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## Soviet Koreans and Far Eastern NKVD in the 1930s

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### Abstract

The period of 1930s in Soviet history is one from the most discussed in the contemporary Russian historiography. Therefore, Russian and foreign specialists conduct a large number of studies on this topic, and process archive data in order to search for new information. Their attitude towards repression is not unambiguous. Despite the large number of publications on this topic, there are still some areas that are unrobed by researchers. One of them is the relationship of NKVD and the Korean diaspora in the Soviet Far East. As is known, NKVD deported Soviet Koreans from the Far East to Central Asia in 1937. However, this question is complicated and accompanied struggles in regional NKVD. The aim of our work is to consider and analyze the relationship of the local NKVD and party organization to the Korean diaspora in the southern part of the Soviet Far East before ethnic deportation.

**Keywords** Stalin repressions · Resistance · Local authorities · Far East · Korean diaspora · NKVD

### Introduction

Korean diaspora in the Russian Far East existed from the nineteenth century. Soviet Koreans took part in the Russian Civil War on the Red side and positively considered Bolshevik policy. However, the first victims of ethnic repressions in USSR were Soviet Koreans. In 1937, this ethnic group was deported in the Central Asia. But incident of 1937 was a final act of different processes of resistance against this deportation in the local party organization and NKVD. We must note the Soviet Koreans received support

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not only from regional NKVD, but from members of the party organization too. Our article is the first work that considers relations between Soviet Koreans and representatives of local NKVD and party at that time. However, position of Far Eastern NKVD had main role. We shall consider it later.

## Literature Review

The subject of Stalin repressions is very popular not only among Russian scholars, but also in the international scientific community. A large number of scientific papers have been written on various aspects of these processes. Many of them were associated with events in the Far East, both in Russian [8, 9, 13, 20, 21] and in other languages [22, 25, 26, 28, 29]. Many research works on this topic have been translated from Russian into English [27, 30].

In the course of research conducted by both Russian and foreign authors, a number of important aspects of repressions were examined—from collectivization, purging in the army and party, to national deportations. Also, studies on these processes were conducted in the NKVD—the main mechanism of repressive measures during Stalin's ruling period. But at the same time, the processes that took place in Moscow and the central cities of the country were mainly affected. The specifics of the repressions in the regions were usually linked to the events in the central office of the NKVD and were limited to mentioning the processes or the names of the participants. Therefore, the studies of this subject were limited—usually Russian scholars considered repressions in the Far East in the connections with situation in Moscow.

On the other hand, repressive processes in the Far Eastern NKVD were on the research periphery. The monograph of A. S. Sutorin, the Soviet journalist of the 1980s, stands apart. He collected archival materials from the State Archive of the Khabarovsk region which were declassified at that time, and published his “Delo kraevogo mashtaba” on its basis.<sup>1</sup> But at the same time, he did not set the analysis of these processes as his task, as well as their connection with the resistance of the population. We can see the same thing in the few works of other historians that consider repressions inside the regional NKVD [10, 11].

Therefore, we believe that this work can make an important contribution to the study of the power structures of the USSR in the Stalin period and the specifics of their resistance to demands coming from the center.

Alexander Kim already considered the process of the Korean deportation in several academic articles [15, 23, 24]. But he in these works did not concentrate attention on the situation in the NKVD on the Korean question. However, it was an important part of the repressive policy of the state in the region.

## Resistance of the Local Bodies of the NKVD and the Party

This is most clearly seen in their relation to the deportation of Far Eastern Soviet Koreans in 1937. Researchers noted that the forced deportation of the Korean population did not go smoothly—hundreds of government officials were removed from their

<sup>1</sup> But Sutorin died before publication of his work.

positions for “characterlessness,” “negligence,” “lack of discipline,” “lack of administrative abilities,” “political myopia,” “for failure...,” “mistakes,” and etc. Many of the communists lost their membership cards, officials lost their positions, and some of them were arrested and sent to the Gulag camps.

For example, by the decisions of the Dalkraikom bureau dated September 10, 1937, “for the failure to meet the deadlines for loading Koreans into the echelons, Senko, the first secretary of the Posyet district party committee, was dismissed and put to justice, severe reprimands were announced to a number of region and oblast leaders, and regional and district troikas were warned that in case of failure to fulfill on time the decisions of the Central Committee on the deportation of Koreans and untimely preparations for relocation, severe measures will be taken” [1, 16: 207–208].

