



To the Question of Economic and Material Data during the 1st Year of Deportation 1937 in Kazakhstan and It Affected Korean Material Life

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Abstract

According to the opinion of many scholars in Soviet Union and Russia, period of the end of 1920s. to the 1930s. was the most contradictory and tragic in the history of Soviet State. A great place in it takes process, named after repressions, which were held for different reasons and had different slogans. The most tragic of them is persecution based on nationality, which, in its essence, went completely against the claims of Soviet authorities regarding equality among nations. Repercussions of that drama

have reached to present day, and besides, still have an influence on politics and ethnic questions in modern Russia.

The first ethnic minorities to get under the pressure of Stalinist repression were Soviet Koreans—national minority in the Far East, non-hostile towards Soviet authorities and, to a greater extent, even loyal to politics of Soviet leaders at that time. They were deported to Central Asia, but at the same time their situation in this region was controversial.

The aim of this work is to consider and analyse the first year of residence of Soviet Koreans after deportation from the Far East to Kazakhstan, based on publications, materials from archives and oral history.

Keywords

ussr – history – repression – Koreans – Central Asia

1 Introduction

As result of first ethnic mass deportation in the Soviet Union the Primorye Koreans were deported in the Central Asia. History of the Korean population in this region is still discussed. In this work we considered situation with Korean deportees in Kazakhstan. Main historiographical base of this work are little-known records from Russian archives, a few of oral materials and written works which have dealing to research subject.

2 Situation with Soviet Koreans before Deportation

Koreans were living on the southern territory of the modern Russian Far East before the arrival of Russian pathfinders in these lands. Thereby, they are indigenous population of modern Primorye region in the Russia, although, in the 19th century the number of Koreans was relatively small on the southern territory of the Far East.

The Russian Koreans supported the October Revolution and the fight of the Red Army against the old regime for several reasons. Bolsheviks put forward two principles of the new government—land for peasants and equality of peoples. These principles found a response in the broad mass of Korean and Chinese population in the Far East.

After the victory, Bolsheviks have kept their promises. National Korean area, called Posiet, in the territory of Primorye region was created as well as Koreans resided in 28 districts of three regions¹ of the modern Primorye region. There were created Korean Education College in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk-city (modern Ussuriysk-city), Korean language schools, national theatre, Korean-Chinese typography and so on.² Korean families usually have many children so Korean population in Russia/Soviet Union was growing at a fast pace.

This was the reason that made a member of The Central Bureau of Korean Communist Party comrade Khan Men-she (Russian name—Khan Andrei) submit a report in direct government of RSFSR with a request to consider the question of creating Korean “national administrative unit”.³ Despite the refusal, Korean community was actively developing until it faced repression of Stalinist period.

3 During Deportation State Plan

With the aim of preparation of first ethnic deportation the Soviet authorities were thoroughly getting ready for the first mass repression based on ethnicity. Firstly, eminent people of NKVD, who were highly experienced and acted quite tough, were sent from Moscow to the Far East. For example, Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov,⁴ the confidant of People’s Commissar of NKVD Yezhov, took an active part in a number of high-profile cases and was transferred to the Far East to carry out large-scale repression, including the one against Koreans.

Before the start of the deportation the list of Koreans, who lived on the southern part of the Far East, has been confirmed. On the 21st of August 1937 Stalin and Molotov have signed the first order regarding the deportation of Korean population. According to this document, eviction of Koreans had to be held in three stages. The first stage—deportation of Koreans from the border

1 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow), Fond 1235. Opis’ 130. 1935. delo. 3, Lists 20–21.

2 Nam, 1991; Kim, 1982.

3 GARF. Fond 1318, 1922–1923. delo. 670, List 64.

4 In future Lyushkov defected to the Japanese and actively collaborated with Japanese Secret Services in work against his homeland. He organized two Stalin assassination attempts. In 1945 he was killed in Dairen by Japanese officers as Japan was defeated by the allies, and he had knew too much about Japanese Special Services, it was dangerous to keep him alive. Since he refused to commit suicide, he was killed by the Japanese themselves in an escape attempt.

areas, the second and the third stages—hinterland of the region depending on their location towards the border. Deportation of Korean population from the Far East to Central Asia was planned to be finished by the 1st of January 1938.⁵

In September 1937 NKVD troops started the process of eviction of Korean population from the southern part of the Far East. At the end of September the eviction of Korean population from Vladivostok has begun.

