready to take up arms to join the Sudetenland to the Reich.

2. If the Sudetenland proposals were accepted and he was asked to guarantee the remainder of Czechoslovakia, he would take the position that he would be able to guarantee it if Poland, Hungary, and Italy did the same (he considered the inclusion of Italy an important counterbalance to the French and English guarantees). He understood that Poland and Hungary would not give these guarantees without addressing the issue of their minorities. I have made this assurance on behalf of the Polish government.

3. The Chancellor, quite confidentially, stressing that I could draw the appropriate conclusions from this, brought to my attention that even today, in the event of a conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia on the basis of our interests in Teszyn, the Reich would take our side (I think that the Chancellor should also have given this statement to the Hungarian Prime Minister, although I was not told about it). The Chancellor advises that under such circumstances our action should not begin until after the German occupation of the Sudetenland, since then the whole operation would be shorter.

Later, during the conversation, the Chancellor insisted that Poland is the primary factor protecting Europe from Russia.

... beyond the line of known German interests, we have completely free hands;

... that he had the idea of solving the Jewish problem by sending them to emigration to the colonies in case of a consent from Poland, Hungary, and maybe Romania (*here I replied that if this finds its solution, we will put up a beautiful monument to him in Warsaw*). In accordance with the instructions in the above conversation, I also raised the issue of Polish-German relations. I must say that the moment was not very suitable, since the Chancellor was completely occupied with the upcoming conversation with Chamberlain.

I raised the issue of Danzig, suggesting to him the possibility of concluding a direct Polish-German Treaty that would stabilize the position of the free city.

...At the end of the conversation, I touched upon the possibility of your meeting with the Chancellor as soon as possible, if necessary. The Chancellor accepted this with pleasure, noting that the meeting could be very useful, especially after the conversation with Chamberlain.

Ribbentrop, for his part, asked me to ask you if you would like to make a statement on the issue of Polish demands for Czechoslovakia, following the example of the Hungarian Prime Minister, so that it could be used in negotiations with Chamberlain. In addition, Ribbentrop assured that the German press will cover our actions against our minority in Czechoslovakia as widely as possible» [1].

Whatever the so-called Institute of National Memory of Poland says today, it cannot rewrite history: Poland was among the countries that flirted with Hitler for anti-Soviet purposes in the 1930s. Moreover, unlike the Great Britain or France, Poland expected to become a direct ally of the Third Reich in its aggression against the USSR, and in 1938 almost took part in the partition of Czechoslovakia, breaking off the Teszyn region from it.Apparently, under the anti-Russian rhetoric of Warsaw there is a desire to hide their own mistakes in the 1938 domestic and foreign policy.

Thus, the lower house of the Polish Parliament adopted a resolution on January 9, 2020, which claims that the Soviet Union was responsible for the beginning of World War II in the same way as Hitler's Germany.

This decision was commented on by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry M. Zakharova: "It seems that, as in the days of the Inquisition, science is declared heresy by the Polish Sejm, and supporters of historical facts are accused of witchcraft by it. This is how ideology defeats truth. And the truth is recorded by the Nuremberg Tribunal. If the Polish Sejm doubts its decisions, then it is necessary to declare it. Such an approach has its own qualification – revision of the results of the Second World War" [30].

You need to be extremely blind and deaf not to notice it then and an outspoken Russophobe to blame the Soviet Union for unleashing the Second World War today.

But as the years and decades pass, events and the people who participated in them become veiled in a haze of uncertainty, as if out of focus. This is due to the fact that each generation of historians writes a book of people's lives under the strong influence of their time, historical will and ideological attitudes.

If this happens during a revolution, then the perception of events is colored in its tones. The arrival of counter-revolution changes the palette of colors that historians and diplomats use, and then white becomes black and vice versa. And only in a political democracy does it become possible not to have a poor one-dimensional vision and assessment of the past, but to have a three-dimensional and objective view.

This is the most productive approach. It suggests that historians should try to explain events and evaluate historical personalities and events.

Today, when we turn our eyes back to the history of this great war, we are even more convinced that the victory over German fascism was possible primarily because the war itself had the character of a universal, popular war, which can not be considered every war.

Only the war that affects the feelings of national dignity and self-love, touches the soul of people, awakens the instinct of national self-preservation, causes the desire to stand up for the protection of violated shrines and the right to exist and live in accordance with one's own views and beliefs becomes popular.

According to the official data, 72 states with a population of 1.7 billion people were involved in the World War II, 110 million people were mobilized, and 55 to 60 million of the world's population died during the 6 years of the war.

On the Soviet front, 70 to 80 percent of all the Hitler troops and his allies were active. Britain, the United States, and the rest of the Soviet-allied world (56 countries in all) accounted for just over 20% of the war's severity. In 1943, in all other theaters of war, only 25 to 45 divisions of the Great Britain and the United States fought together, and the USSR put up to 489 divisions.

At the same time, we must keep in mind that the assistance of our allies in the anti-fascist bloc was not as large in scale as some falsifiers of history are now trying to imagine.

In the early period of World War II, Neutrality Acts were adopted in the United States, according to which the only way to provide assistance to any of the belligerents was to sell weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and transportation was also assigned to the customer, the "pay and take" system.

The Great Britain then became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its foreign exchange funds. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware that in the existing situation, the best way out for the United States was to provide full economic support to the countries fighting against the Nazi Germany. Therefore, he actually "pushed through" the Congress on March 11, 1941 the "law to ensure the protection of the United States," also called the Lend-Lease Act. From that time on, weapons and strategic raw materials were provided to any country whose defense was recognized as vital to the United States, under the following conditions:

1. Weapons and materials lost in the course of hostilities were not subject to payment.

2. Any property left over after the war that was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid in full or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.

3. Unused equipment was supposed to be returned after the war to the United States [10].

There are still various, often contradictory opinions about the role of lend-lease during the Great Patriotic War. Many spears were broken in the discussions on the topic "could the USSR do without the lend-lease?" Many authors believe that, most likely, USSR was able to win. Of course, it is not possible to calculate the price that would have been paid [25; 27; 15].

Lend-lease deliveries accounted for 15% of our own production for all types of aircraft, 12% for tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 2% for anti-aircraft artillery guns. Car deliveries were the most significant. The Red Army received 427,000 trucks and cars (70% of all available vehicles), which gave it mobility. The Soviet Navy also received significant lend-lease assistance. It included 596 warships and vessels built at Western shipyards, which made up 22.3% of the total number of ships and vessels produced by the domestic industry at that time.

Lend-lease aid, as well as British and Canadian supplies to the USSR in total did not exceed 4% of Soviet industrial production during the war years, and main supplies were made in the years from 1943 to 1944, when a radical change in the war was already achieved.

The government of the Soviet Union paid for them with gold, manganese, and other materials needed by the United States, which were brought back by their ships and planes.

It is a widely recognized fact that lend-lease was a unique precedent when countries with different socio-economic structures combined their efforts in the fight against a global evil [15. P. 46].

On June 6, 1944, our allies opened a second front in Europe. The allied forces chose the coast of Normandy (France) for the landing. Here they concentrated 39 divisions, 12 separate brigades, and 10 commandos (marine commando units).

On April 25, Soviet troops met with the allied troops on the Elbe, and on May 8, Nazi Germany signed an act of unconditional surrender. The hotbed of the Second World War in Europe was eliminated [14. P. 12-13].

Thus, the USSR bore the brunt of the Second World War and became the main obstacle to the German-fascist domination of other nations. Italy, Spain, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Finland and even France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, some poles, Baltics, Western Ukrainians, Caucasians, Krymchaks and even Russians, and many others fought against Russia on the side of Germany.

Not necessarily officially and not necessarily at the front with weapons in hand. You can fight with economy, complicity, etc. When the occupation of France began, the owner of the Renault company Baron Louis Renault, willing to save his company from ruin, actively cooperated with the German authorities. He visited the Reich Chancellery, met with the leadership of the Third Reich and got acquainted with the latest examples of German technology. The Germans set up Renault factories to produce trucks – 3-ton AHS and 5-ton AHR. Renault produced more than 35,000 trucks for the Wehrmacht during the war.

Messerschmitts were produced in Hungary. In France, the Luftwaffe produced bombers, transport and liaison planes, scouts and aircraft engines (every eighth engine for the Luftwaffe was produced in France). The French automobile industry produced only 20 percent of all vehicles produced during the war for the Wehrmacht (this is only trucks produced during the war, without taking into account the already built trucks seized after the capture of France in the 40th as trophies).

Belgian fire arms were widely used by the Germans (the favorite SS gun was the Belgian "Browning high power"). The bulk of the oil consumed by the German armed forces was extracted and processed in Romania.

For German military production, economic ties with neutral countries were of great importance. Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Turkey continued to systematically supply it with strategic raw materials, machine tools, equipment, ball bearings, quality steel, tools, ferroalloys, pulp, automobiles, locomotives, radio equipment, optical instruments, naval vessels, weapons and ammunition. In 1942, Sweden, Switzerland,and Spain accounted for 50.3 percent of all German iron ore imports, while Sweden accounted for 33.8 percent of lead and 28.2 percent of zinc ore. The total value of material assets received from neutral countries per year exceeded 1.2 billion DM. In addition, these countries provided services to Germany for military and commercial transportation [19].

All this is called collaboration. It requires a separate discussion (1).

This was the most terrible invasion of Europe in Russia. It already took place in history: in the first Millennium during the great migration of peoples (the Empire of Germanarich), in the XIII century (the crusade of the dog-knights, organized by the Pope and repulsed by the great Alexander Nevsky) and in the XIX century – the invasion of the "two hundred languages" headed by Napoleon).

From the point of view of today, it is appropriate to ask the question: who, why and how organized the attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR?

Its purpose was eloquently expressed by the US Senator and later the 33rd US President Harry Truman: "If we see that Germany is winning, we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we should help Germany, and so let them kill as many as possible…" [12].

In the run-up to the World War II, the world remained Eurocentric, but its geopolitical structure was unstable.

In political processes, the world's leading players clearly adhered to the essence of their geopolitical concepts.

Russia (the USSR), geopolitically sharply weakened, was at this time almost in international isolation. It had mostly rural illiterate population and lost almost all of the old ruling and cultural elite. The economy and infrastructure were just beginning to take shape again, and so, to the global geopolitical actors the country seemed to be an ideal territory for partition and subsequent absorption.

As you know, one of the main results of the First World War was humiliation of Germany in accordance with the ancient Roman principle of Vae victis ("Woe to the vanquished"). Germany lost its vast territories and had to pay predatory reparations that further spurred the need for revision of the Versailles-Washington system designed by the victorious powers – Britain, France and the United States. There was also a need for restructuring the "geopolitically unjustified" borders in Europe and Asia in favor of Germany and its allies – Italy and Japan.

Defeated by Britain and France in the First world war, Germany, humiliated and trampled, could only survive by changing its geopolitical position. It had to take the raw material sources either from Britain and France, or from Russia.

According to the authoritative opinion of Prof. L. Ivashov, "the theory of living space" developed by Professor of Geography at the University of Munich General Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) became the official doctrine of Nazi Germany. The author of the concept of the "continental bloc" Haushofer believed that "the day when Germany, Russia and Japan unite will be the day that determines the fate of the English-speaking world power and the death of the gods."

The German geopolitician believed that the joint efforts of the two continental powers – Germany and Russia – could establish a "New Eurasian Order" and restructure the space of the World Island in order to completely remove it from the influence of the "Sea Power" [5. P. 4].

The coming world war was being prepared as a struggle for world domination, its main content being the decisive battle for the geopolitical space of Eurasia. Space, which not only had an important geographical and resource potential, but also had a different image of the human community, radically different from the Western civilization.

The USSR, as the geopolitical center of the Eurasian continent, was, as before, the main object of the aspirations of the contenders for global dominance.

By this time, the achievements of the independent Soviet state and the success of socialist construction were obvious. For the conquest of the USSR the path of military defeat was chosen.

The initiator country was defined for this purpose. A political figure was found – Adolf Hitler, an energetic and proactive nationalist, a convinced anti-Communist, who raved about the idea of seizing a living space for Germany in the East, an showed good abilities as a large-scale organizer.

As soon as the Nazis came to power in Germany by universal popular vote, they set about their black business. First, trade unions were roughly dispersed. Then came the arrests and massacres of Communists and their sympathizers. Then there were the excesses of the storm troopers. Then, on September 15, 1935, the NSDAP Congress passed the Nuremberg racial laws: "On the citizen of the

Reich" and "On the protection of German blood and German honor," by which all Jews were outlawed.

Further, the political events were developing rapidly. In 1935, all the leading European countries entered into allied relations with Germany, and in 1936, Germany and Japan signed the anti-Comintern Pact. On February 20, 1938, in the Bundestag, Hitler declared that Germany was striving for rapprochement with all states, but not with the Soviet Empire. Then came Munich. The British magazine "Time" in the issue of January 2, 1939, and a number of other publications unanimously recognize A. Hitler as the man of 1938. Thus, A. Hitler was helped to strengthen the armed forces and the economic potential of Europe was literally handed to him. The fascists adopted the theory of racial uniqueness of the German nation as an ideological weapon, and for the majority of peoples (including the Slavs) they introduced the category of "untermensch," i.e. "subhuman."

The Soviet Union demonstrated a diametrically opposite national approach: unity and equality of all (more than 170) nations and nationalities living on its territory, equality of all major faiths. This example was especially contagious for the peoples of the East, the American continent, and the European Slavs.

German philosopher Walter Schubart, who emigrated from Germany in 1941, told about the upcoming catastrophe of the Western civilization and the historical mission of Russia, in his book "Europe and the soul of the East", he wrote: "Russians, with their developed capacity for seeing wholeness, felt constantly and clearly that nothing should be considered separately. From the moment they began to engage themselves, their thoughts revolve, from Chaadaev to the Eurasians, around the question: who are we in relation to Europe? Yunior or only younger, or just other heirs of European or harbingers of a new, Eastern culture?

This question led to a more general question: what is the difference between peoples – in age or the opposite types? And this already borders on a big problem: what are the determining factors of history? What is the meaning of the story?Those who look at the fate of peoples in this way expand their consideration to the rank of general cultural philosophy" [17. P. 92].

Regarding future developments, he noted: "I am now raising the question not of what Bolshevism means for Russia, but of what it means for Europe; and the question is not so: The Third Reich, or Third International, fascism or Bolshevism. No, we are talking about a global historical conflict between a part of the world Europe and a part of the world Russia, between the Western European and Eurasian continents" [17. P. 46].

This state of affairs and unfavorable trends for the West frightened the elite of Western countries, the "world backstage," and they were looking for a way out of the existing situation. The way out for the "fight against Bolshevism" was found in the creation of fascist regimes: fascism against Bolshevism.

The Vatican was also enlisted as an ally in the fight against Bolshevism. In 1929, Pope Pius XI concluded the Lateran agreements with fascist Italy, which provided for the formation of the papal state of the Vatican; in 1930, he declared a crusade against the USSR, calling for "democracy," including Italy and Germany, to jointly solve the problem of Russia. What was the problem? On July 19, 1933, a concordat was concluded between Germany, where the Nazis had just come to power, and the Holy See, according to which the Church recognized the Nazi regime, and the government guaranteed the rights of the Church. In 1937, Pope Pius XI issued an Encyclical against communism [16].

For the sake of historical justice, it is worth saying that the new Pope Pius XII (from the beginning of 1939) condemned the actions of the Nazis against Jews and poles in December 1939. But by this time the conflagration of the great war was already breaking out in the expanses of Europe, and later the Church's insight into the identity of A. Hitler, his true goals and objectives, could not change much. He went with manic perseverance to his goal.

Thus, in 1936, Germany and Italy supported a revolt in Spain against the legitimate Republican government. Berlin and Rome, having sent their troops to Spain, became the main culprits of the three-year civil war in that country, and in 1937 Germany forcibly annexed Austria. Fascist Italy captured Ethiopia in 1936 and occupied Albania in 1939.