But at the same time, researchers did not pay attention to the reasons for such behavior of local authorities. It is difficult to imagine that hundreds of people in leadership positions were simply incompetent in their work, although before that there was no doubt about their administrative abilities. The Far Eastern region was a border region where there were trusted people in the leadership, and they were able to make quick and responsible decisions. In addition, they were checked by the severe everyday life of collectivization and dekulakization, when rigidity and decisiveness were the key to the success of administrative work at that difficult time.

Most of them went through the hardship of the Civil War, which dragged on in the Far East—while the Civil War in most regions of the country had already ended by 1920, in the Far East, it continued until 1923. The same thing goes for foreign intervention—foreign troops left the territory of most Russian provinces in 1920, but in the Far East, Japanese soldiers left the Soviet territory only in 1925.

Therefore, these veterans were not only experienced leaders, but also devoted members of the Communist Party with great experience. We believe that the basis for their sabotage was in fact the Korean deportation. It was also completed by dissatisfaction with the continuous collectivization which took place with excesses and numerous mistakes as in all Soviet regions. And this was conducted on condition that the Soviet government normatively fixed compensation payments for deportees (which by the way were not fulfilled) [4: 27–33, 40–41]. In addition, we consider this system of punishments for representatives of the local administration as one of the final acts of resistance to repression by the region governing bodies. The reasons for this are given below.

As it was previously mentioned, the bulk of the workers in these structures were the people most trusted by the state. First of all, this concerns the veterans (mainly from the command staff) of the Civil War, who fought on the side of the Bolsheviks. It should be noted that Koreans took an active part in partisan activities during the struggle against the White Guards and foreign intervention, primarily against the Japanese troops. Even after the Civil War, the Korean population in the Far East actively supported Soviet power, selflessly fought for it in Northeast China (a vivid example of this is the Soviet Korean and red commander Kim Yucheng, who died in the battles for the Chinese Eastern Railway (KVZhD). The street in Khabarovsk was renamed in his honor).

Therefore, for most of the Civil War veterans who fought on the side of the Reds, Korean activists were comrades-in-arms who went with them through the bloody events of the Civil War. Unlike most other regions of the Soviet Union, the Far East survived a longer period of the Civil War and foreign intervention (as previously

presented, Japanese troops left North Sakhalin only in 1925). For this reason, relations between war veterans in the Far East were more stable. In addition, the first forced deportation on ethnic grounds in the USSR was contrary to the principle of peoples' equality, which was proclaimed by the Bolsheviks at the beginning of the revolution (By the way, this principle became the main reason for the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Civil War). This principle has been observed in the country for more than 10 years. Therefore, we believe that its shameless contravention by the authorities also became the reason why Civil War veterans who worked in the local administration began to interfere with the deportation of Koreans.

Of course, this was not the only reason for their sabotage, but it turned out to be one of the leading ones. In addition, this was the first deportation on a national basis, and the authorities, despite propaganda in the media, could not convincingly present it as a necessity to both the population and the local administration. If the authorities managed to present persecution of the former White Guards and the prosperous part of the peasantry as necessary measures for the development of a socialist society, this did not work out with ethnic deportation. This was the result of opposition of local officials. Consequently, the state was forced to apply sanctions against them.

Returning to the local resistance of the Far Eastern local administration, it should be noted that a significant part of its opposition to collectivization was comparatively passive, in contrast to countering the ethnic deportation of Koreans. Undoubtedly, local leaders who tried to stop deportation through light sabotage showed great civic courage. But it was not reflected in the scientific works of modern researchers.

On the one hand, against the backdrop of global repressions of that time, the punishment of hundreds of communists in the Far Eastern Territory seems insignificant. Moreover, it did not lead to mass executions. But on the other hand, none of the researchers went into the details of the reasons for their sabotage. Therefore, the description of their activities is very poor.