Officially, the deported population was supposed to be paid settlement for courtyards, buildings, harvest and inventory left behind.

Therefore, official receipts were given to the Korean immigrants. Livestock on paper was supposed to be reimbursed at the place of arrival,⁶ although, upon arrival that did not happen.⁷

A.I. Pak, recalled, that “we were deported in November or December. Mom thought it was a mistake and we were temporarily taken away. Parents were uneducated”⁸. At the beginning of winter in 1937–1938 echelons arrived in the Central Asia. Koreans had to live in hastily built dugouts, which has not become a salvation to most—the third of all nursing infants have not survived that winter. Many elderly people have also died.⁹

Tsoi A.D., who turned up in the Kazakhstan at a young age, recalled: “1937 has come. I turned 7. It was announced that we are being relocated to a faraway land ... We had been brought to Vladivostok, where we were put in a boxcar and taken away in an unknown direction.

We were traveling for a whole month—finally, there was a stop: Burnoye railway station—it was between the cities Chimkent and Jambool. The station with this name still exists. It corresponds to the local climatic conditions quite well—sharply continental climate ... Approximately 30 Korean families, we were first placed in buildings of the local granary called “Elevator”, and then we were supposed to be taken to courtyards of the local residents ... From day one Koreans had difficulties with placement, since there was a rumour spread among local population before our arrival that “cannibals” were moved from the Far Eastern region and that is why people were afraid of them and refused to place them in their own houses. October has already come, and in October it

5 Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow). Fond 3. Opis' 58. delo 139. Lists 1–2. Protocol № 52.

6 GARF. Fond 5446, Opis' 57, delo. 52, List 29.

7 GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis' 29, delo 48, List 63–64, 66; GARF, ф. 5446 sch, Opis' 29, delo 51, List6.

8 Park A.I. Interview by Mariia Surzhik. Interview. Ussuriysk, Primorye region, Russia. October 2019.

9 Lankov. 2002.

was snowing there quite often. People started to get sick, there were even cases, when colds had fatal outcome”.¹⁰

As we can see, the reception of immigrants was not organized. Koreans were dumped on any possible territory. The population was also not ready for the reception of immigrants. Hence, rumours spread about Koreans being “cannibals”.

In addition, there was an influence from cultural features of the local population. For example, during conversations of one of the authors with Kazakhs, it was revealed, that most of them are still following the principle “mandatory optional”. This means, that a person surely will not do something they have to do. This particular principle leads to delays and so on. Sometimes such behaviour creates big problems. The Korean deportation was also no exception.

Initially, 18,085 Korean families were moved to Kazakhstan, and around 11,000 families to Uzbekistan.¹¹ The situation with the others was unclear. People were scattered across different republics with no consideration for their wishes or if they are needed in these territories.

During resettlement a part of Korean population was dumped in areas, where it was impossible to farm. It is bad enough there were no good conditions to create a farm. The same thing concerned Koreans-fishermen.¹² Only after a lot of human suffering and many victims, Soviet leadership decided to move the deported population to places, where farming was possible.¹³ During the resettlement, a part of the Korean families ended up in Astrakhan and Rostov regions, where they were fishing. In 1941–1942, due to southern attack of Hitler’s troops, Koreans were used in the construction of defensive fortifications, and later were also moved to Central Asia.