In 1937, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the so-called "anti-Comintern Pact," and in 1940 they also signed the Treaty on military-economic Union, which was based on an agreement on the division of spheres of influence. During this period, these countries strenuously increased their military and economic potential, shifted their economy to a military scale, and deployed multi-million-strong armies.

In such circumstances, the foreign policy interests of the Soviet leadership focused on creating a system of collective security, but the Western states did not support such a desire for peace, they did not agree to a joint fight against the aggressor during the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations in August 1939. Western countries were "sympathetic" to Hitler's expansionist plans, hoping to direct them against the Soviet Union.

And this "good" goal was announced to the satisfaction of the behind-the-scenes organizers in a note from the German foreign Ministry to the Soviet government dated June 22, 1941 " ... the German government cannot remain indifferent to the serious threat on the Eastern border. Therefore, the Fuhrer ordered the German armed forces to withdraw this threat by all means. The German people are aware that in the upcoming struggle they are called not only to protect their Homeland, but also to save the world's civilization from the deadly danger of Bolshevism and to clear the way for a true flourishing in Europe" [29].

The policy of the Soviet state in the pre-war period was to delay the war by all possible and impossible means. Today, this is a reproach to the leadership of the state. Many pages of various texts are devoted to this issue with figures of oil, metal, timber, and bread supplied to Germany. But the USSR had no other option.

The Great Patriotic War was the development and consequence of the Second World War unleashed with the tacit consent of European countries by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939. An aggressive military coalition was formed to wage war against the USSR, based on the triple Pact concluded between Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The leadership of our country had a difficult choice:

– Conduct a pre-emptive strike, become an aggressor in the eyes of the world community and remain in complete world isolation. And the USSR was already an aggressor in the eyes of the world community after the Finnish company, as well as for ideological reasons of the capitalist West. For a preemptive strike, it was necessary to concentrate troops on the border. Extremely unsuccessful fighting with the Japanese in the East in 1938-1939 showed a weak combat capability of the army, although those clashes were propagandistically perceived as victorious. The experience of the Finnish campaign finally showed the inability of the army to a preemptive strike.

Such a blow for Russia meant the death of the entire community as a whole, and not just a military defeat!

– By concentrating troops on the border, waiting for a strike, provoking Hitler to make the USSR a victim of the aggressor in the eyes of the world community. War will become inevitable. It will be possible to get allies for further fighting.

However, concentrated troops can, in case of failure, instantly perish under the blows of an experienced enemy. In this case, as a result of the rapid capture of the Western regions of the country, the most modern military industry of the USSR will be in the hands of the enemy. In the East, it is still under construction (stand-in companies).

Then the death of the entire community is inevitable, since it will be impossible to equip a new army, and even train it, in principle.

– Disperse the troops and continue their training. This, of course, would save some of the troops in case of a failure at the time of the enemy's attack and will allow them to gradually enter into contact with the enemy. But it is likely to gradually grind them out and the USSR may lose most of the army. However, Germany will lose time to evacuate industrial enterprises to the East, and it will be possible to modernize them there for military purposes. Then there is a chance for the survival of the community. Just a chance! The only chance.

As the Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Yu. T. Trifankov rightly notes, Stalin chose the latter option. That was his choice, his right and responsibility [20].

Under these conditions, the USSR was forced to agree to a Non-aggression Treaty with Germany. The Treatywas signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. It defined the mutual obligations of the parties in the political and military fields. It was concluded for 10 years. The Soviet Union was able to continue strengthening the country's defense capability.

Considering the reasons for the heavy defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, we can agree with the opinion of V. M. Tugov, who notes that:

First, Nazi Germany has subdued the entire economic and military potential of most European countries.

Secondly, the fascist armies had extensive experience in conducting victorious wars in the West.

Third, Stalin miscalculated the possible timing of the attack on the USSR.

Fourth, the Stalinist repressions were a serious cause of our failures. They affected many military theorists and practitioners. Only from May 1937 to September 1938, about 40,000 commanders and political workers were repressed.

Fifth, the fascists had superiority in technical equipment and the level of combat training of their troops.

Sixth, the failures were also caused by skewed ideological work. For a long time, negative stereotypes such as the belief in the absolute power of the Red Army and the weakness of the enemy, the low moral and political consciousness of its rear, and other myphs were implanted in the public consciousness of Soviet people [21. P. 10].

The Second World War lasted 2194 days or 6 years and one day, and involved 61 States or almost 80% of the world's population. Military operations were conducted on the territory of 40 countries. Both wars were a real global catastrophe in the history of mankind. They claimed the lives of more than 60 million people [11; 9. P. 548-551; 7].

Newsreels have preserved for posterity the footage in which on June 24, 1945, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, sitting on a white horse, took the Victory Parade, which was commanded by Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky. When 200 soldiers turned sharply to the right and threw the banners of the Nazi Wehrmacht to the ground at the Mausoleum, Red Square froze. It was raining, but in that great moment of celebration everyone forgot about the bad weather and the tragedies that the war had brought to each of our homes. And today we remember the price of the great Victory.

The victory over Nazi Germany and its satellites was achieved by the joint efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition and all freedom-loving peoples. However, the objective course and results of the war showed that all its hardships fell on the participants of the anti-Hitler coalition not to the same extent. The main role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, militaristic Japan and their allies was played by the Soviet people and their armed forces [24].

On March 6, 1942, U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt wrote: "From the point of view of grand strategy... it is difficult to escape the obvious fact that Russian armies destroy more enemy soldiers and weapons than all the other 25 states of the United Nations combined" [8. P. 55].

The analysis of the military and political results of the Second World War allows us to formulate some conclusions and draw the necessary historical lessons.

Geopolitical results of the War and Victory:

1. The main result of the Great Patriotic War was the complete defeat of the fascist bloc and the liberation of the world from the threat of Nazi enslavement. Preserving not only the Soviet Union, but also many countries of the world, their independence and sovereignty.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces played a decisive role in the victorious outcome of the Second World War. On the Soviet-German front, 607 divisions of the fascist bloc were defeated and captured, while the allies defeated and captured 167 divisions.

The Soviet Union bore the brunt of World War II. It should be emphasized that for three years it fought one-on-one against the fascist bloc. The Soviet-German front remained the main one throughout the war. During the four years of the struggle, the enemy concentrated between 56% and 77% of divisions against the Soviet troops. On other fronts, it limited its efforts to 20 divisions, which was no more than 6% of their total number.

2. The Great Patriotic War was the most important component of the Second World War. It was the most severe of all the wars that our country has ever experienced. In terms of the scale of combat operations, the participation of the masses of people, the use of a huge amount of equipment, and tension, it surpassed all the wars of the past.

The USSR emerged from the Second World War as a victorious power, with the most powerful military-industrial potential, a huge combat-ready army (more than 11 million people), armed with the best military equipment, invaluable combat experience and the highest fighting spirit, and represented a force that could not be ignored.

3. The result of the war was a significant change in the political map of the world. The old colonial system collapsed, and the British Empire broke. In the third world countries, a powerful wave of the people's liberation movement was rising, the struggle for national independence. The Soviet Union received new allies in the face of the liberated countries of Eastern Europe, the Far East, and China.

4. The victory in the Great Patriotic War was a decisive factor that opened up new prospects for social development and progress for humanity, and created conditions for many countries and peoples of the world to choose their own path of development.

5. The price paid by the Soviet people for the Great Victory:

– total losses amounted to 27 million people, including irretrievable losses at the front that amounted to 8.668 million people, i.e. the main victims of the war were civilians, the elderly, women, and children. About 1 million Soviet soldiers died liberating the countries of Europe;

– 1710 cities, 70 thousand villages and towns, 30 thousand industrial enterprises, 1876 state farms and more than 90 thousand collective farms were destroyed and looted.

The results of the Great Patriotic War contributed to the awareness of the danger that wars bring, led to the understanding that they should be excluded from the life of society. Referring to the times of the Second World War is a good opportunity to remember that to repel any possible aggression and reliably ensure the country's security, a powerful and combat – ready army and navy are required.

The sources of Victory:

1. The main source of the suffered, immensely dear, but difficult victory lies in the spiritual layers of our people. The people rose up for a just Patriotic War. Asceticism, courage, unparalleled fortitude, faith, and heroism cemented the political, social, military, and technical factors of the war into the stratum that formed the basis of victory. The military and labor feat of the people was duly appreciated:

More than 7 million people were awarded orders and battle medals.

– More than 11.7 thousand people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including 104 people who were awarded twice and three people who were awarded three times;

– More than 16 million people were awarded the medal "For valiant labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945";

– 201 people received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor;

– 204 thousand people were awarded labor orders and medals;

– The highest military commander's order of "Victory" was awarded to 11 outstanding Soviet military marshals: L. A. Govorov, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovsky, K. A. Meretskov, K. K. Rokossovsky, S. K. Timoshenko, F. I. Tolbukhin and General of the Army A. I. Antonov. Generalissimo I. V. Stalin, Marshals G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky were awarded this Order twice.

2. An important source of victory was the higher efficiency of the Soviet organization of economy [23. P. 832].

From 1941 to 1945, Soviet industry produced:

– 1428 thousand aircraft;

– 110.3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns;

– 523.5 thousand guns.

In the period from 1941 to 1944 German industry produced:

– 638 thousand aircraft;

– 53.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns;

– 170,1 thousand guns.

3. Superiority of the Soviet military school over the German one should also be considered one of the sources of Victory.

"It is historically interesting to examine how the Russian military leadership, which was wrecked with its principle of rigid defense in 1941, developed into a flexible operational leadership and conducted a number of operations under the command of its marshals, which on the German scale deserve high praise, while the German command under the influence of commander A. Hitler abandoned the operational art and ended up with a poor idea of a tough defense, which eventually led to complete defeat," wrote the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht's land forces, General Franz Halder, in a post-war memoirs [3].

4. The victory was secured by the stability and continuity of state and military administration. With the beginning of the war, the main body of state and military administration was created – the State Defense Committee.

5. Creating an anti-Hitler coalition, joining the efforts of the allied countries.

At the end of 1941 and in February 1942, the United States provided the USSR with interest-free loans of US $1 billion under the condition of repayment in for 10 years starting from the fifth year after the end of the war. In general, lend-lease deliveries amounted to: 15% of aircraft; 12% of tanks; 22% of warships and vessels of Soviet production. Significant assistance was provided in motor transport, steam locomotives, railcars and aluminum supplies.

The USA received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, a significant amount of platinum, and technology for the production of frost-resistant tires. The peak of deliveries was in 1943-1944.

The opening of the second front, as events have shown, created more favorable conditions for the Red Army's offensive and reduced its losses. Since the summer of 1944, Germany has been in the grip of two fronts. The countries of the anti-Hitler coalition worked closely together and supported each other.

Lessons of the great Victory for the geopolitiks of the XXI century:

1. The main lesson of the great Victory is the conclusion that preparation for war should be carried out in peacetime. Modern military science clearly understands this, but readiness for war is not only the readiness of the Armed Forces, but also the readiness of the entire state, all government institutions, and the entire management system. The state's management system must ensure its readiness for war, must have high survivability, reliability, and mobility.

2. One lesson is that war is much easier to start than to end. Once started, it develops further according to its own laws, the outcome of it is almost impossible to plan. Victory does not always come to those who started the war. The German fascists planned a short-term victorious war. But it was prolonged and led to their defeat.

3. War cannot be planned either its scale or the nature of the means used in it. Starting as a local one, it can draw other states into its orbit and become a global one. Such a course of events is all the more likely with the higher level of development of the human society.

4. The first period of the great Patriotic war clearly showed that an army that was not mobilised and had a low level of combat training was not able to resist an army of invaders. Saving on the needs of the defense, the armed forces and combat training leads to severe consequences.

"When the Army is not properly cared for, when it does not receive the moral support, then there is a new morality that corrupts the army. The military is beginning to be treated with disdain. The army should enjoy the exclusive care and love of the people and the government, this is the greatest moral strength of the army. The army must be cherished," this simple truth was voiced by I. V. Stalin in his speech at the graduation of students of military academies in May 1941.

It is important to remember this today.

5. The Great Patriotic War was an unprecedented test of the strength of our state. Only a people with a powerful fortitude and patriotic consciousness could resist the armies of the enemy, who had conquered the whole of Europe. The patriotism of the Soviet people was an important source of victory over fascism. In the light of what has been said, it is impossible to ignore the acute problem of patriotic education when speaking about the lessons of the war. Patriotic consciousness of the society, formation of state patriotism as a harmonious unity of national and personal interests.

6. Creating foreign policy conditions and forming a bloc of reliable allies. It is impossible to underestimate the huge role in the defeat of fascism of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, the achievement by its members of the unity of mutual goals, tasks and actions aimed at the defeat of a common enemy.

7. The need to constantly study the experience of the bloodiest and most ruthless war in the history of the mankind, to study the combat experience, to carry out a deep and impartial analysis of victories and failures, causes and consequences. We must not forget this, we must not forget our history. This is what will help us to avoid previous mistakes and new ones.

8. The experience of the war proved: victory can only be achieved by the joint efforts of all the armed forces in their close interaction, which leads to the conclusion about the need for a harmonious comprehensive development of the Armed Forces. This parting message in his book "Memories and reflections" was left to us by the Marshal of Victory G. K. Zhukov [28].

Conclusions:

Analysis of the results and lessons of the Second World War throughout the post-war period was the sphere of ideological clashes and attempts to rewrite the history in favor of the geopolitical and other interests of Western countries, which had previously tried to take the main credit for the victory over Nazi Germany.

Victory changed the world, gave it a new quality. The Second World War once again led to a violent change in the global geopolitical configuration. This is legally confirmed by the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. As a result of the redistribution of zones of geopolitical influence, the balance of forces in all strategically important regions of the world has changed significantly again [26. P. 286].

Only two great powers – the USSR and the United States – entered the post-war political limelight. The USSR created an empire of a qualitatively new type – a world socialist system that united countries on the basis of a single ideology. The United States has consolidated its leadership in the capitalist world.

The military-political and economic center of the capitalist system for the first time moved from Western Europe to North America.

Today, 75 years after the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, in the context of globalization and the changing balance of power, new centers of influence are emerging in the world, and a polycentric system of international relations is being created. The dynamics and direction of the formation of a new world order are determined by a complex of contradictions between participants in the world political process. For the leading powers, the experience of joint actions against a common enemy is still memorable. However, many things are perceived differently today.

The main contradiction is the intense competition between the West, which is striving for global dominance, primarily the United States, and the NATO countries, and the growing new centers of power – China, Russia, India, and some other countries, that are gaining economic and political weight. The geographical area of such competition is the whole world.

According to the well-known American political scientist and political figure Zb. Brzezinski, "for the United States, Eurasian geostrategy includes purposeful leadership of geostrategically dynamic states and careful handling of catalyst states in geopolitical terms, while respecting two equal interests of America: in the short term – the preservation of its exclusive global power, and in the long term – its transformation into an increasingly institutionalized global cooperation.

Using the terminology of the more violent times of ancient empires, the three great duties of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion between vassals and maintain their dependence on the common security, to maintain the submission of subordinates and ensure their protection, and to prevent the unification of barbarians" [4].

Humanity has entered the twenty-first century with a great load of dangers and threats to its development. And, although these threats, at first glance, are more predictable than the previous ones, but the level of their danger is not fully understood. Moreover, there is an obvious tendency to expand the conflict space in the world and, which is extremely dangerous, to spread it to the zone of our vital interests.

According to the famous researcher of American studies A. I. Utkin, "a new global redistribution of the world is already underway. And in the center of the battle is again Russia with its huge reserves of raw materials. Therefore, the "velvet" and "orange" revolutions in the post-Soviet space, the wars in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, planned and unleashed by the US in recent times, are not accidental. American revanchism is a revenge for the great victory of the USSR over fascism" [22].