However, in archival materials, there are references to the struggle against the local administration, which prevented the deportation of Koreans. In particular, Stalin wrote to I.M. Vareikis, V.K. Blukher, and G.S. Lyushkov about the deportation of Koreans: "Everything shows that the deportation of Koreans is quite overdue. It is possible that we are a little late with this case... People who sabotage the case, whoever they are should be arrested immediately and punished exemplary. Arrest not only Volskij (one of the largest party officials in the leadership of the Far Eastern Territory – author's note), but dozens of Volskij. Tell Druskis that an exemplary reprisal will be inflicted against him if he does not show appropriate sense of duty and discipline" [2: 23]. Such stiffness in the message of Stalin, apparently, was due to the fact that he was already aware of the resistance of the local administration.

However, the situation with the leadership of the regional NKVD was completely different. Of course, the representatives of this department themselves also carried out repressions, and sometimes on a large scale. But they lived in the Far Eastern region and had a good idea of how the excessive policy of collectivization and kulaks dispossession could end up for their region—as demonstrated by the Soviet Koreans and Russian Old Believers

who abandoned their lands and left for China en masse. So, in particular, in the early 1930s (that is at the beginning of the collectivization process) in Shkotovo and Suchan districts, up to 60% of the Korean population went to Chinese territory, in Grodekovo district—50%, in Chernigovka one—45%, and etc. [3: 78–79].

This led to a catastrophic situation with food on the regional territory. Therefore, local authorities began to ask the center for help [5: 62–62ob].

For the entire Soviet Far East, the territory of modern Primorye region at that time was the food granary—most of the products that fed other territories were grown here. As we see, the mass withdrawal of Korean farmers not only created a food shortage in the south of the modern Russian Far East, but also affected those regions that were receiving stable supplies from the south. This became the reason for a more cautious approach to the village by the party and the regional NKVD in the future.

### **The Opinion of V.K. Arsenyev**

In addition, the local NKVD officers, as well as representatives of the local administration, were quite tough on the positions of internationalism proclaimed by the Soviet government. We believe that this was one of the reasons for their negative attitude towards V.K. Arsen'ev—the man who did a lot for the Russian development of the modern territory of the Primorye region. After the Civil War, he came over to the Bolsheviks' side. But, in fact, Arsen'ev remained a man of tsarist Russia, with its racial and national prejudices, which he was not going to change. First of all, it concerns the attitude towards the East Asian peoples.

As far back as 1914, he wrote that “One cannot count on the Russification of the Chinese. I will say more - it would be naive! It is known that all the “yellow” are amenable to assimilation by Europeans. In this regard, they have some special aggressive power. I have never seen a Russified Chinese, I saw christened Chinese, but not Russified. The fact that a Chinese is a Christian I learned only when he told me about it himself. The Chinese Christian does not change neither in the system of life, nor in customs, nor in clothing, nor in habits. And no matter what efforts are used, the Chinese will forever remain Chinese” [6]. He had a similar attitude to other peoples of East Asia. In the 1920s, his attitude to this issue had not changed—for him, all residents of East Asia remained a “yellow danger.” But at the same time, he completely did not take into account the policy of the Soviet government in the national question because it did not interest him.

This was reflected in his report to the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) on non-Slavic peoples in the Far East in 1928 [7]. It shows that the position of V.K. Arsenyev did not change—moreover, he insisted on the deportation of Koreans and Chinese and those peoples who were associated with them from the Far East. The facts that Dersu Uzala, the man who once saved Arsen'ev's life, was a native of Golds, and the fact that many Chinese and Koreans treated him evidently did not bother the famous Russian traveler.

We will not touch on the moral aspect of V.K. Arsen'ev's views on the racial question, since this topic is beyond the scope of this article.

As is known, this famous traveler maintained contact with many of the White Movement emigrants who also held openly racist views. Moreover, many of them lived in the neighborhood with the Ussuriysk region—in the territory of Northeast China, in particular, in Harbin. It goes without saying, the active participation of the Chinese and Koreans in the Civil War on the side of the Bolsheviks did not please this former officer of the tsarist army. Therefore, local NKVD officers always kept him in mind. His contacts with the white emigration, in particular, with representatives of the same ROVS<sup>2</sup> and other White Guard organizations,<sup>3</sup> hostile to the USSR, as well as the report of 1928, attracted even more close attention to him from the NKVD.

This report by Arsen'ev was in line with the goals of the NKVD center in Moscow which had long been discussing the issue of the deportation of Chinese and Koreans from the south of the Far East. But the regional NKVD administration had a different opinion on this issue.