The difficulty of the situation was that the deported population turned out in an unfamiliar region that was unprepared for living. That is why it was not ready to adapt to the new conditions straight away, they had no information at all. Moreover, the main part of Koreans was included in collective farms, where work was planned in large areas. Although, in the Far East Korean peasants worked in Chinese-Korean garden beds, which specialized in harvesting several multiple crops on a relatively small cropping area.¹⁴ In Central Asia they were settled in various collective farms, which stood with a completely different type of farming. Therefore, forced immigrants were facing difficult

10 Tsoi 2016: 9.

11 GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 32.

12 GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis` 29, delo 49, Lists 29–30.

13 GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis` 29, delo 49, List 35.

14 More thoroughly, we are viewing this subject in the article “Chinese-Korean garden bed—specification of use in the Far East of Russia”.

conditions of transition into another farm system. They did not even have time to adapt in a new region.

4 The Actual Plan

Officially, Soviet authorities had tried to support forced immigrants in Kazakhstan, including Koreans, Iranians, Turkish and Armenians.¹⁵ In particular, for 12624 Korean farms 200 rubles was allocated to each farm to provide water supply, 300 rubles each for housekeeping.¹⁶

To finance the expenses for resettlement and household organization of the Korean immigrants in Kazakh SSR, 82.601.400 rubles were allocated by the Sovnarkom (Совнарком) of USSR order from 20.02.1938 № 201-34.

At the expense of the funds shown above, cost funding for resettlement of the Koreans was made through Selhozbank (Сельхозбанк/ Agricultural bank) with the amount of 75.611.400 rubles (50.231.400 of them were irrecoverable).¹⁷

The Korean families that travelled from the Far East to Central Asia were in poor economic condition. They all had domestic animals in the same conditions as before the deportation. However, the situation has changed after forced resettlement. In particular, 10114 out of 12624 families did not have cows, and 5514 households did not have livestock at all.¹⁸ Therefore, it was decided by Moscow to allocate 300 to 1000 rubles for the purchase of cattle for every household.

Moreover, financial resources were allocated to construct facilities for immigrants, 84 construction specialists were sent there.

However, in the end it turned out, that Narkomfin (Наркомфин/ People's Commissariat of Finance) of USSR did not release a loan to buy cattle and household facilities in 1938 and 1939 for the immigrants, motivating, that there is no special instructions from Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars) of USSR regarding distribution of all benefits, provided by the order of the Central Election Commission and Sovnarkom of USSR from 17.11.1937 for № 115/2043 "About the benefits for agricultural resettlement",¹⁹ to immigrants in the Kazakh SSR (Iranians, Kurdish, Armenians, Turkish and Koreans). This issue was partially resolved later.

15 GARF, Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 61.

16 Ibid. List 55-57.

17 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 75.

18 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 54.

19 Ibid. List 47.

The funds, allocated by the Sovnarkom of USSR, were meant to settle 17.000 households in collective farms, agriculture and fishing. Although, whereas the total amount of the Korean households planned for settlement in Kazakhstan was more than 20530,²⁰ in the end, there was only 12.000 households that got settled.²¹ Activity of the republican authorities has become one more problem. For example, on the 16th of March 1939 People's Commissar of Kazakh SSR reported to Mikoyan, that in 1939 there were 22.820.000 rubles for settlement of immigrants, but People's Commissar of Finance has reduced this amount to 10.661.000 rubles, since the possibilities of arranging fishing collective farming, welfare and recreation, medical construction, organizational expenses and other activities were excluded. Later, finance was allocated to organize fishing collective farms.

From the released finance by Sovnarkom of USSR in 1938 (81.701.000 rubles), 40.849.000 rubles were allocated. However, despite implementation of the budget, plans regarding construction of houses, socialized buildings, water supply, medical welfare and recreational construction were not fulfilled.²²

Moreover, the Soviet state allocated a large number of building materials for the resettlement of immigrants in Central Asia. In addition, it was allocated on average 1600 rubles for each family.

Therefore, according to general plans, good conditions (land, cattle, building materials, financial support) were provided for the deported ones.

However in reality, the supply of Korean collective farms proved to be clearly insufficient. This affected even the land—they were only getting 0.5–1 hectare of irrigated land.