An unprecedented information war is unfolding in the modern world, it leads to a distortion of the meaning and significance of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. Any perversions of the results and meaning of the Second

World War arise in connection with the desire of the whole of Europe to wash away its shame, because the USSR was opposed not just by Germany, but by a United Europe led by Germany.

This puts on the agenda the task of rethinking the entire range of issues related to both the main aspects of the international security and the principles of Russia's national security and the protection of its national interests.

Russia, as a great power building its own (civilizational) development strategy, will always face threats to its national security. Therefore, on the one hand, there should be no complacency at the level of the citizen, the leadership, and society. On the other hand, there is no dramatization and no desire to be closed.

There must be normal, responsible and effective work, first of all, by those structures that are related to ensuring national security. Such work is an important traditional component of the policy of any viable, independent and self-sufficient state.

The pre-war experience and lessons of the great Victory teach that threats and challenges are the most important elements that are embedded in the national security strategy of the state. Threats don't just come out of nowhere. They are closely related to the extent to which the national interests of certain states conflict with each other.

Modern threats and challenges to the national security of the Russian Federation are determined by the fact that today our country is building its own civilizational path of development regardless of how and to what extent major players in the international arena accept or do not accept this fact. As long as the threat of war persists, the guarantee of peace remains the preservation of strong, efficient armed forces and their maintenance in a high degree of combat readiness.

NOTES:

(1) Collaborationism (French Collaboration) in the legal interpretation of international law is a conscious, voluntary and deliberate cooperation with the enemy, in its interests and to the detriment of one own state.

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PHENOMENON OF IMPORT EXPO: NEW APPROACHES IN THE STATE POLICY OF REGULATING EXHIBITION ACTIVITIES IN THE PRC

The article analyzes in detail the accumulated experience of organizing and holding the first Chinese international exhibitions and fairs of imported goods (China International Import Expo), Russia's participation in such exhibitions as an honored guest which presented many industrial and technological innovations in various industries, as well as a comprehensive presentation in the field of trade, investment, and tourism development.

Key words: *exhibition communication management, state regulation of exhibition activities, world EXPO, import expansion, the Great Silk Road, "one belt, one road," Russian-Chinese trade and industrial cooperation, cross-border e-commerce.*

China's efforts to expand imports, which are increasingly being implemented in the form of an international EXPO, are based on the scientific and verified strategic conclusions at the government level about the feasibility of implementing large-scale plans to turn the country into a world trading power. Such ambitious plans have a serious basis, according to forecasts of Chinese experts, in the next five years, the volume of imports of goods and services may reach 10 trillion dollars [19]. This is why the issue of expanding imports was raised as early as in 2012 [9. P. 32].

This idea was soon approved by the State Council of China, which issued a special document "Views on strengthening imports," and in May 2017, at the high-level Forum on international cooperation within the framework of the "one belt, one road," Chinese President XI Jinping, supporting the idea, announced that from 2018 China intends to hold annual representative international exhibitions [14. P. 51-52].

In the subsequent period, the Chinese leadership consistently explained its new policy on regulating exhibition activities at numerous international venues and implemented measures to encourage the expansion of imports. Thus, in 2018, Chinese President XI Jinping, having clarified the policy, unveiled the key directions of openness of the modern Chinese market.

These include, first, expanding access to the Chinese market; second, expanding imports; third, improving the business environment; and fourth, protecting intellectual property rights [9. P. 32; 1. P. 8-11].

Subsequently, these theses were supplemented with new content. Thus, at the opening of the second import EXPO on November 5, 2019 President XI Jinping confirmed China's intention to open the door even wider for importers, taking as a basis such economic measures as reducing tariffs, consistently adhering to its fundamental policy of openness, raising it to an even higher level, removing barriers that prevent the flow of knowledge, technology, talent and other factors that contribute to innovation [23]. The holding of this large-scale event is also seen, but is not dominated by a certain political component caused by the recently escalated trade conflict between China and the United States. Experts say that in the context of this conflict, the meaning of the import fair is growing [3; 2; 21; 5].

First, such an EXPO shows that the PRC intends to hold import fairs and actively expand its imports, demonstrating the unchanging position of promoting a mutually beneficial strategy of openness and protection of trade freedom.

Second, the holding of a second representative import fair serves as a warning to businesses and companies in the United States and some other countries that are currently suffering from the economic downturn in mature markets [23; 17], that they may actually miss out on the Chinese market and huge commercial chances, which in the conditions of increasing economic instability in the world does not bode well for them.

Meanwhile, the huge size and volume of goods and services presented at the fair arouse great respect, which was confirmed by the support from reputable international organizations. The World Trade Organization, the UN Conference on trade and development, and the UN Industrial Development Organization were partners of the import EXPO [1. P. 8]. The first exhibition in 2018 was attended by representatives of 172 countries (the second exhibition in 2019 – by already 181), including 58 countries from the "one belt, one road" region, more than 3600 companies (in 2019 – 3800), including more than 200 leading industrial enterprises and companies from the top 500 largest world, more than 400 thousand buyers from China and other countries. 800 thousand people took part in the exhibition (next year their number reached 910 thousand), and the total amount of potential annual transactions amounted to US$57.83 billion (in 2019 – US$71.1 billion, or increased by 23%) [17; 22. P. 43].

It is very characteristic that out of the total volume of potential transactions, their amount in the field of intelligent high-tech equipment was 28.5% (US$16.46 billion), in the field of food and agricultural products – 21.9% (US$12.68 billion), in the field of automobiles – 20.7% (US$11.99 billion), medical equipment and healthcare – 10.0% (US$5.76 billion), consumer electronics and household appliances – 7.5% (US$4.33 billion), clothing, jewelry and everyday goods – 5.8% (US$3.37 billion), trade in services – 5.6% (US$3.24 billion) [22. P. 43].

Experts especially note that the area for holding the second EXPO in comparison with the first EXPO was increased several times, but despite this, as well as the significant cost of one square meter of exhibition space (usually about 3000 US dollars), it was very difficult to get an exhibition stand.

Visitors to EXPO, scientists, and the expert community see the main reason for such a great popularity in the extraordinary history of this trade and economic exhibition, as well as the traditions of trade in China, that have thousands of years of history. We are talking about the great silk road, a unique communication project in the history of human civilization, which is increasingly attracting the attention of Chinese and foreign specialists [20; 21; 8; 11 etc.], a as well as the efforts of the Chinese leadership, which has developed and implemented the concept of reviving such legendary root, within the framework of the “one belt and one road” initiative, involving new partners in this project [20. P. 120].

Over the past five years, China has already invested more than US$80 billion in the economy of the New silk road countries, concluding 105 cooperation agreements with 106 countries and 29 international organizations. During this time, 22 areas of trade and economic cooperation were created, investments in these projects exceeded US$ 28 billion, creating almost 250 thousand jobs. In general, according to specialists, this activity of China and countries of the economic belt of the Silk Road helped to increase the volume of bilateral trade to US$ 6 trillion, and the total imports into China of products and services over the next five years will be at least US$10 trillion [1. P. 8].

The correctness of the chosen course for the openness of China’s domestic market and the huge organizational work of its government is evidenced by the fact that, according to some experts, the first Chinese international import fair has exceeded all expectations in its scale and has become one of the global commercial exhibitions [4]. At the same time, the second exhibition has already established itself as an important and successfully tested platform for trade cooperation between China and other countries [13], however, giving preference to the countries included in the “one belt and one road” project. It is becoming more and more obvious that the Chinese international import EXPO is a new word, a kind of “know-how” in the modern theory and practice of exhibition management, the world’s first state forum focused solely on filling its own domestic market with goods and services [7].

Experts insist that according to the updated summary data on world-famous commercial exhibitions, [4], the China International Import Fair, held on the basis of the National exhibition center in Shanghai, is indeed one of the global commercial exhibitions in terms of its scale. According to the reference data prepared by the Bureau for the organization of the China International Import Fair, EXPO of such level is the world's first state exhibition dedicated exclusively to imports. It has acquired global significance for its constructive assistance in strengthening trade and economic exchange and cooperation between all interested countries of the world; stimulating the growth of global trade and promoting the growth of the open world economy [4; 12; 15].

It is very important that the exhibition served as an effective open-type cooperation platform for presenting the achievements of national development and prospects for the growth of international trade. Another feature is the patronage of the Chinese government in promoting economic globalization, and, accordingly, its classification as a global public good. And finally, according to experts, the exhibition in Shanghai becomes a landmark project of a new concept for the development and promotion of a new round of high-level external openness of China, which is especially significant today, when "the forces of protectionism are rearing their heads again, and free trade is facing increasing challenges," it's China that "sends a clear signal to the world that mutual benefit and common gain are the right way to develop" [1. P. 8, 21].

The distinctive features of the import EXPO in China are considered to be: the large scale and variety of events; the huge Chinese market opening, the dynamic growth of consumption and imports; the simultaneous implementation of various events of the business program, highly effective and comprehensive service for its participants; a huge survey on purchases, organization of visits to the exhibition by a large number of professional buyers (more than 400 thousand people) [3]; understanding of the general public of the significance of the fact that the exhibition held in Shanghai will allow the whole of China to feel its effects.

The main components of EXPO were determined very professionally and with the account for modern approaches in the global exhibition management. Let's look at them more thoroughly:

1. *Comprehensive exhibition of trade and investment potential of the participating countries*. On an area of about 30 thousand meters, participants had an opportunity to demonstrate their trade and investment potential, including success in their trade in goods and services, development of industry, investment, tourism, and original products.

According to the analysis, the organizers of this EXPO took into account the different levels of economic development of the participating countries. This made it possible to create a preferential regime that ensured participation in such a large-scale exhibition for a number of companies that did not have the opportunity to compete for the right to participate with multinational corporations.

For example, some countries of the “belt and road,” in particular the less developed ones, found it difficult to count on proximity to economic giants. Among the 2800 companies that participated in the first import EXPO in 2018 many were from more than 50 countries and regions of the “belt and road,” and 44 were from least developed countries. Therefore, the organizers of the Shanghai fair presented two standard stands to each such country free of charge [4].

2. *Hongqiao international economic forum*. It is also held annually within the framework of the import EXPO, the organization of which is constantly being improved. So if at the first fair it consisted of an official ceremony and three so-called sub-forums dedicated to “trade and openness,” “trade and investment,” “trade and innovation,” then the main theme of the forum in 2019 was “Openness and innovation, cooperation and common gains.”

This very significant event was held in the “1+4” format: one opening ceremony (the main forum) plus four sub-forums, where new trends in the development of the world economy, ways of its recovery and growth prospects were discussed [15. P. 25]. It is also important that the UN Department for industrial development and other international organizations offered to provide analytical and technical support to the forum, and it is quite logical.

3. *Commercial exhibition of enterprises*. It consists of two parts: an exhibition of trade in goods (with an area of about 180 thousand square meters of consumer electronics, household appliances, clothing, everyday goods, automobiles, intelligent and high-tech equipment, food and agricultural products, medical equipment, medicinal and health products, etc.) and an exhibition of trade in services (with an area of about 30 thousand square meters of new technologies, outsourcing services, creative design, culture, education and tourism) [4].

According to experts, the Chinese government’s decision to hold the first international import EXPO on an annual basis fully reflects China’s determination to actively promote a new round of foreign trade policy and open its market to the world by consistently using and improving exhibition management mechanisms.

The experience of holding two international import EXPOs in Shanghai showed that this model of equal mutual cooperation between different countries has a powerful appeal.

First, EXPO is an ideal platform for testing and implementing new products. For instance, at the first EXPO in 2018, hand-made jute products from Bangladesh were highly appreciated and included in the sales-lists of the leading Japanese Takashimaya Department store chain in the city of Shanghai. L’Oreal, the largest exhibitor at the first and second EXPOs in the section “household chemicals,” called the EXPO an “accelerator” for the launch of new products and the formation of advertising of marketable products. All four brands of this company, demonstrated at the first and second EXPOs, confidently entered the Chinese market, gaining great popularity.

Secondly, EXPO is a good opportunity to feel the pulse of the Chinese economy, an effective form of assistance to professional audiences and buyers from foreign companies to form a reliable idea of the scale of the market for consumer goods and services and existing trends in China. In particular, this led to a change in the Brazilian beef brand, which switched to a new model of wholesale transactions, preferring to launch the sale of this product in small packages, spreading it in relatively small localities, thereby significantly increasing its sales volume.

Third, EXPO has acted as a kind of a platform where companies could find the most suitable partners. An example is the company Stenders, which specializes in the production of branded skin care products, whose products can now be purchased not only in specialty department stores, but also at gas stations, e-commerce platforms and local convenience stores.

Fourth, EXPO has become a gathering place for interested buyers from all over the world. For example, Johnson and Johnson's exhibition stand was visited by several government delegations that signed procurement agreements with more than 50 well-known hospitals in China. Another striking example is the world famous German manufacturer of household electrical appliances Worwerk that demonstrated an intelligent robot vacuum cleaner at EXPO and won a very positive assessment. At the same time, during the 2018 EXPO, a large number of such items, including medical and industrial equipment and measuring devices, were successfully sold directly to customers.

Fifth, the practice of holding two international import EXPOs showed that it is the best platform for foreign products to enter the Chinese market. This fact is confirmed by serious experts. Thus, New Zealand milk produced by LewisRoad Greamy became a huge success in China, and according to its Director O'Wurk, it was made possible thanks to EXPO, which paid great attention to "the huge market of China with unlimited development potential." Experts noted that the second EXPO created a solid foundation for the long-term development of New Zealand products, securing a new brand of popular dairy products liked in China [16].

It is important to note that the Russian Federation is a key participant in the import EXPOs held in China [1. P. 8-9; 14]. It has a special role – it participates in the exhibitions as an honorary guest, which highlights not only the level and scale of Russia's participation, but also speaks of the significant potential of Russian-Chinese trade and industrial cooperation. It demonstrates the special attention to this problem of the top leadership of both countries. As noted by the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin "thanks to the efforts of President XI Jinping and the Chinese government, we are progressing very well in the trade and economic sphere, and we have even exceeded our plans for trade turnover" [6. P. 23].

Thus, in 2018, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia broke previous records, for the first time exceeding the amount of US$100 billion. In 2019, which marked the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries, China-Russia relations of strategic partnership and interaction reached the highest level in history through the joint efforts of both sides [10. P. 33].

It should be noted that a new type of Chinese-Russian trade is currently developing dynamically – cross-border Electronic Commerce. As it grows, strengthens and revives the entire digital economy, this type of business is attracting more and more attention from the political and business circles of China and Russia. In the future, ensuring long-term and orderly development of cross-border e-Commerce is of great importance for further improving the level of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

According to the Association of Internet Commerce companies (ACIT) of Russia, in 2018, Russian post processed about 380 million international shipments, showing an increase of 30.1% compared to 2017. At the same time, 92% of trade shipments came from China, followed by mailings from the EU (3%) and the US (2%). The share of Chinese parcels in cross-border e-Commerce in Russia is increasing every year, but in monetary terms this dynamics is still much less: only 53% constitute parcels from China, 22% – from the EU and 12% – from the US. All this shows that the price of most goods sent from China is still rather low.

The number of orders made by Russian buyers from China via the Internet is increasing, and the volume of cross-border e-Commerce between China and Russia is also growing in 2019, as indicated by expert forecasts [10. P. 33].

In particular, according to the forecast of ACIT of Russia, by the end of 2019, the volume of its e-Commerce market may reach US$33.8 billion (2.2 trillion rubles). Second, China is rapidly increasing its consumption and imports. With the largest population in the world, China is the second largest economy and the second largest consumer market, which has just entered a new stage of continuous growth in consumption. In the next five years, China is ready to import goods and services worth more than US$10 trillion, which will make it possible to occupy the corresponding niches of the Chinese domestic market.