And this was not connected with any mercy or pity on the Koreans (in 1933, Deribas sentenced 3 Korean students of the party school, that were later rehabilitated, to be shot [21], and disbanded 2 Korean national regiments from OKDVA in 1935 [14], thereby had weakened the region's defense) —they understood perfectly what the mass deportation of gardeners threatened to the Far Eastern region with.

In addition, more and more military contingents continued to arrive in the Far East, whose food supply from local resources was very acute. The employees of this structure began to prepare a case against Arsen'ev which was not completed even after his death in 1930, although until 1928, no complaints against him arose from law enforcement agencies of the region. Many of his associates suffered during the repression.

Thus, in 1933, the arrests of scientists according to the “Autonomous Kamchatka” case began. The NKVD officers considered V.K. Arsen'ev to be the head of this mythical organization. He died in 1930, that is, several years before the start of repression on this organization. But this did not bother the people of T.D. Deribas in organizing the trial, and they arrested his widow [14]. According to the plans of the Chekists, this organization advocated the separation of Kamchatka from the USSR. This process affected many representatives of the intelligentsia for various reasons—(1) some of them were the ardent supporters of Arsen'ev's ideas, (2) some of the repressed ones had relatives abroad, and (3) those who had ever opposed the Soviet authorities.

<sup>2</sup> ROVS—Russian All-Military Union. It was founded in 1924. It united in its ranks the White Guards hostile to the Soviet regime. The main slogan of the organization was the struggle against communism, as well as the indivisibility and unity of Russia. Before World War II, the ROVS was the largest organization of Russian emigration, and at the time of its creation, the union totaled up to 100 thousand members. Many members of the ROVS took part in the Civil War in Spain on the side of the Franco regime, in World War II—on the side of Nazi Germany against the Allies. The ROVS policy is not approved by all of the emigrant organizations. After the 1940s, the organization practically did not make its presence felt. The ROVS began to show itself again in the 1990s, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In 2014–2017, members of the ROVS participated in military operations in Ukraine—in particular, their units fought against the Ukrainian troops in the army of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic.

<sup>3</sup> In the late 1930s, they will create a number of Russian fascist parties on the territory of Manchuria with the patronage and support of the Japanese colonial authorities.



## The Role of the Korean Diaspora in the Economic and Political Life of the Far Eastern Region

We believe that the reason for this opposition to the Moscow representatives was as follows. T.D. Deribas<sup>4</sup> and his team realized collectivization and dekulakization in the Far East in 1930 and, most likely, understood what the deportation of two hundred thousand Koreans from his region threatened with. In addition to vegetable starvation in the region (the vast majority of Soviet Koreans were gardeners), this threatened with the reduction of Far Eastern Territory population, which was already scarce. Another problem was the food supply of the army stationed in the region.

The Korean diaspora in the south of the Far East had long been engaged in agriculture and supplied many agricultural products. In tsarist times, Koreans lived semi-isolated due to the discriminatory policies of the authorities. The victory of the Soviet regime gave opportunities for immigrants from the Land of Morning Freshness to participate in the political life of the country. In addition, the Soviets guaranteed the preservation of cultural characteristics to all national minorities in the country. Therefore, in the south of the Far East, there were educational institutions, cultural centers, press, and theater. The bulk of the Korean population retained their traditions in many ways (holidays, customs, language, culture, etc.), but the most educated Koreans had already entered the power structures of the region.

The issue of the deportation of Koreans from the Far East had been discussed for a long time. Many party leaders expressed anxiety about the fact that Japanese spies might seep into the country through Koreans in the south of the Far Eastern Territory. In all appearances, the head of the Far Eastern Chekists understood this problem, so he and his deputy (Zapadnyj)<sup>5</sup> raised the question of creating living conditions for Koreans in the Khabarovsk region [12]. Such a settlement could close the question of the mass resettlement of Koreans in other regions of the country.