From the families of Korean immigrants, 2.445 of them were not economically organized in Kazakhstan and were wandering around the republic.²³ Some wandered as a part of a group consisted of several families, and others wandered as one family.²⁴ Part of them moved outside the republic to other regions of Central Asia. Thus, Koreans appeared in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It has not been without loss of lives.

In Kazakh SSR, from 560 objects of communal and medical premises for Korean collective farms, only 26 were built by the deadline. Similar situation also occurred in Uzbekistan. Houses in both republics were also not finished by the estimated deadline. During the investigation, NKVD has discovered huge

20 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 33.

21 Ibid. List 75.

22 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 15. List 46–45.

23 Ibid. List 32.

24 Park A.I. Interview by Mariia Surzhik. Interview. Ussuriysk, Primorye region, Russia. October 2019.

embezzlement in this direction. Meanwhile, these houses were of unsatisfactory quality of buildings—there was poor brickwork of the walls, roof deflection, bad doors and frames and so on.

Almost all construction plans were disrupted, including construction of wells and outbuildings. On a number of constructions for Koreans 31,480,000 rubles were released. However, the process of these constructions was carried out without an approved plan, title lists, projects and estimates.

By the 1st of November 1938 from 3300 housing starts, only 1392 were completely finished, the rest were only 70% finished. From 545 objects of socialized buildings only 162 were being built, with the average readiness of approximately 40–50%.²⁵

There also had been extortion by the authorities in relation to immigrants. In particular, for construction from every house of Korean farmers 304 rubles were withheld from their salary.

Despite all these measures, construction was not completely finished in 1938 (as originally planned), and was eventually postponed to 1939.²⁶

All in all, by the end of 1938 it was planned to finish only 1800–2000 semi-detached houses, which was 50% less than originally planned housing.

1815 households were placed in the houses of liquidated state farms and vacant houses of unoccupied collective farms. Also, 5872 families were placed in temporary premises—dugouts, barracks and storerooms adapted for living.²⁷ Part of the families turned out in huts.²⁸ Obviously, these places were unsuitable for living.

This situation was associated with another nuance. Most of residential buildings, loaned to Korean immigrants on the territory of a huge liquidated state farm named after Strelkov, were occupied by MTS (motor technical stations), village council and other organizations. According to Moscow's plan, these organizations should not have occupied residential buildings at all. In the end, immigrants themselves had nowhere to live.

In some cases, the Korean collective farms were loaned a property amounted to numbers that exceeded credit-worthiness of collective farms.²⁹ This drove them into debt.

The irrigation construction plan for Korean collective farms was also not completed. The problem was not only delay in hydraulics. There was also lack

25 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 75.

26 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 15. List 29.

27 Ibid. List 24.

28 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 31.

29 Ibid. List 48–49.

of building materials, which local leaders simply forgot to deliver to place of work.³⁰ This had a negative effect on the crop of Korean collective farms. Another serious impact for them was activity of motor technical stations. They finished soil and crop processing on the fields of immigrants after significant delay, and the autumn plowing³¹ was generally thwarted.

Regional and district organizations inflicted their damage upon Korean collective farm workers. Not only they did not help Koreans, but also managed collective farm vehicles on their own, ignoring the needs of collective farms. Besides, regional and district organizations when using a vehicle did not pay migrants for petrol, vehicle breakdown and so on.³² Thereby, all expenses (financial, material, technical and time related), regarding use of vehicles by regional and district organization representatives, were paid by collective farms on their own.

Even the livestock was not issued to migrants in full amount. Out of 4114 heads of cattle only 1552 heads were issued. There was a similar picture regarding the pigs—only 242 out of 782.

A problem also occurred among Koreans regarding the issued livestock. It was absolutely unfit for reproduction, since it consisted of 60% animals for slaughter. Therefore, the Korean collective farm workers were forced to take the same livestock for slaughter in Uzbek office of Myasokhladprom (Мясохладпром/meat refrigeration industry) of Narkompischeprom (Наркомпищепром/People's Commissariat of food industry) in USSR, which issued the same livestock. There were very few animals for reproduction.