At the recent 24th meeting of the heads of government of China and Russia, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang demonstrated his full support for cooperation between the two countries in new areas, such as cross-border e-Commerce and technological innovation. The Joint Communique signed after the meeting noted that the "implementation of the Memorandum on promoting the quality development of bilateral trade" will optimize its structure, create new points for trade and economic growth and stimulate the development of new forms of trade, such as e-Commerce and trade in services." The parties agreed to "actively expand investment cooperation in the field of high-tech and digital economy." This shows that the leaders of the Chinese and Russian governments have shown maximum confidence and achieved complete unity in implementing the strategy of promoting bilateral trade and economic cooperation to a higher level.

Some regions of the Russian Federation have a large import potential that should be reoriented to the Chinese market. Among them are Moscow [18], Primorsky, Krasnoyarsky and Zabaykalsky Territories [6. P. 19; 24. P. 13-14].

It should be recognized that economic and trade cooperation between China and Russia has long been promoted mainly by the efforts of the government of the two countries, and the "people's trade," focused on the market, has not been able to make a breakthrough. It is possible that cross-border e-Commerce can become a touchstone, a popular flow that will break down all barriers to free market trade between the two peoples, serve as a bridge and link to strengthen mutual understanding and realize the aspirations of the peoples of China and Russia [10. P. 35].

Such promising investment projects in Russia as the construction of modern cross-border trade and tourism complexes were also discussed at the exhibition's discussion platforms. Tourist projects arouse increased interest among the Chinese, last year they became the leaders in the number of inbound tourist trips to Russia – 1.478 million visits, or an increase of 14% compared to the previous period. It is no accident that the regions of Russia demonstrated new types of tourism at the import EXPO in China. Thus, the Sverdlovsk Region clearly showed the available opportunities for medical tourism, Udmurtia presented "weapon tours" to the homeland of the Kalashnikov, much was also said about the development of Arctic and gastronomic types of tourism. Intergovernmental documents being developed now provide for the possibility of expanding the scope of visa-free tourism and extending the period of visa-free stay [24. P. 14-15].

Experts note an increased backlog in the build-up of expert supplies from Russia to China, the 2019 exhibition saw the opening of a representative office of the Russian export center (REC) in Shanghai, a similar headquarters will open in Beijing, and in the future-Agency points in 20 cities of China. A. Slepnev, Head of REC, noted that this will allow Russia to present the full range of services to support Russian – Chinese trade: credit and insurance support, logistics assistance, participation in exhibitions and search for partners [24. P. 15].

This will lead to the entry of Russian companies into the Chinese market through the e-Commerce platform, will create in China a complete, integrated system providing for the Russian-Chinese trade," [24. P. 15], moreover, speaking at the opening ceremony of the second EXPO Chinese President XI Jinping said that China's total imports of goods and services in the next 15 years will amount to US$40 trillion. In particular, it is planned to import goods worth US$30 trillion for this purpose, as a support for imports to China, the country plans to continue reducing customs duties and simplify the customs clearance procedure [24. P. 15].

According to the research, Russia is firmly among the 20 key partners of the Shanghai trading platform. Now it is planned, in addition to Internet sites and tourism, to interact with catering and hotel businesses, as they are able to provide the maximum volume of purchases. All this and much more meets the mutual intention to significantly increase the volume of foreign trade turnover of China and Russia, which will be increased to US$200 billion a year in the coming years, as agreed by the leaders of the two countries – Vladimir Putin and XI Jinping [23; 7. P. 23 and other].

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ETHNIC TERRORISM AND ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS OF THE XIX-XX CENTURIES: ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS

The article considers the processes of evolution of ethnic terrorism during the XIX-XX centuries. It is noted that the emergence of ethnic terrorism is associated with the growth of nationalism and the rise of national movements. The article shows the relationship between ethno-political conflicts and ethnic terrorism. It is emphasized that ethnic conflicts are often intertwined with socio-political conflicts. The article considers the influence of left-wing revolutionary terrorism on ethnic terrorism both when it only began and in the subsequent historical periods. The article analyzes the impact of left-and right-wing ideological trends on ethnic terrorism. The article considers the ideological and political platform and activities of various ethnic terrorist organizations. It is stated that the specific forms and ideological and political orientations of ethnic terrorism depend on the socio-political situation in a particular country and on the trends that dominate the world politics at various historical periods.

Key words: *ethno-political conflicts, ethnic terrorism, nationalism, left-wing radicalism, right-wing radicalism.*

Ethnic terrorism is one of the main types of modern terrorism, along with left-wing, right-wing and religious terrorism. It can be described as "an inadequate form of struggle against actual or perceived infringement of the rights and interests of an individual nation or ethnic group." [9. P. 25]. In recent decades, ethnic terrorism has shown the highest degree of activity. The share of national separatist groups accounted for 31% of terrorist acts committed in the world from 1968 to 2016, which exceeds the number of terrorist attacks committed by left-wing, right-wing and religious organizations [7. P. 47]. Ethnic terrorism is generated by ethno-political conflicts, and its forms and manifestations depend on the influence of various socio-political and ideological-political factors specific to each country and historical epoch.

The era of the formation of nations and national states gave rise to nationalism [3. P. 320], which became the ideological basis of the first manifestations of ethnic terrorism. American ethno-politologist L. Snyder saw the first manifestations of "integrating nationalism" in European political life in 1815-1871. The scientist used this term to characterize nationalism as an ideological platform that was supposed to consolidate politically divided ethnic groups [13. P. 48].

In the first half of the XIX century, Italians and Germans were scattered across the territory of many medium and small states in Western Europe and the processes of modernization created an objective basis for uniting them in ethno-nation. The Great French Revolution put into practice the idea of national unity and provided the ideological basis for such a union. While fighting for the unification of his homeland, Garibaldi also fought for the establishment of the republican form of government. The ethno-political conflict in the Italian lands was characterized by a complex structure. If in the territories under the rule of the Italian monarchical dynasties and the Vatican, the struggle for the national idea was intertwined with the struggle for anti-monarchical and anti-clerical goals, in the territory of Northern Italy, which was part of the Austrian Empire, the goals of the national liberation struggle prevailed over all others. It's here that the phenomenon that is now commonly called ethnic terrorism took shape. Subsequently, the Italian experience was borrowed by European anarchists and Russian narodovoltsy, who linked their ethnic and revolutionary terrorism. The specific feature of ethnic terrorism is that it occurs as a form of manifestation and development of ethno-political conflict. With the resolution of such conflict, the ground for it disappears. This happened in Italy along with the unification of the Italian lands not "from below," in a revolutionary way, but "from above," under the rule of the Savoy dynasty.

At the end of the XIX century, a new wave of ethno-terrorism rose in Europe. It was caused by a different type of nationalism that L. Snyder called "dividing" or disintegrating nationalism [13. P. 48]. This type of ethno-nationalism was associated with ethno-political conflicts that originated in the Eastern part of the European continent. In the second half of the XIX century, the territory of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe with a few exceptions belonged to three continental empires: the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman (Turkish). Dozens of peoples who lived here differed in culture, religion, language and the level of economic development. In the second half of the XIX century, Eastern Europe gradually embarked on the path of modernization and felt its consequences, such as urbanization, industrialization, the development of education, science and mass communications. The ethnic self-identification was manifested in the most acute way among the intelligentsia, which formulated its own national ideology. The first task of almost all national movements in East European countries was to study, preserve and develop national culture in general, and the national literary language in particular. The authorities were distrustful of such activity of national movements and hindered it, encouraging political nationalism, the main goal of which was formation of national states. The transition of nationalism into a political form was accompanied by an increase in its aggressiveness and the formation of an ethnocentric vision of the world. This was the ground for the appearance and development of ethno-political conflicts in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the late XIX – early XX centuries. In some cases, the severity of ethnic and political conflicts pushed participants and activists of national movements to the path of terrorism.

At the same time, revolutionary terrorism, inspired by the Russian Empire, became more active in Eastern Europe in general and in the Russian Empire in particular, inspired by left-wing, non-Marxist ideas. The example of Russian terrorists from among the narodovoltsy, and then the social revolutionaries, had an impact not only on national movements that originated on the outskirts of the Russian Empire, but also on the national liberation movement of the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, who were united with Russia by their civilizational identity and similarity of languages. Students from Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro sought education in Russia and learned there not only professional knowledge, but also social ideas, including revolutionary. This happened not only in Russia, but also in the territories of West European states, where young people from the Balkan Peninsula maintained contacts with Russian revolutionaries in exile. American historian S. Fey noted: “In the 60s and 70s of the XIX century, many Serbian revolutionaries were in Switzerland and there came under the influence of Russian revolutionaries, such as Bakunin, Kropotkin and Herzen. They adopted a revolutionary program that was supposed to be implemented through anarchic acts of violence and terror.” [2. P. 75]

After the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and the Berlin Congress of 1879, Serbian territory was liberated from Turkish rule, but some parts remained under the control of the Austrian Empire. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a new hotbed of ethnic terrorism. The hopes of the Serbs for reunification of their historical homeland were destroyed by the annexation of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1907. The aim of “Mlada Bosnia,” an organization which emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was reunification with Serbia. Members of that organization switched to the tactic of individual terror against representatives of the Austrian authorities. Members of “Mlada Bosnia” followed the example of the Russian revolutionaries of the nineteenth century, they were also inspired by the more recent example of the First Russian revolution of 1905-1907. In the end, it was a member of “Mlada Bosnia” G. Princip who committed the terrorist attack, which became trigger for the beginning of the crisis that led to the First World War.

The plans for a post-war peace settlement assumed the solution of the national question on the basis of the principles of self-determination of peoples. But it was very difficult to implement the right of nations to self determination in practice. New borders appeared on the political map of the world, and with them new centers of ethno-political conflicts, even though previously existing conflicts had not been completely resolved. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes can serve an example of the intertwining of old and new ethno-political conflicts. It emerged after the First World War and was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. However, the basis of the national policy of the Yugoslav authorities was not the idea of unity of the South Slavic peoples, but the nationalist idea of Greater Serbia, which in practice meant imposing the Serbian language and culture on the entire population of the Kingdom. In the Yugoslav part of Macedonia, the policy of the royal authorities encountered resistance from the Bulgarian nationalist and separatist VMORO. Macedonian nationalist terrorists established contacts with other nationalist and separatist groups operating in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, most notably the Rebel Croatian Revolutionary Organization, whose members were known as the Ustashi. This organization set as its goal the creation of an independent Croatian state. Receiving support from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, together with Macedonian terrorists from VMORO, Ustashi organized the murder of king Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French foreign Minister L. Bart in Marseille in 1934. This action is recognized as the starting point of the process of internationalization of terrorism that began in the 30s of the XX century.

After the murder of Alexander Karageorgievich and L. Bartu, the history of VMORO and the Ustashi developed differently. At the same time, in 1934, the VMORO declared self-dissolution, although some of its members continued their political and terrorist activities. The evolution of the Ustashi went in the direction of open fascist ideology. During World War II, the Ustashi collaborated with Nazi Germany and committed numerous crimes against the civilian population.

Ukrainian nationalists, just as the Croatian Ustashi, evolved towards fascist ideology and practice in the 20-30s of the XX century. Ukrainian nationalism was formed before the First World War. At that time, it often covered itself by liberal and socialist slogans. After the First World War, a new type of Ukrainian nationalism emerged, influenced by the ideas and practices of the fascist movements in Italy and Germany. In the first half of the 1920s, several groups of radically oriented people emerged from among the Ukrainian emigration and in 1929 they became part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN's ideological platform was the concept of "integral nationalism" put forward by D. Dontsov. In 1926, he published a book under an explicit title of "Nationalism," in which, guided by the thesis of social Darwinism about the eternal enmity between the "strong" and "weak" nations, he proposed a new ideological platform for the Ukrainian movement. In the spirit of fascist ideology, D. Dontsov determined that the driving force of the new Ukrainian nationalism should be "strong will, strength, violence, racism, fanaticism, ruthlessness and hatred, voluntarism and romanticism, immorality and anti-intellectualism" [12. P. 32].

Western Ukraine, which after the First World War became part of the newly recreated Polish state became the main place for the activity of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists. As in the case of the Balkan Peninsula, attempts to solve national problems within the framework of the Versailles peace settlement have created new ethno-political conflicts in Poland. During the XIX – early XX centuries, Polish nationalists actively supported the Ukrainian national movement, viewing it as a means of fighting the Russian Empire. But after the formation of an independent Polish state, the goals of Polish and Ukrainian nationalists diverged. Polish settlers were moved to the West Ukrainian and West Belarusian lands and non-Polish languages and culture were restricted and oppressed. The discontent of national minorities was suppressed by punitive actions called "pacification." This policy of the authorities of interwar Poland provoked outbreaks of ethnic terrorism, the main subject of which was the OUN. The right-wing ideological platform of the OUN allowed an active use of methods of individual terror. The most high-profile terrorist act committed by the OUN was the murder of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs B. Pyeratskiy. The future leader of the OUN S. Bandera organized this crime. Bandera guerillas, like the Ustashi, tainted themselves with the mass killings of innocent people during the Second World War. A well-known example of their brutality is the so-called "Volyn massacre," during which several tens of thousands of Poles were killed and tortured.

In contrast to the ethnic terrorism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which had much in common with left-wing revolutionary terrorism, ethnic terrorism between the two world wars was more closely associated with the right-wing fascist terrorism. There are several explanations for this. First, all ethnic terrorism is based on the ideas of nationalism, and it was extreme nationalism and chauvinism that served as the basic ideology of the fascist movements of the interwar period. Second, after the First World War, the influence of the left-wing, non-Marxist ideas declined. The left flank of the world political spectrum was occupied by the Communist movement. Marxism rejected the tactics of individual terror as ineffective, although in the 20-30s of the XX century attempts were made, even if unsuccessful to use ethnic terrorists in the interests of the "world revolution." [15. P. 95-96]

After the Second World War, ethnic and national problems in the world worsened. The process of decolonization began, accompanied by the rise of national movements, the emergence of many ethno-political conflicts and the spread of ethnic terrorism. Most often, the ideological basis of the activities of terrorist organizations of an ethnic nature was nationalism, as it was, for example, in Palestine in the 40s of the XX century or in Cyprus in the 50s of the XX century. [4. P. 67].

The second half of the XX century was marked by an increase in terrorist activity in many regions of the world. The most common type of terrorism in that period was again left-wing, revolutionary terrorism. But, unlike in the past, when revolutionary terrorism was based on the non-Marxist left-wing ideas, the revolutionary terrorism of the 1960s and 80s was mainly represented by organizations and movements that positioned themselves as Marxist. What is the reason for such self-identification? As has already been noted, Marxists officially rejected the tactics of individual terror. The change in their position was due to the peculiarities of the development of the international Communist movement after the Second World War. Because of the dissolution of the Comintern, it lost its former organizational unity. When Stalin's cult was criticized in the USSR and new approaches to a number of issues of strategy and tactics of the Communist movement were determined at the XX Congress of the CPSU, its ranks began to wobble. Not all Communists agreed with the thesis about the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism, considering it a departure from Marxist-Leninist teachings. The differences that emerged among the Communists were intensified by the Soviet-Chinese conflict. As a result, parallel Communist parties appeared in a number of countries, they called themselves "Marxist" or "Marxist-Leninist." Their members interpreted the Communist doctrine in a radical way and recognized terrorist methods as acceptable and necessary in the struggle for the socialist revolution. The left-wing version of Marxism became the ideological basis for the activities of such well-known terrorist organizations as the RAF in Germany, the RENGO Sekigun in Japan and the Red Brigades in Italy. Former member of the Central Committee of the Peruvian Communist party K. Marighella published a book titled "Mini manual of the Urban Guerrilla" [10], which became a manual for terrorists of all kinds.