In addition, Koreans were already an essential part of Far Eastern society—they worked not only in executive committees, but also in the NKVD, and they were in good standing in these structures. So, in particular, a Korean employee of this structure,

<sup>4</sup> Deribas Terentij Dmitrievich (1883–1938)—famous participant of the Russian revolution 1917, old Bolshevik, officer of VChK, OGPU and NKVD. He was a participant of Russian revolution 1905–1907. In 1920s, he worked in the Secret Department of OGPU USSR. In 1931, Deribas became member of collegiums OGPU–NKVD. From October 1933, he supervised the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway by prisoners. His successful work in this object was positively estimated by Moscow and in July 10, 1934, Deribas received two new posts—Head of local NKVD in the Far East and Head of Special Department in the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. In July 31, 1937, he was removed from all posts and in August 12 arrested and blamed in “espionage, sympathy for Trotskyism and the organization of a number of conspiracies in the NKVD and the Red Army”. Later he was deported in Moscow for intensive interrogations. In July 28, 1938, Deribas was sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR to death. He was shot in the same day in polygon “Kommunarka” near Moscow (it was the place of death of some dozen thousand repressed people). In 1957, the case of Deribas was reconsidered and in December 31, he was posthumously rehabilitated and reinstated in the KPSS. The case of Deribas is rare in itself, because almost all participants of Stalin repressions in the 1930s, who had high-level positions, usually are not subjects to rehabilitation.

<sup>5</sup> Zapadnyj (Kesselman) Semen Izrailevich (1899–1938)—participant of the First World and Russian Civil wars, since 1919 in VChK, commissar of state security of the 3rd rank, member of the Bolshevik party from 1918. Until 1928, he served in Ukraine, from 1928—in the Soviet Far East. Zapadnyj was arrested in August 1937 and was shot in February 1938. By Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR from April 28, 1980, he was rehabilitated posthumously due to lack of corpus delicti.

Pak Sen Hun, participated in the interrogations of K. A. Harnskij<sup>6</sup> the famous specialist in Japanese studies, and other persons from academic world [19].<sup>7</sup> Such investigative matters were considered important and only trusted people were allowed to access them. According to eyewitnesses, even after the deportation of compatriots, many Korean security officers were on the side of the forced deportation to Central Asia and continued their work in the organs. This indicates the following.

First is their important positions in the regional NKVD. Secondly, despite the purges carried out by Moscow brigades, the regional NKVD still remained strong in the second half of the 1930s and could afford to protect at least part of its employees. This is confirmed by its stubborn struggle with G. S. Lyushkov, when he began to work on the side of Japan against his homeland.<sup>8</sup> By the way, the Red Army was unable to protect its Korean officers. Most of them were sent to the torture chambers of the NKVD, and were shot for the most part [17, 18]. In addition, the raids of Korean partisans in Manchuria and Korea allowed the NKVD to receive valuable information about the situation of the future enemy. The Moscow commissions stayed in the Far East temporarily, and they carried out punitive actions and then went to the west. And the local Chekists had to solve the problems that remained and even multiplied after the “guests”. Certainly Deribas did not like this situation but Moscow had its own estimations.

### Activity by Lyushkov

In the end of July 1937, Stalin decided to send a new operative group in Khabarovsk with Head G.S. Lyushkov, who must change Deribas in the post of the Head of regional NKVD. Up to that time, Lyushkov had good results in provision of the repressive processes in the Rostov region, and his activity was highly estimated by People’s Commissar N.E. Ezhov.<sup>9</sup> Even Stalin gave him private audience before trip in Khabarovsk. Lyushkov arrive in the Far East with big group of officers from Rostov, these persons have loyalty directly to him. New appointment can give him important perspective; therefore, he had interest to support mass repressions in the region.

In his indictment trials, Lyushkov tried to link all the groups of the repressed (who were innocent, but “confessed” everything under torture and blackmail) into one system, and even the connections in these processes were clearly far-fetched. Here is one example—a message from Lyushkov to Yezhov: “Being in a responsible leadership post in the region, VOLSKIJ by all means helped to settle the Primorye region

<sup>6</sup> Harnskij Konstantin Andreevich (1884–1938) was a Russian hereditary noble, was born in the family of officer, and was an active participant of the Russian Civil War in the Red side. He was one of the best orientlists in the Soviet State. In the summer of 1937, Harnskij was arrested on charges of involvement in espionage and sabotage activities. Later he received blame in spying for Japan. This case was not only for one person, because not only Harnskij was blamed, but for other professors and scholars too. This process was famous in the Far East. In April 25, 1938, he was sentenced to death and executed. In 1957, Harnskij was rehabilitated.