Calculations with migrants for property left in the Far East (including movable and immovable property, growing crops, fresh produce, and livestock) amounted to 9.416.500 rubles have not been fully carried out.³³

In total, 41.035.000 rubles were allocated for the arrangement of migrants. By the 20th of September 1938, 34.872.200 rubles were spent by the local authorities. Although, there was no report for a significant part of this amount.³⁴ Thereby, part of this money was misused.

Schools for Koreans were unfinished. For their construction Soviet leadership in Kazakhstan allocated 6.800.000 rubles. However, the local Sovnarkom only used 4.900.000 rubles out of it, but even with this money the work was

30 Ibid. List 65–68.

31 Autumn plowing—digging the ground in autumn, is considered an important preparatory stage before the planting in spring.

32 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 15. List 21.

33 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 71.

34 Ibid. List 70.

not completed.³⁵ By the 1st of November 1938 out of 33 schools building objects only 28 were being built, and they were only 64% ready.³⁶ There was a problem regarding school meals for schoolchildren and pre-schoolers.

The supply of Koreans was unsatisfactory as such. In particular, regular supply of baked bread was not provided, there was lack of fat, fish and vegetables, there was a special need for children's clothing and footwear. The retail network was also unfinished.

The policy of Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR took an important part in the medical field—they seriously considered it normal to build hospitals with 10 beds.³⁷ Although, obviously, that such a small amount of beds for a hospital is irrational as for the population as well as the state. In addition, there was a lack of medical personnel in regions.

The situation also worsened when a part of sawmill materials for RSFSR migrants were not delivered to the republics of Central Asia on time—6239 wagons were brought instead of 9652.³⁸ A part of the wood was rotten, affected by fungus, in some cases the standards were breached.³⁹

By the 8th of October 1938, around 500 wagons of wood, 120 tons of nails, 2100 boxes with glass, 590 roofing rolls, 150 tons of linseed oil, 2.5 millions bricks, 16 tons of wire and other materials⁴⁰ still have not been moved from the base warehouses for Korean migrants.

It was not organized to monitor funds by collective farms.

However, Korean collective farms managed to strengthen economically in such distress.⁴¹ Migrants managed to pull themselves together in these difficult conditions and start a fight for survival.

Due to lack of funding, a part of Korean collective farms (i.e., collective farm named after Stakhanov) moved on to a private initiative. They were building adobe-saman⁴² semi-detached houses with 2 living rooms per flat. This allowed them to stay within the budget of 4000 rubles per house (3200 were taken from a loan, 800 by labor participation of collective farmers).⁴³

35 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 16. List 101.

36 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 75.

37 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 13.

38 Ibid. List 34.

39 Ibid. List 16.

40 Ibid. List 55.

41 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 31.

42 Saman—is a raw brick made from clay soil with the addition of straw. This sort of brick is a very primitive building material which has been used since the 5th millennium BC.

43 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 31.

The above-mentioned collective farm named after Stakhanov has even set a record. From 4 hectares of experienced sowing they harvested 72,5 centners (1 centner = 100 kg) of rice from each hectare.

As a result of such a successful activity in agriculture, most Koreans were getting from 4 to 6 kg of rice per one worker a working day, excluding an income from other agricultural crops.

In Kazakhstan, in several areas, the Koreans were harvesting 20–40 centners of rice crop from one hectare.⁴⁴

Under the pressure of circumstances, economic and cultural life of the Koreans has begun to change. They began to adopt many customs from local population or partially change their traditions under local influence. For example, they have lost a culture of cultivating a garden bed and all the traditions and skills associated with it. Instead, *bakhcha*⁴⁵ took the first place.

This situation also affected Korean cuisine—some dishes disappeared due to lack of components (for example, spicy red caviar, small shrimp in fried pig blood) or changed under the influence of local traditions (this way, instead of *kaduri* local *kozinaki* appeared).⁴⁶ Dishes of local cuisine, such as *plov*, also appeared in the Korean diet.

Central (Moscow) authorities drew attention to arbitrariness of republican administrations regarding Korean immigrants only in 1938–1939.