Although left-wing extremist terrorist organizations and groups dissociated themselves from the Soviet-oriented Communist movement, the success of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the 60s and 70s of the XX century contributed to the growing popularity of the left-wing ideas around the world. Since there is often a social component in the ethno-political conflicts, ethnic terrorism may also be partly motivated by the left-wing ideas. One of the most well-known ethnic terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan workers ' party, both in its name and in its documents, openly proclaims its commitment to the Communist values as it understands them. In the program of action adopted at the founding Congress of the PKK in 1978, it was "declared a party of the working class of Kurdistan, armed with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the ultimate goal of which is to build a classless society in Kurdistan" [16. P. 231]. The PKK leaders were not confused by the fact that official Marxism-Leninism condemned the terrorist methods of struggle practiced by their party. However, realizing the incompatibility of Communist principles and nationalism, they emphasized their negative attitude to it, although in reality the goals of the PKK coincided with the goals of other openly nationalist Kurdish parties.

An even greater degree of integration of left-wing ideas and national separatist goals can be noted in the European terrorist organizations that were very famous in the second half of the XX century – the Northern Irish IRA and the Basque

ETA. Ethnic terrorism in the Basque Country was triggered by an ethnic conflict that arose after the end of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. The Basques first gained national autonomy after the establishment of the Republican system. It is no accident that the entire population of the Basque Country supported the Popular Front government during the Civil War. But while the Popular Front was generally dominated by the left-wing parties, the power in the Basque Country belonged to local nationalists. They did not conduct socialist experiments, but the Basque military units fought stoutly on the side of the Republicans [8. P. 69]. After the defeat of the Republic, the Francoists destroyed all traces of national autonomy, the Basque language and culture were banned. Discontent with this situation was severely suppressed. The socio-economic situation of the Basques also deteriorated, as the economic situation after the end of the Civil War remained difficult for a long time [1. P. 636]. The younger generation of Basques was particularly radical. These circumstances led to the creation of ETA in 1959, which adopted methods of individual terror. ETA declared itself "the Basque socialist movement for national liberation," considering its struggle as a "part of the international proletarian revolution." [5. P. 158] Nevertheless, the ideological platform of ETA remained eclectic, since, according to the participants of the organization, its socialist ideal was at various times embodied by "both Israeli kibbutzim, the Yugoslav self-government, Marxism-Leninism, vague Maoism and the Nicaraguan-Sandinista model of the new society." [5. P. 158]. But for the majority of ordinary ETA militants, the main idea was the struggle for national self-determination.

Despite their fascination with left-wing ideas, both ETA and IRA remained national separatist organizations. At the same time, they interacted with terrorists of various directions. Russian political scientist I. Khohlov noted: "In order to expand their own capabilities and for the sake of basic survival, IRA and ETA have established links with other terrorist organizations far beyond their regions." [6. P. 89]. Among these organizations, various Palestinian groups stood out.

The emergence of Palestinian terrorism was a consequence of the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine. The Palestinian territories were divided between neighboring states and after 1967 they came under Israeli control. All the Palestinian organizations that emerged in the 1950s and 60s were based on a platform of non-recognition of Israel and the need for an armed struggle against it. But Palestinian organizations had no resources for an open armed struggle and they began to commit terrorist acts aimed at both state structures and the civilian population of Israel.

In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established. The members of the organization shared the same understanding of the ultimate goals and ways to achieve them, and their ideological attitudes reflected the main trends in the development of political processes in the Middle East and the world in the 60s and 70s of the XX century. Some organizations, in particular Fatah, were adherents of the ideas of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism, while others, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine or the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine were ideologically close to the left-wing extremist terrorist organizations in Europe and other regions. Over time, the influence of the left-wing and secular political ideas in the Middle East began to weaken. A large number of extremist organizations and movements appeared, guided by the ideas of "political Islam" or Islamism [11. P. 33-34]. Such an organization in Palestine was the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which emerged in 1987 on the basis of a local cell of the Muslim Brotherhood. There is a close relationship between ethnic and religious Islamist terrorism, since their ideological foundations – nationalism and Islamism – have a certain similarity. Russian researcher of political Islam Yu. I. Uspenskiy notes: "Nationalism smoothes out the contradictions within the society, but exacerbates the differences with other societies. Islamism exacerbates them both inside and outside of the society." [14. P. 71].

Ethnic terrorism arises from conflicts of an ethno-political nature, but its specific forms are determined by socio-political conditions and prevailing ideological and political trends. Ethnic terrorism can be close to both left-wing and right-wing terrorism, and can almost merge with religious-type terrorism, as is happening today, when ethno-religious terrorism has become a noticeable phenomenon.

The growth of nationalist sentiments among certain ethnic groups is often provoked by violations of the rights of these groups, discrimination on national, racial and religious grounds. National intolerance contributes to the escalation of ethnic conflicts, which increases the risk of international terrorism, especially in its ethnic form.

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SPECIFICS OF FOREIGN AND RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE IN FINANCING POLITICAL PARTIES

The purpose of this article is to examine the specifics of election campaign financing in Europe and Russia. The article considers legal basis of financing in the Russian legislation and analyses financing in a number of foreign countries.

Key words: *the electoral process, financing of parties, financing of the electoral process, Europe, EU.*

In the modern world, candidates running for parliaments or post of the president often face such a problem as campaign financing. This is because elections are very expensive, both for the state and for the candidates. High-quality campaigning by a candidate is impossible without campaign finance in the run-up to the election. Based on the above, it can be understood that the main component of the election campaign is fundraising.

The peculiarity of financing both political life and election campaigns abroad is that it is regulated by special legislation. To prove this, it is enough to recall the Austrian law “On the tasks of financing and election campaigning for political parties” (1975).

Based on a number of past elections, it can be concluded that the Russian Federation did not have a legal framework for election financing during the period when the Communist ideology was replaced by democratic values.

To date, with the adoption of a number of legislative acts establishing the constitutional rights of citizens to elect and be elected, election financing has become a special subject of legislative regulation at the federal and regional levels [2. P. 17-20]. These normative acts with chapters on election financing, include: Federal Law No. 138-FZ of 26.11.1996 (as amended on 09.11.2009) “On Ensuring the Constitutional Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Elect and be Elected to Local Self-Government Bodies” [3]; Federal Law No. 67-FZ of 12.06.2002 (as amended on 03.12.2012) “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation" [6]; Law of the Stavropol Territory No. 68-KZ of 27.07.2006 (as amended on 20.10.2011) "On the Election of Deputies of the Duma of the Stavropol Territory"; Federal law No. 51-FZ of 18.05.2005 (as amended on 02.05.2012) "On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation" [4].

The main focus during elections in the Russian Federation is on "the Formation of the Electoral Fund of Candidates and its Expenditure." In accordance with the Federal Law "On Presidential Elections of the Russian Federation," the total spending from the candidate's election fund may not exceed 400 million rubles and the maximum spending of a candidate running in the second round of voting may not exceed 500 million rubles.

The election fund of a candidate running for the post of the President of the Russian Federation is formed from the following monetary assets:

• the candidate's own funds, the amount of which may not exceed 10 percent of the total spending of the said candidate's election fund or 15 percent for the candidates taking part in the second round;

• the funds allocated to a candidate by the political party that nominated him/her, the amount of which may not exceed 50 percent of the total spending of the said candidate;

• voluntary donations from individuals and legal entities, the amount of which may not exceed 1.5 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of the total spending of the said candidate's election fund.

In order to finance the election campaign to the State Duma, political parties must take into account the following requirements in accordance with the Federal Law "On the Elections of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation":

1) electoral funds of political parties shall be created at the expense of:

a) internal funds of the political party owned by it, but such funds shall sum up to no more than fifty per cent of the maximum amount (in accordance with this Federal Law);

b) donations of citizens and legal entities (they may amount to respectively 0.07 and 3.5 per cent of the maximum spending);

2) the maximum amount of all spending from the electoral funds of political parties shall not exceed 700 million rubles;

3) electoral funds of regional chapters of political parties shall be created exclusively at the expense of [10]:

a) internal funds of the political party (but not the funds in the electoral fund of the political party) which shall sum up to no more than fifty per cent of:

b) voluntary donations of citizens and legal entities.

It should be noted that the maximum spending set in the electoral legislation may be small. This is due to the fact that for better party "advertising" using PR technologies and other tools to promote campaigning, more money is needed than those provided for in the electoral legislation. Because of all this, candidates have to resort to “black financing” of elections, that is, candidates pay from election funds only for the expenses that are easily verified by the election commissions.

The so-called soft money plays a great role in the federal election campaigns. This is money spent outside the limits of restrictions and prohibitions provided for by the electoral law. This money is not intended for this purpose, but is used in this way. These funds are given to political parties established at the level of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

Control over the electoral process by the state is an urgent problem today (i.e., the manifestation of political extremism). The main example of this is financial assistance to Russian public organizations from abroad.

The greatest threat during the election process is to damage the integrity and sovereignty of Russia and incite racial, national or social hatred through the media.

Due to the growing public demand for information, the security services of some countries may misinform the public with false information to support candidates with extremist goals. An example of such interference is the interference in the 2000 Yugoslav Presidential election, as well as support for the opposition in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential election.

Financing of political parties in foreign countries. In *France*, the system of state funding of political parties is in effect, but since 1995 donations from legal entities have been prohibited. The amount of donations from individuals has been cut down.

If we consider *the UK*, we can say that there is no state funding for parties. There is also a law providing that all subsidies to the party funds exceeding five thousand pounds must be made public.

In *Germany*, there is also a system of state funding for political parties – for every vote received by a party that overcame the half-percent barrier in the elections, the state pays 1 Euro once.

In *Italy*, the system of state funding for parties depends on the results of elections. Donations from the trade unions, corporations, and foreign organizations are also allowed.

In *Sweden*, government funding is allowed, but anonymous donations are prohibited.

In *Belgium*, the state also finances political parties. However, if parties demonstrate “hostility to human rights,” funding is stopped.

In *Spain*, political parties are funded from the state budget, as well as by the donations from their supporters. Foreign donations and contributions from Spanish businesses and companies are prohibited.

In the *Czech Republic*, the state can help parties financially. However, their financial statements should not be published.

Poland has a differentiated concept of public financing, depending on the results of the previous elections. Foreign donations are also prohibited.

Despite certain differences due to various socio-political concepts of foreign countries, the most pressing issues of the election financing can be identified as follows: what are the opportunities of participants in the electoral process to use them? how and in what way are election funds created? who controls the legality of all operations on the money collection and spending?

Fundraising is the most important and main issue without which it is impossible to hold elections. The system of financing the electoral process with public funds and private donations has undergone significant changes.

Depending on the answers to these and other questions, an assessment of the political institutions in various states is formed, in particular, in terms of their corruption.

In those countries where the concept of state subsidizing of the majority of political party expenditures has prevailed, the question of the optimal model of state participation remains on the agenda. Such participation in the election financing is carried out in two directions: support for candidates or political parties.

State involvement in the financing of elections. Legislation on elections, as well as on political parties, indicates a serious victory for the supporters of the state "involvement" in the process of formation of political institutions.

The electoral process in most foreign countries is funded by public funds and private donations. Data on the participation of the state in the electoral process indicate an increasing degree of the government "involvement" in the process of financing political institutions. Even countries with a high level of development of democratic institutions, where the state has traditionally "distanced itself" from the participation in the elections, have changed their attitude to this process [1].

The maximum amount of funding for the political parties is set in some foreign countries. For example, in Sweden, state support for the political parties is provided in the amount of SEK 360 million. Each party can expect to receive the amount of money that is determined by the number of seats it has won in the Riksdag (for each seat, the party currently receives 333,300 SEK). Political parties receive all the amounts listed under the article "party assistance." In addition, they are entitled to "Chancellor's aid" in the form of basic and additional payments.

By analyzing the world practice of state financing of political parties, we can distinguish four main methods of direct state financing of political parties:

• depending on the number of votes received by the party in the national (parliamentary or presidential) or municipal elections;

• equal shares for all registered political parties;

• a combination of two methods: the first part of public funding, which is distributed according to the number of votes received, and the second part is sent to political parties in equal shares;

• depending on the number of votes and the number of seats in the Parliament: part of the state funding is allocated in accordance with the number of votes received, and a part goes to finance political parties that are allowed to distribute parliamentary seats.

Parties that receive the required percentage of votes can expect quarterly payments in addition to compensation for election expenses. The fund from which these payments are made is formed by the state in such a way that the funds received by each party correspond to the level of its electoral "success" [7].

As rule, in many countries there are three groups of financial sources: private funding, own funds of political parties and public funding.

The party's own funds are created from entrance and membership fees, contributions to the party's cash register from the salaries of party members who hold positions in government structures (MPs, government members), income from the party events (exhibitions, lectures, festivals), income from property and business activities. In most cases, political parties' own funds, especially membership fees, make up a small part of their resources. For example, in Italy, the membership fees of most parties do not exceed on average twenty percent of all their income.

Private financing remains predominant in most countries. This is understood as voluntary donations from individuals and legal entities (monetary contributions, gifts, waivers under wills). In most countries, it is prohibited to finance political parties from abroad (donations from international organizations, foreign states, organizations, citizens and their associations). Such financing is considered as interference in the internal affairs of the state. Donations from private legal entities to party funds especially increase during the election campaigns. They are used as a means of subordinating political parties to the interests of certain social groups of financial and industrial capital, and are one of the causes of the widespread political corruption.

The third source of funding for political parties is the state. State funding is made in the following forms: general, special and indirect.

It is also worth considering the development of state payments in *Germany*. Initially, German parties did not receive any funds from the state budget. Then the parties that were represented in the Bundestag were funded. However, this contradicted the constitutional principle of equal opportunities for all participants in the electoral process. Therefore, the state began to finance all parties receiving not less than 2.5percent of the actual "second" for land lists or 10 percent of the "first" in one of the electoral bodies. At the moment the numbers have changed a lot. Parties must get at least 0.5 percent of the total number of votes at the European Parliament elections and at least one percent at the land elections for land lists.

Now let's turn to specific data. On June 4, the Central Election Commission published the parties' consolidated economic reports for 2017. RBC's analysis of the party reports from 2005 onwards (the most recent information is not available on the CEC website) revealed that in 2017, for the first time, the parliamentary parties depended on the budget by at least 75 percent. In general, in 2017, the total funds of the main domestic socio-political parties – deposits, as well as state profits and deductions – decreased significantly compared to the previous years [8; 9].

The part of the state funds in the party budgets began to increase after 2011. The graph shows that by 2017, all the four parties depended on the public money by 75-97 percent.

In accordance with the law, the annual state subsidies are provided to the parties that have received more than 3% of the vote in the previous State Duma elections (Federal Law No. 95-FZ of 11.07.2001 (as amended on 26.07.2019) "On Political Parties," Article 33. Federal budget funds allocated to political parties). Up until 2006, party subsidies ranged from 1 to 3.6 rubles per vote, depending on the year; since January 2006, they amounted to 5 rubles per vote, and this amount has also become fixed. Since 2009, it has become equal to 20 rubles per vote, and since 2012 – 50 rubles. In 2015, the amount has almost doubled to 110 rubles, and in 2016, it amounted to 152 rubles per vote. Parties whose candidate collected 3% or more of the vote in the presidential election also receive a one-time payment within a year from the date of the announcement of the results of the vote. Since 2009 (or since the 2012 election), this payment is 20 rubles per vote cast for the candidate.

Since 2014, elections to the State Duma have been held according to a mixed system. In 2016, in single-member districts, the opposition parties were mostly defeated by United Russia. In the State Duma of the 6th convocation, United Russia had 238 deputies out of 450, then, with the emergence of single – mandate members in the State Duma of the 7th convocation it had 342 deputies. The decline in faction led to an outflow of party sponsors. In 2016, only one non parliamentary group – Yabloko, that used to receive state funding, lost it, because it gained less than three percent of the vote at the federal election.