<sup>7</sup> Pak Sen Hun 1989. In 1940s. Pak Sen Hun worked in the 88th brigade, and he was a personal curator of Kim Il Sung—future Head of North Korea.

<sup>8</sup> About which we plan to say more in our forthcoming article, provisionally titled—Lushkov against NKVD: history of one treason.

<sup>9</sup> Nikolaj Nikolaevich Ezhov (1895–1940) —Head of NKVD in 1937–1938. He was an author of most famous repressive acts in the USSR. He was shot in 1940.

with Koreans and complete the economic seizure of Primorye, select the appropriate staff of nationalist-minded Koreans for responsible posts. VOLSKIJ mentions Afanasij KIM, with whom Lavrentyev was connected, as a large Japanese resident in the Korean regions. KIM is a secretary of the District Committee of the CPSU (b) [in] Posyet. In his Nos. 7900 and 07905 [reports] dated 10 / IX he reported on DERIBAS' evidence that according to Lavrent'ev's task to save Afanasij KIM in connection with the arrest. During the audit, I found that at the end of 1935 the c.-r., so-called Shanghai group, in which 18 people were arrested including Afanasij KIM and other large Korean workers were arrested, was liquidated. During the investigation Afanasij KIM, Lyu-Kyu-Sen and others began to show that they discussed the issue of the allocation of Korean districts to the autonomous region. Lyu-Kyu-Sen stated that Lavrent'ev had one meeting in his apartment, and there they were distributing ministerial posts, etc. However, on the instructions of Barminskij<sup>10</sup> everything was turned into a joke, the matter was turned off, sent to the Special Conference, and they all escaped having got exile and camp" [1:207–208].

These reports of Lyushkov show his complete incompetence and warped judgment in many matters. His own ignorance in the history of the region resulted in accusations against Volskij that he "by all means contributed to the settlement of Primorye by Koreans and the complete economic seizure of Primorye." Although Koreans massively moved to the territory of the modern south of the modern Far East as far back as the nineteenth century (that is, long before the birth of Volskij and Lyushkov himself), gardening was their traditional occupation. In order to destroy everyone who, in his opinion, might disagree with his point of view, Lyushkov falsified the facts—in particular, he came up with the anti-Soviet organization "Shanghai Group," etc. Now it is hard to imagine what Lyushkov meant by "nationalist-minded" elements, but, taking into consideration his behavior at that time, it was difficult to expect any objective and adequate assessment from him. But, in fact, in this regard, he acted like many other assistants of Yagoda and Yezhov—not to think, but to fulfill what they were ordered to. Moreover, the search and illegality of any of their actions in the course of the repressive policy were not punishable. We believe that he did not completely understand what his actions threaten in the region. But as a result of all these processes, Moscow Chekists were able to conduct a series of deportations on national and social grounds in the territory of the region. Due to all these punitive actions of the Moscow NKVD commissions, the region received big problems in a number of aspects, which were subsequently resolved over the course of decades, and not always successfully. In addition to undermined agriculture and large losses in the region's population, the Lyushkov team inflicted great damage on the army and the local NKVD structure.

<sup>10</sup> Barminskij Sergej Arsentievich (1900–1938) —senior major of state security (1936), and commissar of state security of the 3rd rank. One from founders of the football club Dinamo (Kiev)—most famous and titled football team in the Soviet Union. Participant of the October revolution and Russian Civil wars. Served in Moscow, Ukraine, on Romanian border. Last work place—Head of the 5th Department of NKVD of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Barminskij was arrested in August 9, 1937 and shot in February 10, 1938.

Only after it Moscow commission of NKVD can start deportation of Korean population from Far East. But it is subject for another work.

## Conclusion

As we can see, officers of the local NKVD tried to defend Soviet Koreans from deportation before the arrival of the Moscow commissions. They searched for options against deportation (like, Deribas and Zapadnyj) or closed repressive processes against them, if it was not serious (like, Barminskij).

Of course, it was not a result of any mercy or pity on the Koreans—Soviet Far East needed them for economic and political reasons. Therefore, local NKVD had interest to support them until mid-1930s.

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## Compliance with Ethical Standards

**Conflict of Interest** The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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