General of NKVD Chernyshov⁴⁷ started to check situation with Korean immigrants in the Central Asia. He sent to Moscow many reports about lawlessness of officials of Central Asian Republics to Korean population. Only after his investigations in the work of Central Asian Republican governments the situation with Korean people becomes better.

NKVD has decided to carry out the whole inventory of properties, transferred to Korean collective farms on the 1st of January 1939, transfer additional loans to Korean collective farmers, liquidate “Spetsstroï” (Спецстрой/ Special Construction) before the Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR and transfer all collective

44 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 37.

45 *Bakhcha*—a large field, generally covered by watermelons, melons and pumpkins. Usually located far from settlements. It is usually common in Central Asia, although, after the 1950s Soviet Koreans has brought this system to the Far East. As a result, *bakhcha* also was also covered by cucumbers and other crops.

46 Kim 2016.

47 Chernyshov Vasilij Vasil'evich (1896–1952)—general of NKVD. In 1934–1937- was Head of border service of Far Eastern NKVD. At that time he met T.D. Deribas, Head of Far Eastern NKVD until 1937. He was deputy of Head of NKVD (1937–1941). Moreover, he was sole Deputy of Ezhov, who was not repressed. Chernyshov worked with Korean population in the Far East in 1934–1937, therefore as person who was familiar with Korean question, he was curator of the Koreans in the Central Asia in 1938–1939.

farm constructions to the department of Collective farms, strengthen motor technical stations.

According to the investigation, it turned out that “Spetsstroï” completely failed construction plans for migrants, in addition, it achieved refinancing in the amount of 5,115,200 rubles.

NKVD charges against “Spetsstroï” relied on the following facts:

- 1) This office did not complete the construction plan and arbitrarily changed it towards financial downsizing.
- 2) By the 1st of November 1938 the receivables of “Spetsstroï”, through advanced payment of Kazakh Potrebooyuz (Consumer Union), amounted to 2,383,000 rubles.
- 3) By the 1st of September 1938 this organization has saved a huge amount of construction surplus, about 8,000,000 rubles.
- 4) During the audit it turned out, that “Spetsstroï” transferred various property, that was meant to be for Koreans, to outside organizations amounted to 443,500 rubles.
- 5) In this way building materials, intended for Korean migrants, were distributed or sold to various organizations—895 cubic meters of roundwood, 1028 cubic meters of sawn wood, 46, 3 tons of concrete, 500 kg of nails and so on.⁴⁸

Therefore, it was urgently tried to withdraw the remaining funds from “Spetsstroy” already in 1938. However, the Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR under the leadership of the deputy chairman comrade I.T. Tajiyev⁴⁹ did not agree to that and continued funding of the administrative apparatus and building materials of this office funded by Selhozbank. Only after intervention of NKVD activity question of “Spetsstroï” was closed.

48 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 74–75 (back page).

49 Tajiyev Ibrahim Tajiyevich (1904–1960)—Soviet Communist party leader who mostly worked at Kazakh SSR. Tajiyev has held a number of senior management positions in Kazakhstan. During the period of deportation of Koreans to Central Asia held a post of vice chairman of Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR, dealt with the issues of construction, industry, half-finished products. For a short period of time was even a chairman of Council of People’s Commissars of Kazakh SSR (May–June 1938). Contributed to the failure of Korean settlement program in Kazakhstan, but was not seriously punished, in 1940 got demoted. Although, mistakes made during management of settlement of Koreans in the 1930-ies were not taken into account and were repeated by him again during the construction of metallurgy plant in Temirtau (a city in Karaganda region of Kazakhstan), where in 1959 workers’ riot broke out. During the investigation of this incident, Tajiyev was withdrawn from Central Committee of Communist Party of Kazakhstan and expelled from the party in October 1959. The next year he suddenly died.

In addition, during the investigation The Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR was obliged to the following actions:

- 1) To provide free food for children in schools and kindergartens until the new harvest in Korean collective farms.
- 2) To return to Korean collective farms 304 rubles each, withheld for every house built from the earnings of collective farmers.
- 3) Sovnarkoms of Kazakh SSR and Uzbek SSR had to restore building materials, incorrectly released to local organizations from Korean funds, at the expense of republican funds.