In addition to the state budget financing in election campaigns, the party budgets are formed from a certain number of sources [5].

Now let's turn to the *problems of financing election campaigns in the Russian Federation.*

Today, one of the issues for the candidates running for the posts of deputies or president is financing of the election campaign, because significant spending is required both from the state and the candidate. If there is no campaign finance available in the run-up to the election, there can be no question of a high-quality campaigning by a candidate. For this reason, receiving money is considered to be the main component of an election campaign.

Abroad, the financing of social and political life is also subject to special legislation. For example, the Austrian Federal Law "On the tasks of financing and election campaigning for political parties" was used by many other countries as an example. The experience of general elections shows that Russia did not have a sufficient legal framework for election financing during the transition from the Communist ideology to the democratic values.

Special attention is paid to the formation of the candidates' electoral funds and their rational spending during the elections in Russia. For example, according to the Russian legislation, the total spending from the candidate's election fund may

not exceed 400 million rubles and the maximum spending of a candidate running in the second round of voting may not exceed 500 million rubles. It's worth noting that the election fund of a candidate running for the post of the President of the Russian Federation is formed from the following monetary assets:

– the candidate's own funds, the amount of which may not exceed 10 percent of the total spending of the said candidate's election fund or 15 percent for the candidates taking part in the second round;

– the funds allocated to a candidate by the political party that nominated him/her, the amount of which may not exceed 50 percent of the total spending of the said candidate;

– voluntary donations from individuals and legal entities, the amount of which may not exceed 1.5 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of the total spending of the said candidate's election fund, established in accordance with the law, for each citizen or legal entity.

If we consider certain values for the maximum amount that can be taken from the electoral fund of a political party, the figures are as follows:

a) 15 million rubles in a subject of the Russian Federation where no more than 100 thousand registered voters reside;

b) 20 million rubles – in a subject of the Russian Federation where more than 100 thousand but fewer than 500 thousand registered voters reside;

c) 25 million rubles – in a subject of the Russian Federation where more than 500 thousand but fewer than 1 million registered voters reside;

d) 35 million rubles – if in the territory of such RF subject, to which a regional group(s) corresponds, more than 1 million but fewer than 2 million registered voters reside;

e) maximum sum of all expenses is 55 million rubles, it is paid in the territory where more than 2 million registered voters reside.

It should be noted that the maximum spending set in the electoral legislation may be not enough. This is due to the fact that for better party advertising using PR technologies and other tools to promote campaigning, more money is needed than those provided for in the electoral legislation.

It should be stressed that the legal regulation of elections by the state should ensure the legality of election campaigns. This is necessary due to the fact that money laundering often occurs during elections. Also, a well-known problem is the so-called lobbying, that is, the influence of "shadow parties" on the adoption of important political decisions. This is also very relevant in the modern world, although it was born in Soviet times. All these are channels of "black financing," which, unfortunately, cannot be completely stopped in practice, even if severe sanctions are imposed.

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ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTION RESULTS TO THE FINNISH PARLIAMENT IN THE COURSE OF FOUR ELECTORAL CYCLES

Today, researches that analyze elections in various countries and the results of their spatial distribution are gaining popularity, because they reflect socio-political processes with the account for the territorial factor. It allows us to make certain forecasts about the country's political course in respect of other states, for example, neighboring countries, which is especially relevant for the Russian Federation. The article reviews the system of elections to the Parliament of Finland and analyzes the results of the last four electoral cycles in order to identify distribution of voters' votes depending on the electoral district. The main parties participating in the elections over the past four years are considered. At the end of the article, the results of the spatial distribution of the results of the parliamentary elections in 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 are presented. It can be concluded that Finland is characterized by an average regionalization of the party system with small deviations, which makes it possible to clearly trace the preferences of voters, taking into account the territorial factor.

Key words: *Finland, Parliament, elections, spatial analysis, electoral cycle, regional distribution.*

Recently, researches on the regional specifics of electoral processes are gaining interest. In the focus of a separate discipline – electoral geography – there is a question of how the voter's place of residence affects his political preferences. It is assumed that factors such as distance from the capital, proximity to the border, economic and geographical profile of the territory, its historical memory or cultural landscape have a direct impact on the course and results of election campaigns [6]. Election statistics allows us to conduct research using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, which strengthens analytical and predictive abilities, and allows us to identify non-obvious causal relationships between voters' preferences and socio-political factors that affect them and are projected into the future in the form of certain voting results. It is already possible to identify individual studies that analyze the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in a local-country context, which can reflect more fundamental processes taking place in the society [13; 5]. Continuing this tradition, the article focuses on the dynamics of electoral cycles in Finland, neighboring Russia, in order to assess how significant regional disparities are for its domestic political life.

Finland is a country with one of the most developed democratic systems in the world, which is provided, among other things, by its electoral system, which guarantees the open expression of the citizens' will, protection of civil rights and freedom of the media [12]. The expert organization Freedom House confirms the status of Finland as a free democracy, giving it a rating of 1 out of 7 possible positions in 2018 [7].

The election to Eduskunta, the Finnish Parliament, is one of the most important events in the social and political life of Finland. Eduskunta occupies an exceptional position in the system of state power in the country: it issues laws, makes decisions on the state budget and approves international agreements. It represents the will of the Finnish people, who elect 200 of its members in a free vote every 4 years. During the parliamentary elections, the country is divided into electoral districts, each of which elects a certain number of deputies.

Finland adopted universal suffrage before other European countries, allowing women to vote in 1906 [9. P. 5]. Finnish citizens can vote at the parliamentary elections at the age of 18. Citizens living abroad also have the right to vote. Finland's electoral system has not changed much since independence. Parliamentary elections are held in 15 multi member constituencies by proportional representation [7]. The D'Hondt method is used for the allocation of seats in the legislature, meaning that citizens vote for national party lists with the additional determination by the voter of the priority of the candidate from the party list. The number of deputies from each district is determined by its population [8].

Professor S. Chernyshov writes, that such a vote for a party (or electoral bloc) and for a particular candidate implies "that each candidate in the voting list is assigned a number, and the voter notes in the ballot not only the party for which he votes, but also the number of the candidate from this party, which he prefers. Thus, the elector's vote not only determines the number of seats received by the party in the Parliament, but also who in the party list becomes an MP, so as not to create advantages for those candidates who are listed first in the party lists" [1].

Typical distribution of the parliamentary voting results in Finland are considered on the example of four main political parties that occupy leading positions over several electoral cycles [3]:

1. Social Democratic Party (SDP) was founded in 1899 in Turku as the workers' party of Finland. It is one of the largest "left" parties. The "core" of its electorate is made up of civil servants and the middle class. This party has a special influence in the southern industrial cities.

The party got its name in 1903 after the Congress in Forssa. In 1918, the party led the Finnish revolution, forming a revolutionary government in Helsinki.

The SDP almost collapsed after the defeat in the revolution, but was reorganized under the leadership of Väine Tanner (party Chairman in 1918-1926 and 1957-1963). Representatives of the party have repeatedly served as Presidents of Finland: Mauno Koivisto (1982-1994), Marti Ahtisaari (1994-2000), Tarja Halonen (2000-2012). The goal of the Social Democrats is to create a society based on freedom, equality and solidarity. The party is supported by more than 40 thousand of its members, who interact in 65 divisions across the country. In 2007, the SDP won 21.4% of the vote and 45 seats, respectively. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, the party won 19.1% and 42 seats in the Parliament. In the 2015 election period: 16.5% (35 seats) and in 2019 – 17.7% (40 seats).

2. “True Finns” (PS). A relatively young party founded in 1995 in Helsinki. The Charter of the party defines its main goal – to unite on a Christian-social basis a group of the population whose interests in the social and economic spheres and social status have not received due attention from the state.

Since its creation, the party has gradually increased its electoral potential. If in the 2007elections, it received 4.1% of the vote (only 8 seats), then in the 2011 elections the True Finns were supported by 19.1% of voters, which allowed them to get 39 seats in the Parliament. The results of the parliamentary elections in 2015 were less effective (17.6% of the vote), and the number of its representatives in the Parliament decreased to 38 deputies. However, True Finns received four Ministerial portfolios, and two of them are key posts: the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is also worth noting that the party’s leader Timo Soini took part in the Finnish presidential elections twice. In 2006, he was supported by 3.4% of voters, in 2012 – by 9.4%. In 2017, there was a split in the party, some of the deputies left the parliamentary faction and founded a new organization – “New alternative” – which later changed its name to “Blue future”. The party adheres to nationalistic and conservative views, stands in favor of reducing the level of taxation and immigration control. As a result of the April 2019elections, the True Finns received 17.5% of the vote and, accordingly, 39 seats in the Parliament (3).

3. National Coalition Party (KOK) was founded in 1918 as a result of the merger of the Young Finns Party (1894-1918) with the Finnish party (1863-1918). The party positions itself as a conservative party, representing the interests of entrepreneurs and patriots, and is popular among the military and in major cities. In the early 1920s, the Coalition Party focused on resisting communism and preventing the spread of the communist ideology. It should be noted that the party’s program was repeatedly updated and reformed, later it switched to dynamic conservatism. The party professes center-right liberal conservatism, and its representatives are in favor of preserving the national traditions, language and culture of Finland. The fundamental principles are ensuring school education for all, gender equality, and respect for the environment.

In the 2007 and 2011 elections, the party was among the leaders, receiving 22.3% and 20.4% of the vote (50 and 44 seats in the Parliament) (3). The party’s

Chairman during that period Jyrki Kainen became Prime Minister of Finland. In 2015, the Coalition Party received far fewer votes, gaining only 18.1% of the vote (38 seats). However, the party's candidate Sauli Niinisto was elected President of Finland in 2012 and re-elected in 2018. In the 2019 elections, the party retained the results of the previous vote, receiving 17% of the vote and 38 seats in the Parliament.

4. Finnish Center (KESK) was established in 1906, until 1965 it was called the Agrarian Union, and until 1998 – The party of the Center. It is based on the ideology of the center – left social liberalism. The party has more than 280 thousand members. From the moment of its foundation until 1995, it participated in the government, then, it moved to the opposition. It advocates an active environmental policy and the conservation of natural resources, supports the rural economy and increasing the number of jobs. The party's core is the rural population, representatives of small and medium-sized businesses. In 2007, it took the first place with a result of 23.1% (51 seats in the Parliament), in 2011 – the fourth place with 15.8% (35 seats). In 2015, the party again managed to win 21.1% of the vote, gaining 49 seats in the legislature. However, in 2019, the Finnish Center suffered a setback, it gained only 13.8%, losing 8 seats compared to the previous elections (3).

It can be concluded that the preferences of voters changed over the course of four electoral cycles (table 1). If in 2007 and 2015, the Finnish Center was in the first place, in 2011, it was the National Coalition Party, and in 2019 – the Social Democratic Party. It is interesting that in 2019, the votes were distributed between the three leading parties (SDP, PS и KOK) almost equally.

Table 1

Results of parliamentary elections in Finland of three parties during the last four electoral cycles (1)

	2007	2011	2015	2019
Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)	21.4% 45 seats	19.1% 42 seats	16.5% 35 seats	17.7% 40 seats
True Finns	4.1% 8 seats	19.1% 39 seats	17.6% 38	17.5% 39
National Coalition Party	22.3% 50 seats	20.4% 44 seats	18.1% 38 seats	17% 38 seats
Finnish Center	23.1% 51 seats	15.8% 35 seats	21.1% 49 seats	13.8% 31 seats

Analysis of the regional distribution of parliamentary election results over four electoral cycles. Based on the results of the 2007 elections, the National Coalition was in the second place, losing less than 1% to the Finnish Center Party. The analysis shows that the regions voted for the Center with a clear regional reference: more to the North (Lapland and Oulu), support for the party also grew (the range of 33-43%, depending on the district). In the southern regions, the National Coalition Party won from 23-30% of the vote, in the rest of the country – from 11 to 20%. The Social Democratic Party received most support (about 28% on the average) in the central regions (Hame, Satakunta and Kymi). In 2007, the results of the True Finns party were modest, it received no more than 6% of the vote, which is explained by its relative novelty in the party landscape.

Table 2

Regional distribution of parliamentary election results in Finland in 2007 (1)

Region	FC	SDP	NCP	Left alliance	Green	Christ. Dem.	SNP	TF
Helsinki	6.9	21.2	30.2	6.8	20.1	2.5	6.0	2.9
Uusimaa	12.4	20.2	28.7	6.7	10.9	4.1	9.5	6.0
Varsinais-Suomi	15.9	21.9	27.5	10.6	9.4	4.7	5.1	2.5
Satakunta	24.7	29.5	21.4	12.1	3.5	2.4		5.2
Häme	20.3	28.0	24.7	8.3	6.1	7.7		2.2
Pirkanmaa	16.3	23.8	25.1	9.6	8.7	6.2		4.9
Kymi	23.8	28.0	23.6	7.1	4.9	6.6		5.4
Etelä-Savo	37.4	27.6	18.9	1.7	7.0	3.6		3.2
Pohjois-Savo	35.8	19.5	17.1	11.2	4.0	8.1		3.4
North Karelia	35.7	31.5	11.8	2.6	11.7	3.1		2.8
Vaasa	32.5	12.7	14.1	4.7	1.5	7.0	20.6	6.0
Central Finalnd	33.2	24.5	14.8	7.4	6.9	7.9		2.6
Oulu	43.2	12.8	14.0	16.1	6.1	3.2		3.5
Lapland	43.1	15.1	11.9	23.1	3.2	1.0		1.8

Next, we will analyze the results of the 2011 elections. The vast majority of supporters of the National Coalition Party traditionally live in the South, so the best results were achieved in the southern regions-Uusimaa (28.4%), Helsinki (27.3%), and Native Finland (23.0%). Voters from Varsinais-Suomi, Hame and Pirkanmaa also made a significant contribution to the victory. In Northern regions like the North Karelia (10.5%), Oulu (11.9%), and Lapland (12.5%), the party did not receive significant support.

The Social Democrats again performed better in the Central districts: North Karelia (26.4%), in Kymi, Satakunt, and Khyama where the party received 24% of the vote. The Northern group of districts (Oulu, Lapland,Vaasa) continued to vote for the Finnish Center.

True Finns demonstrated a sensational result in this election, increasing the number of votes by 15% and taking the third place. More than 23% of the votes for the nationalists were cast in the regions of Satakunta, Kymi and North Karelia, which in the last election gave preference to the Federal center and SDP. In six other districts, it received more than 20%. Only the urbanized, rich South and the Swedish-speaking West voted somewhat more modestly: Helsinki – 12.9%, Vaasa – 17%. Some experts believe that such a "breakthrough" was rather an isolated case, since the nationalists managed to successfully play on public sentiments, however, this did not lead to a significant expansion of its electoral base [4].

Table 3

Regional distribution of parliamentary election results in Finland in 2011 (1)

Region	NCP	SDP	TF	FC	Left alliance	Green	SNP	Christ. Dem.
Helsinki	27.3	17.5	12.9	4.5	10.4	16.7	5.8	2.4
Uusimaa	28.4	19.3	18.8	6.4	5.1	9.1	8.3	2.8
Varsinais-Suomi	23.0	19.6	18.1	11.6	9.6	7.3	5.5	2.9
Satakunta	17.6	24.0	23.7	16.1	10.9	3.8		3.4
Hame	22.4	24.1	20.6	13.2	6.9	4.5		6.8
Pirkanmaa	22.3	21.6	21.1	10.4	8.3	8.3		5.0
Kymi	17.9	24.6	23.3	16.8	5.7	4.2		6.6
South Savo	14.1	24.0	20.5	26.8	2.2	7.1		4.5
North Savo	16.4	18.3	20.8	25.4	8.4	5.5		3.9
North Karelia	10.5	26.4	23.1	26.2	4.2	5.4		2.8
Vaasa	14.1	14.0	17.2	22.7	3.7	1.4	19.4	6.6
Central Finland	15.0	21.2	18.1	21.9	9.0	6.5		6.4
Oulu	11.9	11.0	20.2	33.4	14.5	4.9		2.7
Lapland	12.5	11.8	20.5	32.2	16.7	3.4		1.6

According to the results of the 2011 elections, the National Coalition Party was the winner. The highest turnout was shown in the capital region, Helsinki (70.54%), while the lowest was observed in remote territories – the Aland Islands and Lapland. The turnout in the parliamentary elections in the autonomous region is usually much lower than the country-wide turnout. In the past elections, it was registered at the level of 41.18%, but in 2007 it was 45.86%. It is obvious that in the South-Western part of the country, electoral activity is higher than in the North-Eastern part. Urbanized Western territories are characterized by a much higher population density, concentration of industrial enterprises, research centers, and universities. As a result, their socio-economic indicators are higher than in the East, which probably affects the civil activity.