Moreover, certain measures were supposed to be applied to the rest of the participants of this confusion, related to Korean settlers.

Attempts to somehow fix the results of such difficult situation were made by the central authorities. In particular, Narkomzem (Наркомзем/ People's Commissariat of agriculture) and Selhozbank of USSR were ordered to provide lending to Korean collective farms and collective farmers for the purchase of working productive livestock in the plan for 1939.

Narkomfin of USSR was ordered to audit the work of Selhozbank in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in funding of events, related to household management of Koreans and to bring to justice those, who allowed funding of construction in Uzbekistan without approved title lists, projects and budget.

Prosecutor's office of USSR was ordered to prosecute those, responsible for disruption of Korean construction, as well as supply of defective livestock received on exchange receipts for Koreans.⁵⁰

During the organization of settlements with Koreans in Central Asia even administrative structures of Primorye region and Khabarovsk region got also involved. As a result, all migrants, who had exchange receipts for horses, were given the corresponding animals.⁵¹ Before that, they were not given horses at all. Although, the settlement was not fully carried out.

During the investigation of all above-mentioned processes, participants in criminal activities in the migrant's case were prosecuted. NKVD investigation regarding the "Spetsstroy" case has revealed even more offences. All financial and material losses in these cases were later reimbursed from the republican budget.

Archive materials show, that the question of managing the settlement of the Korean migrants in Kazakhstan was quite complex from the beginning. Initially, "Spetsstroj" by Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR claimed that, however, partial management of this process at that time was also carried out by OMZ

50 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 15. List 17-20.

51 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 16. List 85.

prison department of NKVD and in another period—a different department of Narkomzem. In the end, “Spetsstroï” gained full management of this process.⁵² We believe that, for the right to lead this project, there was its own fight in the administrative circles of the republics, since settlement management of Korean migrants gave an opportunity to receive large amounts of money.

There were own ideas of settlement of migrants in this office. Their report noted, “dependence mood was created among the Korean population. Under the influence of anti-Soviet agitation, migrants of most places refused to come to work for house construction considering, that the state has to build their houses without their participation”.

In the end, Regional Committee of the CPSU and Executive Committee “carried out relevant work, after which the level of the Koreans going to work improved, local collective farms were involved in construction of the Korean villages, however, it was too late to make up for missed construction time”.

Thereby, “Spetsstroï” has written in the report of Sovnarkom of USSR that disruption of housing construction for Koreans occurred through the fault of the Korean settlers themselves.

As we can see, heads of this office did not want to understand difficult living conditions of migrants. The Koreans were relocated from the Far East to Central Asia (a completely unknown region for them, with different climatic conditions and an alien type of farming and different properties of the soil), they often did not have important things for living. They were not returned the property, which was taken away in the Far East. Some migrants did not have normal living conditions at all. This resulted in high mortality rates among them, especially among children and elderly people. Thereby, Koreans had to take extra care for their small children and older people. At the same time, they were actively engaged in agriculture and had harvest twice bigger than the local collective farmers.

However, “Spetsstroï” thought, that Koreans had little work and lots of spare time. As a result, the office made them build houses for themselves and, moreover, took away a part of their salary for the houses, in the construction of which these migrants took part.

To justify their illegal actions, “Spetsstroï” has described “anti-Soviet” attitude among Koreans in the report. Apparently, leaders of “Spetsstroï” assumed, that accusations of “anti-Soviet” actions will let Moscow close their eyes on the situation with Koreans.

Moreover, Sovnarkom of Kazakh SSR considered such types of enforcement from the side of its office towards the migrants as normal. It is seen through

52 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 40–41.

above-mentioned archive materials. Although, Moscow thought differently, seeing complete arbitrariness of the republican authorities towards Korean settlers and big financial losses.

It was noted, that there was no accounting made regarding financial expenses and building materials for Korean settlers in Uzbek and Kazakh SSR.