Let's analyze the results of the 2015 elections. The Center Party has traditionally achieved the best results in the Northern and North-Eastern regions (42% in Oulu and Lapland, 32.5% in North Karelia), while receiving the least support in the Southern regions (for example, only 7.2% in Helsinki). The election results for the True Finns were distributed almost evenly, only in Satakunta 25% of voters voted for the party, which is the maximum result. The party failed to develop success either in the Northern districts (it lost more than 15% of support in Lapland and Oulu) or in the Central districts (for example, in Hama, Pirkanmaa). The largest share of votes NCP again received in the Southern part of the country: in Helsinki, Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi. The maximum result of the Social Democratic Party has also recorded in Satakunta and Hama, which are consistently supporting it, with an indicator of 22.6%.

Table 4

Regional distribution of parliamentary election results in Finland in 2015 (1)

Region	Christ. Dem.	FC	Green	Left alliance	NCP	SDP	SNP	TF
Helsinki	1.8	7.2	18.8	9.8	26	15.5	6.8	11.3
Uusimaa	2.6	11.5	10.0	4.4	24.0	16.6	10.2	18.0
Varsinais-Suomi	2.4	16.2	8.7	10.3	21.0	15.5	5.0	19.3
Satakunta	2.9	20.6	2.7	9.6	15.0	22.6	0.3	25.0
Häme	6.1	17.8	5.1	6.0	21.5	22.1		19.5
Pirkanmaa	4.9	16.6	10.3	7.8	19.7	19.5		17.8
Kaakkois-Suomi	4.5	25.2	6.4	3.0	15.9	22.2	0.3	21.1
North Karelia	6.3	32.5	6.7	5.9	11.5	16.0		19.7
Vaasa	5.7	27.4	2.5	2.9	11.9	11.8	20.7	15.9
Keski-Suomi	4.4	26.9	9.0	6.7	13.1	19.0		19.3
Oulu	1.1	42.7	6.2	11.8	10.9	9.0	0.6	16.2
Lappi	1.1	42.9	2.6	13.7	10.1	10.8	0.5	16.5

It can be noted that a distinctive feature of the 2015 parliamentary elections is the fact that no party in the final count won more than 20% of the vote, although the voters' turnout was 72%, which is one of the highest figures for all years.

In conclusion, let's look at the 2019 parliamentary elections. The Social Democratic Party received the largest number of votes (17.7%) and seats, while the NCP received approximately the same results: 17.0% and 17.5%, respectively. The Finnish Center Party gained only 13.8%, losing 18 seats, which is the worst result in 100 years [3]. According to N. Plevako, the 2019 parliamentary elections demonstrated the political fragmentation of the country, since none of the parties gained more than 20%, raising the question of an agreement among the parties to form a common course of action [11].

Speaking about the spatial distribution of voting results, it can be noted that it is again similar to the previous outcomes: the Northern regions again voted for the Finnish Center, while the South, on the contrary, preferred the Social Democratic Party.

The above review shows that the distribution of parliamentary election results in Finland over the course of four electoral cycles shows a fairly definite commitment in the choice of the parties, depending on the territorial situation of the region.



Drawing 1. Regional distribution of parliamentary election results in Finland in 2019 (2)

This trend can be seen throughout the four electoral cycles under consideration. The North, for example, the regions of Lapland and Oulu traditionally support the FC, where it has consistently received from 30 to 40% of the vote over four electoral cycles. The southern regions (Helsinki, Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi) continue the trend and express maximum support for the NCP or SDP.

It can be concluded that Finland is characterized by an average regionalization of the party system with small deviations, which makes it possible to clearly trace the preferences of voters, taking into account the territorial factor. Despite certain surprises that may occur during the elections, such as the results of the True Finns party in 2011, such changes are rather exceptions, depending on the current socio-political situation, rather than on fundamental conditions such as territorial affiliation.

NOTES:

(1) Compiled by the author based on news monitoring and electoral statistics. https://www.stat.fi/til/vaa_en.html.

(2) Electoral geography. https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/ru/countries/f/finland/finlyandiya-parlamentskie-vybory.html.

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TIBET BUDDHISM IN THE YUAN DYNASTY POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 1267-1279, Kublai fights for the real conquest of all of China. To begin with, Kublai found himself a commander-in-chief of the Chinese Shetanktse, then he decided to move the capital of his kingdom from Karakorum to China, namely to the place of the old capital of Daxin, later and now it is Beijing. A new city was built in the suburbs of Dasino, it was called the great or the capital to Khanbalik, in Chinese Dadu. Kublai had no religious fanaticism, but there was an ethnic fanaticism. In this sense, it is much more interesting to identify common stereotypical bases of behavior associated with the psychology of Kublai, and more so with the nature of the unconscious, allowing you to build a different order of ethnic structure, based on the immanent sense of unity.

Key words: *state, mentor, Buddhism, dynasty, politics, religion, legitimacy, Emperor.*

In 1261, Kublai Khan appointed the Pagba Lama, the Khan of the law, that is, gave him power over Tibet, and the latter in return blessed the Yuan dynasty (the original creation of the world). Kublai Khan and his retinue and the Mongol army assimilated with the Chinese after the conquest of China. Kublai Khan devoted all his power to restoring the Chinese tradition.

By 1279, all of China was subject to Kublai and, importantly, Kublai had the legal title of the Great Khan of Mongolia and Chinese Emperor. During this period, part of Tibet was also captured, where Kublai Khan later adopted Buddhism. It is known that it was the Pagba Lama who helped Kublai Khan to realize that only Buddhism can help him create an ideal model of the universal emperor, the Chakravartin Raja, who rules people of many languages and "turns the wheel of Law." So the Pagba Lama, on the instructions of Kublai Khan, created a new Mongolian alphabet, a square script. It is known that the Pagba Lama worked on the creation of a new writing system for two years and in 1269 he presented his work to Kublai Khan. As a sign of his admiration and gratitude, Kublai Khan granted the Pagba Lama the title of Imperial Preceptor. Thus, the new writing system became the state language by order of Kublai Khan. The alphabet was used on seals and metal or wooden passes (paizs, as they were called in Mongolian).

As for the language, there were also significant changes, characterized by the study of its functional aspect. There is every reason to believe that the FSP (functional-semantic field) is the same not only for the related group of languages, but also for the entire ethnic area, which is based, including on racial differences. This assumption is based on the nature of ethnicity, when relations between people are built in a certain coordinate system: those similar to us and those unlike us. Moreover, dissimilarity becomes a source of conflict between ethnic groups, including on the basis of language. At the same time, it is the racial component in the nature of an ethnic group that serves as a kind of barometer of a person's well-being in a non-ethnic environment. The significance of the racial world that constitutes an ethnos is also that on this basis, the Diaspora may even have a dual ethnic identity. Kublai had ethnic fanaticism, but not religious fanaticism.

From the point of view of the internal content of the nature of an ethnos in a multi-ethnic state, the ethnic process reflects only the technology of power implementation, representing a set of relatively independent actions of subjects, structures and institutions connected by various goals and interests. In other words, the ethnic process reflects the political will of the authorities, on the one hand, and the real interactions of individuals, groups, and institutions, on the other. This process is accompanied by mutually exclusive trends – consolidation and divergence.

It can be assumed that in an ethnically diverse society, the latter trend is due to the nature of information culture, which acts as a social memory of humanity, providing a link between the past, present and future through language, customs, traditions and mainly – single origin. It should be noted that at the present stage of human development, completely new forms of relations are being formed that allow us to overcome various barriers and return to our origins. We are talking about the formation of virtual communities, including ethnic ones, in the context of the information revolution. An individual representative of an ethnic group can be located at a considerable distance and at the same time take an active part in the social life of the ethnic core, that is, the factor of integration of the spatial characteristics of the ethnic group receives an additional dimension – intersubjective. It is in this context that we speak of new forms of ethnic communities, meaning an ethnic structure internalized in the knowledge, feelings, and evaluations of its members.

There is an understanding that the direct translation of a certain generalized culture leads only to some spatial and cultural disorientation of some people due to the localization of their consciousness. And, to the same extent, there is a reverse order of understanding that culture is not transmitted as a certain attitude, but is a consequence of centuries-old formation of the way of thinking, actions and actions that characterize the nature of an ethnic group as a special manifestation of its internal and external life.

So on the instructions of Kublai, a new code of laws was created by the 90th years of the 13th century, combining the basics of the Genghis Khan Yasa with the Chinese Jin Code. It introduced new administrative divisions, dividing the country into twelve provinces, created departments for internal and foreign affairs, and a department for the supervision of employees. "Kublai gave his protégé the so-called Pearl Document, according to which Buddhist monks were exempt from taxation and received various other privileges. Soon after, he sent the Pagba Lama and his younger brother back to their homeland as the abbot of the main Sakya monastery. While Kublai sent small detachments of troops to "pacify" the remote corners of Tibet, which were still beyond the reach of the Mongols, the Pagba Lama and his brother were supposed to establish Kublai's moral authority over the entire country" [4. P. 44]. At this time, Kublai's Mongol opposition arose, and the Mongol world did not want to accept Kublai's sinization. The leader of this opposition in Mongolia was Kaidu, the grandson of Ogedei, who ruled in Kashgar. He was continuously at war with Kublai throughout his life.

As a result, it is known that China was ruled by Chinese dynasties according to the ancient Chinese tradition. The Chinese themselves call their country Jungo, that is, the Middle state or Tian Xia, the middle Kingdom, on the principle that China was considered the most important state in the world. Consequently, the Mongols and the manjuri, who seized China, became part of China. This is an archaic sino-centric concept, but it is still used in the Chinese politics.

However, if we study history outside of this sino-centric model, we can come to a very different conclusion. The name Jungo, the Middle state, was used to refer to different states within different limits. The barbarian states included Han China, where the Han people who created this country are located. However, outside of the Chinese culture, it was impossible to create a legitimate dynasty in China, where the Han people made up a fairly large majority of the population and after the annexation of China by foreign empires, the majority population in these empires was also Han. It was a serious problem for the conquerors, and as a result, foreign conquerors adapted the Chinese state system and declared the dynasty their own in order to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the Han majority. So, when we talk about the Yuan Empire, it was not a Chinese empire, China was only a part of it, it was a purely Mongol state that included China. "The Yuan period is characterized by the capture of China by the Mongol nomads. The Mongol rulers continued the traditions of both Chinese rulers and Genghis Khan and were loyal to Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. In addition, representatives of other religions – Christians and Muslims – found shelter at the court of the Mongol Khans. The Mongols carefully looked at the Confucian principles of administrative and bureaucratic arrangement of state power" [5. P. 121]. The borders of the Yuan Empire included not only the adjacent countries of Mongolia proper, but also all the territories conquered by the Mongols from the Pacific to the Atlantic, as well as Russia itself. So the borders of the Yuan Empire were not completely defined. The then khanate was ruled by the Genghisids, the Golden Horde, they were independent, but formally recognized themselves as vassals of the great Khan, whose residence was located on the territory of Beijing. This dependence did not apply to the relations between the Mongol Khans and representatives of the Tibetan Sakya school, they were not Imperial vassals, it was the relationship of mentor and patron, and finally these relations were formed under Kublai. Formally, the source of worldly power over Tibet, the head of the Sakya school was endowed with the Mongol Khan, but the Khan himself, who claimed universal power, legitimized it by the religious mandate of his mentor. "Civil and military Affairs were transferred to a special official, ponchen, who was appointed by the Mongol Khan for a certain period. Tibet was divided into 13 regions, the appointment of the chiefs of which also depended on the Mongols. In 1268, 1287, and 1334, the Mongols conducted three surveys in Tibet to determine the amount of tribute. It shows that they actually exercised a certain power over Tibet" [3. P. 205].

In this period, the concept of two orders was created, its author was Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen. The concept describes ideal relationship of the great emperors with religion. All living beings want to be saved, spiritual salvation consists in complete liberation from suffering, and worldly salvation consists in well-being, according to the above concept. Thus, spiritual salvation is possible only through the attainment of bodhichitta. Bodhichitta (SKT. Bodhi – "enlightenment" and Chitta "consciousness"; in Tibet – byang chub kyi sems) is the most important concept of Buddhism, meaning the perfect state of the individual, devoid of negative obstacles. Bodhichitta arising from the great compassion is also interpreted as a harmony of internal and external manifestations. This state is pure and perfect, located outside of time and space [1].

Enlightenment means knowing the only true path that leads to liberation from suffering and Nirvana. Such enlightenment is possessed by a bodhisattva (Bodhi – "awakening, enlightenment," sattva "being"). A bodhisattva is one who has performed numerous feats of love and compassion, gradually accumulating merit, and has come closer to the state of a sage who has learned the truth and has come out of the painful wheel of endless births and deaths. The natural result of Buddhist practice is clear thinking, arising from the experience of an unimpeded inner space. This practice allows you to completely get rid of suffering and cyclic births. Infinite suffering and liberation in Buddhism are revealed in a single form of being, liberation is the extinction of our desires, but there must be a principle of the middle way, and this is the absolute independence of the inner being.

Thus, the concept of two orders, put forward by Kung Pagba Gyaltsenu, the spiritual liberation and worldly good depend on the religious and worldly orders, the first is owned by the Lama, and the second – by the ruler himself. They are equal, but each has its own specific functions. The "unity of the two laws" – the secular and spiritual – codified the predominant spiritual positions of the Buddhist leader over the secular ruler, leaving the state political functions to the secular ruler.

The unity of the two laws over time extended not only to the political sphere of the heads of the Church, but also covered the daily life of ordinary people, thereby defining the specific features of the "social face" of Buddhism in the Mongolian land [2. P. 326]. The Lama here corresponds to the Buddha himself, and the ruler of the chakra corresponds to the Vartin. The Vartin chakra is the ideal Buddhist monarch. The mentor – patron relationship and the concept of two laws have no analogues in modern law, the concepts of which do not apply to them, so there is no standard category in international law to indicate the position of Tibet in respect of the Mongols in their Empire. In this regard, it is impossible to agree with the established statement that the "concept of two laws" was a legal fiction, since Buddhism in the Yuan Empire was not considered an official religion, its hierarchs were not included in the imperial system of government, and the patronage of Buddhism was explained solely by the desire of the Mongol Khans to maintain control over the Buddhist part of their subjects. Although Buddhism was considered the most favorable religion in the Yuan Empire, the idea of Buddhism played a significant role in the relationship between the Yuan dynasty and Tibet, since Tibet was a Buddhist state and the Buddhist monks actively participated in the political life of their state. It is known that Kublai appointed Pagba Lama as the state tutor of the Yuan Empire. Following Buddhism prevented the assimilation of the Mongols by the Chinese in the Yuan Empire, where the Chinese constituted the most numerous part of the population and it was facilitated by the fact that the Yuan emperors were Buddhists and showed religious tolerance. There was definitely some control of the Tibetans by the Mongols, but the principle of direct subordination did not apply to them. There was only the Mongols' help in governing Tibet and maintaining peace, but the incorporation of Tibet into the Yuan Empire.