Whereas leadership of both Central Asian republics requested a second budget from RSFSR for resettlement of Koreans in 1939 in their regions. It is not exactly known, why it was done—for elimination of negative results of own actions or attempts to continue acts of corruption. Anyway, they got a refusal from Moscow on that.

However, Moscow still allocated 18.350.000 rubles by 1939 for migrants to reside in Kazakh and Uzbek SSR (including deported Koreans) in addition to previously used amount for the same needs. Although, state control was set to monitor spending of this amount.

In addition, building materials were allocated for 1939,⁵³ in particular, more than 90.000 cubic meters of lumber.

The same applied to the issue of completing school constructions for the Koreans in Kazakhstan—additionally was allocated 24.870.000 rubles on the republican budget.⁵⁴

Lending money with the amount of 3.000.000 rubles was allocated to Korean fishing collective farms to purchase fleet and fishing gear.⁵⁵ Fishermen were finally taken to places, where they could do their usual work.

In fact, the situation that happened with Korean settlers, was a result of poor leadership from the side of administration of both republics.

It is necessary to note a huge amount of arbitrary acts and lawlessness of Uzbek and Kazakh SSR authorities towards the migrants. While the local population of both republics tried to somehow help Koreans in many cases,⁵⁶ officials were robbing them. Numerous facts of materials issue to outside organization demonstrates, that there has been high level of corruption. Capture

53 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 15. List 1.

54 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 16. List 101.

55 GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis' 23 A. delo 56. List 23

56 In particular, it was confirmed by Lyubov Khwan, who turned up in Kazakhstan after the deportation. Khwan Lyubov. Interview by Alexander Kim. Interview. Ussuriysk, Primorye region, Russia. 2009. The same thing is described by Tsoi A.D., in particular, he wrote that “the local population was convinced that the settlers were certainly not “cannibals”, normal in communication, peaceful, and then began to settle Korean families in their places—some provided a separate room in a house, others provided space in their good solid sheds, helped them to install a stove they could cook on and that would keep the place warm. In such critical conditions such real qualities of ordinary people as kindness and generosity appear”. (Tsoi 2016: 9).

of houses, using collective farm transport at will, unauthorized salary cuts for Korean collective farmers, stealing money from the budget show the level of lawlessness of local authorities.

5 Conclusions

Long time in the CIS countries (including Russia) the losses of Korean population during the deportation were considered as results brought by central authorities of USSR.⁵⁷ Undoubtedly, the death of most people during the forced move from the Far East to Central Asia lays on the conscience of Moscow organizers of the first ethnic mass deportation. Although, as we can see, the majority of deaths among Koreans in the first year of deportation has had another reason—actions and inactions of authorities of republics in Central Asia regarding the migrants.

However, despite numerous facts of arbitrariness regarding them from the side of administration of Kazakhstan and heavy losses, the Koreans were able to survive and even rise. They were able to rebuild quite quickly and adapt to the new living conditions. Although, it cost them great losses.

Evaluation of our study shows that, in its essence, the Korean deportation had mixed outcomes. In one of the previously published works was indicated that this process also had economic goals.⁵⁸ But as a result, this deportation has mostly brought losses to the country. Economic benefits from relocation of the Koreans in the Far Eastern region (confiscation of property and livestock, transport of active peasants to Central Asia) could not cover huge financial costs for settlers in Kazakhstan. The reasons of that were actions of authorities in Central Asia (corruption, arbitrariness, requests for allocation of new financial investments in 1939 to compensate their actions and so on) as well as unaccounted additional expenses (i.e. buying a fishing fleet for the settlers, additional transportation of population and so on).

In spite of NKVD general Chernyshov wrote about many mistakes and facts of lawlessness of regional authorities to deportees on example of Korean people in the Central Asia, Soviet government did not note this important information and created same problems again in the processes of later deportation of the Soviet population. Reasons for this will be considered and analysed in other works.

57 Kim 1999, Bugai 1994.

58 Kim 2012.

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