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AFTERWORD TO THE ARTICLE BY O. G. RUMYANTSEV "ON SOME POLITICAL SCIENCE ASPECTS OF THE 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION"

Everything that was and is written by O. G. Rumyantsev, one of the most authoritative constitutional lawyers in the modern Russia, has both academic and purely practical value. Of course, the article submitted to the Editorial Board of the journal "Political Science Issues" at the time when, according to the author the 2020 constitutional reform "has changed the text of the Constitution by a third, and its spirit and public perception almost completely," could not be left outside our interests or without comments. We are not lawyers, which makes our comments on the legal aspects of the content of the article, to put it mildly, inaccurate. But we do not pretend that we are doing a legal interpretation of explicit and latent judgments, statements, assumptions and guesses in connection with the proposed changes in the Constitution and the procedures for their adoption, supported by the experience and knowledge of the President of the Constitutional Reform Foundation, Candidate of legal sciences O. G. Rumyantsev. We as non-legal reviewers are rehabilitated by the conceptual refrain that the author himself made. We are talking about "some political science aspects" in the context of the issues under discussion. The analysis of, first, "relations between the state and society" will be "watched" through a political science prism; second, "the correspondence of the attempted swing to the growing challenges and clearly increasing public demand for the social and political development of Russia as a renewed advanced nation."

This list of problems and questions, rather than any other or strictly defined list, becomes the most relevant for O. Rumyantsev. And for the civil society also conceptual and mobilizing issues and problems, which are very important when the public consciousness is torn under the influence (here we resort to the author's wording) of Orwellian Newspeak, the gap between the law and truth, and the discrepancy between the actions of the state authorities and socio-cultural norms and public understanding of due process.

You cannot say about the article that it is far from being objective. What is worth noting is that the author of the article reveals ways of preserving the political system unchanged. To do this, the author draws analogies between the chosen method of saving the corporate system, which developed in the concrete historical conditions of the end of 1993 as a temporary one and the actions that have been initiated and implemented today in the course of Constitutional amendments. The idea of the author's concept in the article is based on a detailed and strict analysis. The article begins with the statement that "the current situation requires analysis." And it would be rash for the author of the article not point out that such an analysis is an easy one. Let's emphasize again, the author of the article compares today's constitutional amendments (reforms) with the events of the end of 1993. Both then and now it was and it is a way to save the corporate system. But then, in 1993, as Rumyantsev believes, the existing system was considered temporary. It is logical to assume that the author of the article is leading the argument to recognize that the temporary nature of the system is exhausted today. Therefore, it would be important to get rid of the temporary model of the corporate system with constitutional amendments. But what should be changed? The choice, as it turns out, is not great. O. Rumyantsev in his arguments does not reveal anything else, in addition, and seeks to ensure that the reader also guessed (he says "it is quite possible"!?) that the today's ruling class "made a bet on the powerful self-growing authoritarian potential of the inner core of the Constitution laid down by Yeltsin's team in order to strengthen specific Russian constitutionalism and overcome the crisis." Of course, the modern ruling elite is guided by its own ideals and ideas about the current situation in the country. Hence, hidden overtures of the initiators of this amendment in the form of transferring the key issues in the secondary: a demonstration of who holds the initiative, the attractiveness of most of these initiatives and their constitutional amendments, which, in the opinion of the author, looks not fundamental. The author of the article also guesses that the Constitution has become a means of solving operational problems. His judgment may also look prescient, that the tactical benefits of the attractiveness of initiatives and amendments will become a strategically unpleasant addition of a deepening split in the society, also on the constitutional issue.

If we correctly interpret O. Rumyantsev, he is not avoiding the fact that the ruling elite is not going to lay down their weapons for a moment and wait for the salvation from the civil society institutions and organizations. Hence, the ruling elite bypass in "eloquent silence" the long-required turn to democracy and other elements of civil society in their absolute meaning. That is, in an invalid meaning, as it is understood by this very "presidential power," updated to the degree of "autocracy."

Constitutionalist O. Rumyantsev unmistakably points to the main subject of the modern Russian reality, when he writes that "in modern Russia, economic and political monopolism, not controlled by the society, definitely rules; the egoism of the ruling narrow class firmly determines the superstructure, including its legal patterns. It requires strict pragmatic actions in the interests of the actual beneficiaries and the established system of production relations, appropriation and distribution, rather than observing the principles of the constitutional system." Exposing the ugly essence of ruling substance, the author hereby directs the arrows of censure towards those who had been the culprit of old and new programs for the reconstruction of the country and society. And since this revelation is not, as we imagine, something super-new in political discourse and unknown even to the ordinary consciousness, it cannot be a prophecy of a special vocation for the Russian people or for Russian society. Even more so for the "educated class," a concept that is used four times in the article.

It is also surprising that in such a small article, the author manages to include historical stories in the text and in the subscript. In these historical analogies, the reader can easily navigate the conflicts of the formation of a "second society," parallel to the official society and the world. It is also not difficult to assume that, as in the era of perestroika, we can expect that this phenomenon will become the basis and driving force, the social base of a new power transformation and perestroika.

An observer who is not from the O. Rumyantsev's side, but who is professionally associated with the internal changes in the Soviet-Russian society and with the preparation of the new Constitution in 1993, could not fail seeing and cannot fail seeing now that under the bursting and spreading shell of the Soviet or the today reality, there is a deeper process, that of political self-determination of masses departing from the dominant power of guardianship. But he cannot fail to see that the political self-determination of the masses is a contradictory process. And it is performed in a variety of ways, where there is always a place for broken illusions. The illusions of moving backward, not forward.

Not having a social and political support in essence, but only ideally, as O. Rumyantsev writes: « The people as a historical and cultural community of people with a single language, history, territory and ideally as a political nation is enshrined in the Constitution as the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of state power (Part 1. Art. 3)" – all the critics of the current stage in the reform of the Constitution should not fall into another illusion. In the eyes of critics of modern constitutional reforms and the meanings contained in them, in the eyes of O. Rumyantsev's opponents, what is being done with these very amendments can mean only one thing: strengthening of a single power vertical by a single power horizontal. And this is perceived and interpreted by a part of this very society not only as a bulwark of the growing authoritarianism, but also as a subversion of the spirit of the Constitution, which has always been based on the understanding of the society's contract with the state as an official representative of society. It is reasonable that civil society and its subjectivity should be put at the top. But it should be taken into account that there is no dispute today that any theory of democracy comes from a particular model of society and its current state. And then, in the context of the problem under discussion, we should also raise another question: what type of civil society is most appropriate for the modern and future Russian state. Nothing significant is added to the understanding of the best type of civil society corresponding to the best state structure by using quantitative definitions of such concepts as: "society," "people," "public associations," "public order ", etc. The recognition of the existence of subjectivity in civil society is of fundamental importance. There is no task to prove that civil society will solve all the problems and contradictions prevailing in the society and the state. This is an illusion. In order not to fall into another illusion, let's pay attention to the remark of O. Rumyantsev: "Unfortunately, there was not enough spirit to support the civil society structurally – in the form of an independent landmark Chapter 2 "Civil society," as we proposed to do in 1990-1993 and in 2013." This is more than the subtle observation of a subtle observer. The "political economy" meaning of this observation (a term again widely used by O. Rumyantsev) is whether the civil society always has the spirit to be the subject of a historical, economic and political process. Or it has yet to be found. In the article, we find the idea that in each of the historical periods and in each case, the concept of civil society, the constitutional norm on civil society opens up new, unexpected opportunities for the synthesis of society and the state, for civil power and state power.

Oleg Rumyantsev, we believe, as a "free observer" speaks openly and honestly: "… in the 2020 constitutional amendments, there are two groups of positive innovations that move us in the right direction." "There are important and mostly necessary norms about the conditions of economic growth, labor, social partnership, culture, upbringing of youth and children, family, children, marriage, education, language, etc." He doesn't speak for anyone, and he doesn't represent anyone; he's on his own when he writes: «…I do not share the "taste" criticism of the accepted norms from a number of my colleagues. Many of the amendments are substantially in line with the proposals we published earlier, which means that the work of the Constitutional Commission and, later, of independent constitutionalists was partly not in vain."

The author of the article boldly operates and uses the fundamental categories of political science: institutions and organizations of civil society; concentration of supreme power, presidential power; unified system of state and public power; society; people; political nation; carriers of sovereignty; contract of society and state. The political institutional engineering and PR of the "new decision-making system" involved in the reform does not escape his attention and analysis. In his interpretation, this is nothing more than "the desire to hedge the risks associated with the change of the supreme power, to preserve influence after the "big transfer" (to hedge against an "internal opponent") and to close from an "external opponent" (conditional nationalization of the elite, restriction of foreign influence, attempts to rally the people around the personified state sovereignty)."

We agree that the discussion around constitutional reforms and the order of their legitimation play a central role in attempts to formulate constitutional and normative projects through imitation of Western models of liberalization and democratization and to imitate our own, Russian traditions of governance and management. The author of the article, and we together with him, do not consider the types of discourse considered by critics of constitutional reforms and their initiators to be completely representative. And, moreover, that these discourses, in themselves, substitute for political analysis and even a real political process. This is confirmed by O. Rumyantsev: "With the adoption of the new version of the Constitution, the reasons for the objective aggravation of contradictions, acute political differentiation in the society, and subjective difficulties in managing the process of increasing division are unlikely to disappear by themselves. The potential of a justified mid-decade consensus, in my view, is coming to an end. We need deep incentives for a new and long-term consolidation of the society and the state."

Until now, at all stages of Russia's evolution, it was the ruling class that sought to turn society into an instrument for ensuring and supporting the existing form of government, the national economy, and established social values. Since the responsibility for the country in most cases was assumed by the state, it determined the priorities and parameters of their purposes. And this fulfilled the most important state duty. Against this social background, the great ideals of freedom, political and social equality, and justice were rooted in ideological and worldview utopias and praktopias. Russian political design incorporated socialism, Marxism, anarchism, and radical forms of democracy. There is no reason to believe that these ideals and ideas will necessarily resurrect unchanged. However, it is unthinkable to recognize the power of society if it is devoid of norms of behavior, and is not able to develop political projects. Civil society tends to go into private life and be infected with the virus of selfishness. "A political culture built on selfishness," as many serious analysts recognize as a given, "simply will not provide a worthy motivation not only for the development, but also for the preservation of existing rights, democratic institutions, social solidarity or independence." [1. P. 10]. O. Rymyantsev writes: « It is society that is the social collective actor. As a social community and a set of institutions and organized interests, social relations, it should be considered as a starting platform, a key support and the main addressee of the constitutional system. It is society that is called upon to play the leading role of an equal partner, and if necessary, an opponent of the state (in the case of the latter's usurpation of power)." He also writes: "The state is accountable to the society and must, in turn, protect the democratic constitutional order, law and order, provide the necessary social, economic and political conditions and mechanisms for the normal reproduction and further self-development of institutions, members of society and the people as a whole." When he writes like this and thinks like this, we believe that he is thinking for the society. At the same time, someone else is acting for this very society. Among them are those who believe in God, which is reflected by an amendment to the Constitution. And those who are also written about in the article: who represent groups, classes, and even castes with their own intimate interests and ideas. Both the first and the "second society," and millions of officials and civil servants. And presidential power extended to all state bodies.

The negative forecast, which the author of the article insists on, seems to be repugnant to the author's self-perception and professional vision of the situation. It is closer and more natural for him to see in the Constitution the legislative basis for the ideological unification of the entire Russian society. The spirit and letter of the Constitution for him are expressed in equality, in legal equality in civil, political and other rights. And equality – in social rights. We are sure that he does not see a future without a balance, without an interaction and harmony between the complexes of these rights. Everyone should be equal before the law. But this is difficult to achieve in our country. But there is no other way. Therefore, we believe that he is trying to hide this psychological strain behind a positive project and expectation that he has invented: "We need a holistic eco-environment and architecture of diverse, integrated decision-making non-profit organizations that represent the interests of the regions and territorial communities, producers and consumers, entrepreneurs and employees, experts and practitioners, the entire political spectrum capable of replacing millions of officials and civil servants."

But this project-expectation, it seems to us, should be addressed not to an abstract civil society, not to the "educated class" or "creative class," but to conscious citizens, that is, citizens who participate in political life. For the harsh, tested "educated class" that has known all the suffering from the government and the state (we are aware that we do not live in an abstract world of constitutional idyll, but in a concrete Russian state), resentment and apathy can not be an obstacle to its subjectivity because the supreme power does not see it as a priority substance in its messages. Banal and romantic is the subjectivity of the "educated class" if it falls into apathy and distrust, if it does not receive beliefs in the reasonableness of constitutional amendments. We can theoretically assume that in the conditions of overstrain (the economic crisis, the unfolding very difficult fight against the COVID-19 pandemic) will bring new and worthy figures to the political arena. The same society is waiting for this. Or it is preferable not to wait, but to act without destroying or undermining the state. To act, at least in such areas as: to propose a program of actions contrary to the interests of the actual beneficiaries of the existing system of relations of production, assignment and distribution; to direct the efforts of Gazprom, a company that advertises itself as a "national treasure", to gasify the entire country. And reformat the old slogan: "Communism is the Soviet power plus electrification of the entire country" (later added "chemization of the national economy") in the slogan: "Russian society and the state are the people's power plus gasification of the entire country." Under the current circumstances, the US President is determined to provide direct financial support to the population groups affected by the crisis, small and medium-sized businesses. Russia does not have the possibility for such measures, because there is no printing press to increase the money supply. But Russia has natural resources and money is made from them. And it would be possible to reach an agreement with the beneficiaries of natural rents, to reduce the price of gasoline and tariffs for housing and communal services. Good intentions may not be the most impractical in the face of increasing internal and external tensions. But there is always and everywhere a sacramental question, this is a universal principle – who will take on such a mission?

The author of the article could not but touch upon the issue of constitutional amendments to the organization and functioning of power mechanisms. Admits that a "step forward" has been made in this direction. And further, he leaves this issue: "however, the analysis of the changes in the form of government is the subject for a separate article." This is his right. As his right to testify about the weak legitimacy of the Constitution due to the amendments of certain parts of the Constitution and ignoring other, more important and essential ones; or about the introduction of a procedure of popular vote instead of a referendum. And, of course, the elimination of risks for securing the results of privatization and subsequent redistribution of property for guaranteed transfer of fortunes and statuses by inheritance. O. Rumyantsev is an experienced and knowledgeable lawyer, when he circumvents the "power" issue of the amendments with its personalized line, one could reproach him for this. But we won't do that. And even more than that, we will support his version of the analysis of the power issue of the constitutional amendments. Many supporters of the historical-political-legal school tend to breed twists and turns around the intersections of fate and the logic of the state, power and powerful persons. There is a riddle in it, and without a proper solution, but it requires to be solved. The question remains: so does this or that ruler (ruler or President) meet the purpose? So, let's put it this way: is the current situation in the country caused by the peculiarities of the person of the highest power or is it a struggle of forces and interests? And the character of the modern era is a derivative of properties and features not of the face, but of socio-historical circumstances. O. Rumyantsev understands that a non-standard course of thought is possible on this issue, which will be followed by a rush of other questions that have not yet been answered convincingly to be legitimate. And we stand in solidarity with him. The political, social, legal, and constitutional thought of the Russian Federation has been tossing between liberalism, conservatism, and radicalism for more than a quarter of a century. At the same time, statesmen and/or thinkers and officials of the Russian Federation in one way or another wanted and want to restrict or expand the power of the state and the state apparatus, with the mandatory and declarative suggestion that only they, and they only are the state itself and its essence. They are opposed by the representatives of the civil society and certain personalities. We would define the ideological essence of such a policy as liberal conservatism. The text and arguments of O. G. Rumyantsev brought us to this point. Is it not a paradox and illogicality?! Paradoxes and illogicalities have become realities not only in everyday life, politics, and law, but also in knowledge.

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